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ESSIEN-IBOK, ASIKPO J.

ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY: A
QUANTITATIVE METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

Howard University

PH.D.

1980

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HOWARD UNIVERSITY

ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF NIGERIA'S
FOREIGN POLICY: A QUANTITATIVE
METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Faculty
of the Graduate School

of

HOWARD UNIVERSITY

in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the
degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of Political Science

by

Asikpo Essien-Ibok

Washington, D.C.
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The specificity of the subject matter demanded that a quantitative methodologist should oversee my work in addition to Dr. Okolo. I am indebted to Dr. Winston Cox, who filled that position. He gave me the initial impetus in quantitative methodology in the Political Science Department. He also left before this research came to a logical conclusion.

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in his department right from my first year in graduate economics to the dissertation stage in the Political Science Department. He has given me all the assistance I ever asked of him.

As much as I would like to share my errors, omissions and commissions, all the qualitative and quantitative work reported here is solely and wholly my responsibility.

Dedicated to Dr. Ducarmel Bocage.

ABSTRACT

ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS OF NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY:

A QUANTITATIVE METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

This study is an inquiry concerning the functional relationships of the economic determinants of Nigeria's foreign policy. We posit that significant changes in the fundamental attribute of a major continental power (Nigeria) will affect the behavior of that nation towards other nations and thus alter the overall relations among other major powers.

Such an inquiry will contribute to our knowledge of foreign policy correlates, which in turn if effectively utilized will have an autonomous effect on the perceived power of Nigeria. It will provide a theoretical construct for the macro-metric power weight formulation of the Third World. The application of the econometric models to build this theory will carry the discipline of foreign policy a step further away from the traditional end of the spectrum, and a discernible degree closer to the scientific end.

We approached the study from two methodological levels. The first was an empirical (qualitative) analysis that utilized the aggregate data of history and economics to delineate the structural development of the foreign policy output. The second level was quantitative. We

screened and codified the qualitative data we thus obtained, utilizing econometric models to test our argument based on the economic determinants of foreign policy.

FINDINGS

The variations in foreign policy in the period 1960-1977 are linearly related to the changes in the gross national product, export, capital outflow, and petroleum production; and inversely related to the balance of payment, gross national product per capita and foreign reserve. Diplomatic personnel and the support for wars of national liberation in Southern Africa, correlate positively with the economic growth indicators.

Nigeria's economic insurgency has generated a quasi-economic and political independence that has a positive functional relationship with the evolving political consciousness and economic interdependence of the African nations. The growing political activism for the decolonization of the colonial enclaves in Africa and the formation of economic regionalism -- (ECOWAS) Economic Cooperation of West African States exemplify this achievement.

The re-alignment of the United States' African policy in the 1970's, the socialist revolution in Angola and Mozambique in 1975, and the decolonization of

Rhodesia were to a large extent influenced or made possible by the economic potentialities of Nigeria. Nigeria's aggressive foreign policy in the 1970's has radicalized politics in the African politectonic zone.

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INTRODUCTION

The strength of a nation and the cluster of its power in national and international affairs rises in conformity with the subterranean rhythms of its economic growth, followed by political and military currents. Nigeria tends to exhibit these characteristic features in the decade of the seventies.

NATURE AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Between 1960 and 1977, the Gross National Product (GNP) at constant 1970 prices, has increased more than six-fold (from \$5 billion to \$34 billion) and continues to increase at an annual GNP growth rate of 10 percent.¹ National income per capita has accelerated from \$100 in 1960 to over \$400 in 1977. Savings and investment expressed as a proportion of the GNP increased from 5 and 10 percent respectively in 1960, to about 25 percent each in 1977.²

¹ Wouter Tims, Nigeria: Options for Long Term Development World Bank Country Economic Report (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1974), pp. 1-6. See also Theophilus Olatunde Odetoca, Military Politics in Nigeria: Economic Development and Political Stability (New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1978), pp. 109-141.

² Federal Office of Statistics, Nigeria's Principal Economic and Financial Indicators (Lagos, Nigeria, 1977), pp. 2-15.

Today, Nigeria ranks as the fifth largest producer of world crude petroleum. Revenue from oil totalled \$20 million in 1960 and exceeded \$7 billion³ in 1977. Nigeria has advanced from the stage in 1960, when the average daily production was about 5,100 barrels⁴, to 2.4 million barrels per day (bpd).

The first national development plan (1962-1968) budgeted \$3.1 billion, the second provided for \$10 billion, and the third (1975-1980) ambitiously called for \$60 billion, a large increase from the second.⁵

Concurrent with the rise in economic growth is the increased interaction in international affairs. Nigeria has supported, financially and militarily, the struggle for national liberation, from Guinea Bissau to Equatorial Guinea. In Mozambique, in 1975, Nigeria supported FRELIMO in its struggle against Portuguese colonialism. In Zimbabwe, Namibia, and the Horn of Africa, she has taken a radical and aggressive stance in support of the struggle for the complete eradication of colonialism, racism and

³ Federal Office of Statistics, Nigeria's Principal Economic and Financial Indicators, p. 10.

⁴ African Progress Magazine, African Investors and Placement Services, Inc. (U.S.A., April, 1973), p. 30.

⁵ Sayre P. Schatz, Nigerian Capitalism (Los Angeles: Univeristy of California Press, 1977), p. 363.

neo-colonialism in the respective territories.⁶ It has been conjectured that Nigerian troops fought along with Cuban troops in Angola.⁷ With the Organization for African Unity (OAU) and the Economic Cooperation of West African States (ECOWAS) Nigeria has shown symbolic gestures of providing effective leadership in the 1970's.⁸

Nigeria has become an aid donor, though a modest one. Nigeria has given interest free loans to several African countries (See Chapter Five) in the seventies. She has loaned the World Bank \$240 million at 8 percent interest, and \$120 million to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to help finance oil credits for the developing countries, who were affected by the oil crisis of 1973.⁹ With the European Economic Community and the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, she has influenced the allocation and distribution of loans and aid from those institutions to the Third World, particularly to the poor

⁶ Guy Arnold, Modern Nigeria (London: Longmans Group Ltd., 1977), pp. 133-143.

⁷ See West Africa, (London, October 24, 1977), and James H. Polhemus, "Nigeria and Southern Africa: Interest Policy and Means", Revue Canadienne Des Etudes Africaines, Vol. XI, No. 1, 1977, pp. 43-66.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Nigerian-American Economic Relations (Washington: Embassy of Nigeria Publication), pp. 83-85.

African nations.¹⁰

Given the level of her economic development,¹¹ in relation to the increased interaction in the international system in the 1970's, could we establish the relationship between the two variables? If we could, what is the nature of the relationship? Is the relationship linear or curvilinear? Or is it causal? If linear or causal or both, how do changes in one affect the other?

THE PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

The purpose of this study is to investigate more precisely and to scientifically establish, the functional relationships between Nigeria's economic development and its foreign policy output. Such a research inquiry will contribute to our knowledge of foreign policy correlates, which in turn, if effectively utilized, will have an autonomous effect on the elements of national power.

The a priori assumption is that economic development is Nigeria's primary objective. With an average growth rate of about 10 percent of the GNP per annum in the 1970's,

¹⁰ See Olajide Aluko, Nigeria's Role in Inter-African Relations, with special reference to the Organization for African Unity in African Affairs.

¹¹ Development in this context is used synonymously with economic growth, unless otherwise stated or defined.

her sphere of influence has expanded, and her leadership role has inevitably transcended her territorial boundaries. Her wealth (economic) has transformed African diplomacy in international politics. It has transformed her economy and her foreign policy. The study of this dialectical transformation, is what this research is dedicated to.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Much has been written on the development of Nigerian foreign policy. Some of the writers are: (L. Gray Cowan, 1962;¹² James Coleman, 1963;¹³ Claude Phillips, 1964;¹⁴ and Gordon Idang, 1971¹⁵). Their works are basically descriptive. They delineate the institutional

¹² L. Gray Cowan, "Nigerian Foreign Policy", ed., Robert O. Tilman and Taylor Cole, The Nigerian Political Scene (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1972), p. 125.

¹³ See James Coleman, "The Foreign Policy of Nigeria", ed., Joseph E. Black and Kenneth Thompson, ed., Foreign Policies in a World of Change, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1962).

¹⁴ See Claude Phillips, The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964).

¹⁵ G. Idang, "The Politics of Nigerian Foreign Policy: The Ratification and Renunciation of the Angola-Nigerian Defense Agreement", African Studies Review XIII, No. 2, September, 1970, pp. 227-257.

processes that are involved in the development of foreign policy. The parliamentary democracy operating in the republican government of Nigeria, they agree, gave the opposition party as much privilege and right as the ruling party in foreign policy formulation. That competition and rivalry developed into unhealthy politics and a state of confusion as to, "What is Nigeria's foreign policy?" It was in a description of that state of confusion that Claude Phillips made an assertion that, Nigeria had no foreign policy.

Gordon Idang tried to explain the "no foreign policy era" through the weaknesses in the constitutional federalism which he said, gave more power to the regions than to the center. James Coleman observed the dualism¹⁶ in the input process that constantly constrained effective foreign policy formulation. Both agree that the breakdown of the First Republic stemmed from the ineffective, contradictory nature of the domestic policies.

Other writers are the analysts -- (A.B. Akinyemi, 1970; Olajide Aluko, 1971; John Stremlau, 1977). Aluko

¹⁶ Dualism refers to the conflicting roles played by the traditional and the modernized branches of the political system. The roles of the traditional chiefs conflicted with the roles of the elected members of the House of Assembly.

analyzed the pre and post republic foreign policy of Nigeria and saw the state of relations to be pro-British. The reasons for this, he said, were heavily embedded in Nigeria's political, economic, and cultural relationships with Britain, which in themselves, were rooted in colonial history.¹⁷ The use of a common language (English) as a lingua franca by both nations, he maintained, became an element of shared common culture that attracted each one to the other. Aluko saw Nigeria's gigantic economic, social, and political programs to be highly dependent on British expertise and technology transfer,¹⁸ which pre-supposes a healthy political relationship between the two nations.

Stremlau researched the historical perspective of the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1969) with its international political ramifications. His historical account concerns us very little here, but his analysis of the pre-war foreign policy arouses our interest. Nigeria, he said,

¹⁷ Olajide Aluko, "Nigeria and Britain After Gonon", in African Affairs, July 1977, Vol. 76, pp. 303-320.

¹⁸ Ibid.

"sought unabashedly to maintain close relations with Britain and other Western governments."¹⁹ Western foreign aid and investment, he said, contributed significantly to the 5.7 percent annual economic growth rate between 1960 and 1966.²⁰ In addition to foreign aid, 85 percent of Nigeria's exports were sold to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OCED) and close to 75 percent of Nigeria's imports came from that group.²¹ Unlike Aluko, Stremlau sees the political linkages developing along the economic nexus between Nigeria and OECD.

Akinyemi²² stressed the aspects of statecraft and political leadership style of the arch-rivalries, Ghana and Nigeria. He recognized that the domineering personality of Kwameh Nkrumah (Prime Minister of Ghana from 1957-1966) and Ghana's population of 8 million, coupled with a healthy economic situation at the time, provided for a faster political modernization in Ghana, as compared to Nigeria.

¹⁹ John Stremlau, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977), pp. 3-27.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid.

²² A.E. Akinyemi, Foreign Policy and Federalism: The Nigerian Experience (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1974), pp. 75-99, 149-190.

This modernization provided a greater leverage in Ghana's foreign policy formulation and conduct, than it did for Nigeria. While Nigeria was split by ethnic rivalries and loyalties, Ghana had little to worry about in terms of tribalism.

Almost all of the writers mentioned above have approached Nigerian foreign policy from a general perspective that is very orthodox in orientation. Each attempted to look at the domestic factors of foreign policy and their institutional components. None has tried to look at a specific factor and its general impact on foreign policy formulation. This thesis attempts to do that. But before we embark on that we shall review again some other literature that we think is relevant to our theoretical framework and conceptualization.

James Mayall²³ presented an article in African Affairs Magazine on "Oil and Nigerian Foreign Policy," in which he remarked that, "if oil has had any superficial impact, it lies in the opposite direction." What Mayall

²³ James Mayall, "Oil and Nigerian Foreign Policy" in African Affairs, July 1976, Vol. 75, pp. 317-331.

meant was, that oil has affected Nigeria's foreign policy indirectly, that is, basically through the government's development plans, which have attracted foreign private investment and thus have affected bilateral and multilateral foreign relations.

Mayall became skeptical about Nigeria's ability to affect such organizations as the Organization for African Unity on the grounds that:

1) Nigeria's incapacity to influence events in Africa emanates from her affinity to Britain and Western European trading partners (a point that Aluko and Stremlau have raised) in defiance of Nigeria's professed foreign policy of collective African unity, non-alignment and liberation;

2) That the declaration of sovereign equality and non-interference in the domestic affairs of states by the charter of the OAU, which Nigeria adheres to, deprives Nigeria of any assertive hegemonic role in global African politics.

Mayall's insightful observations delineated some of the major constraints placed upon the effective exercise of Nigerian foreign policy in the sixties. It is our position in this study, that the level of Nigeria's dependence on Britain (economically and politically) decreases, with the increase in the rate of Nigeria's

economic development in the seventies. The lessening of that dependence has generated an increase in multilateral economic and political interactions between Nigeria and the OAU (See Chapter Five). It is an undeniable fact that the principle of sovereign equality and non-interference in the domestic affairs of state is still a limitation. but Nigeria's African foreign policy does not raise an objection to the contrary.

Mayall sensed a conflict of interest and the existence of tensions, arising from Nigeria's alliance within the OAU and its solidarity with the OPEC, which controls much of the world's petroleum, at increasingly high prices, which the majority of the African countries can not afford. He pointed out that any policy that tends to consolidate Nigeria within the OPEC, might alienate the non-oil producing producing African states against Nigeria.

His predictive remark has motivated an inquiry into the capability, strengths, and limits of Nigeria's foreign policy. It is these attributes that we are researching. But we shall presently defer such investigations to the latter chapters of this thesis in order to keep up with the logic of our argument.

Theophilus O. Odetola's²⁴ work is a sociological analysis of the political and economic development in Nigeria from the civil war to the reconstruction. The author compared the first six years of the First Republic (or what he called the multiparty system) with the twelve years of the military interregnum and asserted that, "the military has been more efficient in the re-structuring of the economy through direct supervision of reporting and accountability than the multiparty system." He attributes the foreign policy successes (such as the Indigenization Decree and the Promotion Enterprise Decree) to the ingenuity of the military regime. He maintains that the multiparty system in Nigeria failed to develop new capabilities to handle increasing political demands, consequently, it resorted to highly repressive measures: crushing the opposition, jailing the opposition leadership, and rigging elections.²⁵

While Odetola's theoretical current descends from the intellectual tradition (of Samuel Huntington, 1968; Horowitz, 1971; Edward Shills, 1962; Lucien Pye, 1962; Janovitz Morris, 1971; David Rapaport, 1962; and Claude Welch, 1966) that views military autarchy as an agent

²⁴ Odetola, "Nigeria and Britain After Gowon", p. 8.

²⁵ Ibid.

of political modernization particularly in the developing countries, his conclusions are highly debatable. There is no doubt that economic development has taken place in Nigeria during the military regime, as Odetola has shown, but there is every doubt that the cause of that development has been the military.

To attribute the cause of the economic development to the military, is to confuse the cause with the effect. It is common knowledge that petroleum has been fundamentally responsible for the level of Nigeria's economic development and therefore, the cause. It is also uneconomic or rather non-logical, to infer that a non-productive sector such as the military, which consumes about 5 percent of the gross national product, is the cause of the economic development. If the variations in the military are explained by the changes in the GNP, then it is only logical that the military is a function of economic development. One of the effects of economic development is therefore reflected in a peace time military force of 350,000. The capability to maintain that military strength, lies, basically, in the economic strength that builds organized military capabilities.

It is acceptable to laud the good work of a government in power, when reasons justify such evaluation but the needs to establish objective criteria for such

evaluation and justification go beyond the need for the given orthodoxy. Especially, when that orthodoxy fails to stand the test of empirical truth. The truth remains that there has been economic development in Nigeria. Empiricism contributes to the logic of that truth. It also contributes to the invalidation of the premise that the military is the cause of Nigeria's economic development.

When we move away from Odetola to Andrew Kamarck²⁶ we shift from the specific to the general. That is, we move away from concentration in Nigeria (because nothing what so ever has been written on the economic determinants of Nigeria's foreign policy in specific) to Africa, in general. Andrew Kamarck, in "Economic Determinant's of African Foreign Policy", illustrates that the economic forces affecting politics and foreign policy are derived from: 1) the domestic structure of the economic system and the international linkages of the economic and the political system; 2) the objectives of the government and the people as to what form of government they want in relation to their external relationships, and; 3) the conflict between the first and the second.²⁷

²⁶ See Andrew Kamarck, "Economic Determinant's" in Vernon McKay, ed., African Diplomacy (New York: Frederick Praeger Publishers, 1966).

²⁷ Kamarck, "Economic Determinant's", pp. 55-67.

He characterized African economies as being highly dependent. African trade and investment, he said, are comparatively of little importance to the rest of the world.²⁸ Because African trade is less important, African states have little or no influence in international politics,²⁹ Kamarck believed. His contention is also, that even if the African countries are organized in a monolithic bloc in the United Nations Assembly, they could not use economic power (which they don't have) as a bludgeon to serve their political interests in the world arena.

When Kamarck treated African states as a monolithic bloc he certainly included Nigeria in that categorization. Like Mayall's deposition, which has gone before, Kamarck's proposition definitely raises another question -- whether Nigeria with all of her economic potentialities, can positively affect African politics? Kamarck's hypothesis, we are opportuned to investigate, but we shall investigate it with the understanding that we have ourselves made clear, that

²⁸ Kamarck, "Economic Determinant's", pp. 55-67.

²⁹ Ibid.

what is true for Nigeria may not necessarily be true for Africa in general. But our main concern is first to prove what is true for Nigeria.

Beyond Africa, there has been quite a few pieces of literature on economics and foreign policy written by Western and non-Western scholars. Most of what has been written on the economic determinants of foreign policy has some flavor of ideological propaganda, of the pre and post cold war era. Here, we have dichotomised the controversy (which is basically from two schools of thought) into the pluralist views and the marxist views.

Feliks Gross³⁰ (1954:24) styled economic determinants of foreign policy as being monocausal in approach and therefore, marxist. Gross is not alone. Most of the conservative and liberal democrats of the Western school of thought are behind him. They range from (J. Rosenau, 1974; N. Waltz, 1967; C. Macridis, 1976; Hoffman, 1971; K. Holsti, 1967; Hans Morgenthau, 1974; J. Stroessinger, 1969; J. D. Singer, 1976) international relations scholars to the comparativists who interpret economic factors of foreign policy to be literally a marxist or neo-marxist doctrinaire approach. They

³⁰ Feliks Gross, Foreign Policy Analysis (New York: Philosophical Library, 1954), pp. 31-37.

maintain that there are other interacting causal factors which carry relative weights as economics.

The theoreticians of war and its aspects (G. Blainey, 1975; L. Bransom and G. Goethals, 1968; M. Russett, 1972; Q. Wright, 1964; G. Pruitt and R. Synder, 1969; G. Storessinger and et. al.) view multiplicity of variables, ranging from socio-psychological, anthropological, economic causes and effects of war, whose elimination, reduction, or proliferation, victory or defeat is a major foreign policy concern of all nations. Quincy Wright in, *A Study of War*,³¹ analyzed causalities of six major wars, from the French Revolution to World War I, and concluded that war was political, technological, juro-ideological, socio-religious, and psycho-economic.

Then the political theorists (Arnold Brecht, 1970; Alvin Gouldner, 1970; Karl Deutsch, Max Weber, 1948; Talcott Parsons, 1949; et. al.) critiqued what they called economism or economic determinism. Alvin Gouldner posits that it is a unimodel,³² and therefore fails to

³¹ Quincy Wright, *The Study of War* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1942), pp. 717-793.

³² See Alvin Gouldner, *The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology*, (New York: Equinox Books, 1971).

scientifically explain other interacting or intervening variables. Weber replaces Gouldner's unimodel with his portestantism³³ -- another unimodel, while Parsons introduces a theory of voluntaristic schema, based on morality, for Weber's structural functionalism.³⁴ Brecht repudiates economism on the grounds that Marx and Engels, in denouncing the value judgements of their contemporaries and of former generations, expressed value judgements of their own, both negative and positive.³⁵ That, "their polemic emphasis that the prevailing idea of justice and morals in each epoch depended on economic factors, in particular on methods of production and class interests merely subjective and relative";³⁶ that in the transpositive

³³ Max Weber, "Protestantism and Capitalism", in J.E.T. Eldridge, ed., Max Weber: The Interpretation of Social Reality (New York: Charles Scribner's & Sons, 1971), pp. 33-45.

³⁴ See Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (New York: The Free Press, 1929). Also in "Evaluation and Objectivity in Social Science: An Interpretation of Max Weber's Contribution", International Social Science Journal, Vol. 17, 1965. pp. 46-63.

³⁵ Arnold Brecht, Political Theory: The Foundations of Twentieth-Century Political Thought (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 186-189.

³⁶ Brecht, Political Theory: The Foundations of Twentieth-Century Political Thought, p. 188.

and transtraditional sphere of value judgements their ideas were rather absolutistic in character.³⁷

Yet the methodologists (K. O'Leary, 1971; Karl Deutsch, 1978; P. Burgess and R. Lawton, 1972; J. Rummel, 1972; P. McGowan, 1973; R. North and Choucri, 1974; J.D. Singer, 1973; et. al.) attempt to second rate the motivation of economic underpinnings as being the driving force in foreign policy. However, McGowan's statistical analysis of 45 nations in the 1960's supported the porposition that the level of a nation's economic development affects the formulation of its foreign policy.³⁸ Bandyopadhyaya (1968:33) finds that economic development is a major influence on the foreign policy of India and Pakistan.³⁹ Bunker (1969:296) also finds a relationship between the two variables for Peru, in a diachronic analysis of the period 1958 to 1960.⁴⁰

³⁷ Brecht, Political Theory;, p. 188.

³⁸ Patrick McGowan and Howard Shapiro, The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1973), pp. 107-116.

³⁹ J. Bandyopadhyaya, "The Making of Foreign Policy: A Tentative Subsystem Model for South Asia", in South Asian Studies (July 1968). pp. 107-108, 125.

⁴⁰ R. Bunker, "Linkages and Foreign Policy of Peru: 1958-1966", in Western Political Quarterly, 1969 Vol. 22, pp. 280-297, 77, 108, 155.

Rummel⁴¹ (1969:234) finds that economic development is one of the two major factors (the other being size) accounting for the activity of nations in the international system. Moore's⁴² study (1970:75) of 119 nations in 1963, supports Rummel's, but Salmore and Herman⁴³ (1969:23) contradict these two, finding that economic development does not explain much of the variance in the activities of 76 nations during 1966 and 1967. It must be mentioned that the methodologists were far from concentrating on the economic variables alone; their list of variables (twelve in number) range from individual variables, elite variables to linkage variables.

But the Marxists, neo-Marxists, and the radicals view economics as the overriding factor in the political relations of nations. Karl Marx, although he did not

⁴¹ R.J. Rummel, "Some Empirical Findings on Nations and Their Behavior", World Politics, 1969, Vol. 21. pp. 226-241.

⁴² D.W. Moore, "Governmental and Societal Influences on Foreign Policy: A Partial Examination of Rosenau's Adaptation Model", Ph.D. dissertation in Dissertation Abstract (Columbus: Ohio State University, 1970), pp. 94-223.

⁴³ S.A. Salmore and C.F. Herman, "The Effect of Size Development and Accountability on Foreign Policy", Peace Research Society Papers, 1969. Vol. 14, pp. 15-30.

write much about the foreign policy of nations, laid a philosophical foundation of the economic theory of foreign policy. In A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx asserted that, "men in their social production, get involved in definite relations that are indispensible and independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite state of their development of their material productive forces."⁴⁴ The sum of these relations, he contends, constitute the economic structure of society, the real foundation on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness.⁴⁵ In Historical Materialism Versus Economic Determinism, Engels tries to explain more fully the limits of economic determinism. He remarks that: 1) economic conditions are regarded as the factor which ultimately determines historical development; 2) political, judicial, philosophical, religious, literary and all kinds of development are based on economic development. But all of these react upon one another and also upon the economic base. It is not that the economic position is the cause, and alone active, while

⁴⁴ Karl Marx, "A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy", in Selected Works, Vol. I, 1969, pp. 502-507.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

everything else has a passive effect. There is rather an interaction on the basis of economic necessity, which ultimately always asserts itself.⁴⁶

Engels knew that there would be a confusion about the model (economic determinism) he and Marx had given and he further modified it this way -- "according to the materialist conception of history, the determining element in history is ultimately production and reproduction in real life. More than this, neither Marx nor I have asserted. If, therefore, somebody twists this into the statement that the economic element is the only determining one, he transforms it into a meaningless, abstract and absurd phrase. The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure also exercise their influence upon the course of historical struggles and in many cases preponderant in determining their form."⁴⁷

In actuality, people have twisted Marx and Engel's economic model into a unimodel, in spite of Engel's attempt to rephrase it. V.I. Lenin labored to save the Marxian model in a major theme of international relations,

⁴⁶ Frederick Engels, "Historical Materialism Versus Economic Determinism" in Marx and Engels Selected Works (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1969).

⁴⁷ Ibid. pp. 475-477.

developed in his major work -- Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism.⁴⁸ He empirically illustrated the economic imperatives of the foreign policies of Britain, France, Germany, and the United States, in relation to other countries, and (the attendant) war as the effect. The history of colonialism was for the first time scientifically diagnosed, and fitted into the dialectical materialist radiographie.

In contemporary times there has been more substantive concern over the economic motive of foreign policies than there ever was before. The activities of nation states (the powerful states) in their interactions with the less economically powerful, tend to raise these concerns. The classical and neo-classical theories of international trade were conceived to be bourne of comparative advantage to each participant. But, they have instead, under the tutelage of the imperialist nations, created dependencies and underdevelopment.

The poverty of many nation states, in the midst of the very rich, in the twentieth century has produced

⁴⁸ See V.I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1975).

the critiques of the traditional world economic order. Some have seen in the military industrial complex societies, a direct relationship between economic and foreign policy. Gabriel Kolko, in The Roots of American Foreign Policy⁴⁹ sees that the relationship between the objectives of foreign economic policy and direct political and military intervention, has been a continuous one and an intimate one and very often, identical.⁵⁰ The world is full of many examples. Chile was a case in point. Paul Baran noted that the diplomatic, financial, and if need be, the military facilities of the imperialist powers are rapidly and efficiently mobilized to help private enterprise in distress to do the job.⁵¹ H. Magdoff supports Baran on the ground that a substantial portion of the huge military machine, including that of the Western European nations, is the price being paid to maintain the imperialist network of trade and investment in the absence of colonialism.⁵²

⁴⁹ See Gabriel Kolko, The Roots of American Foreign Policy: An Analysis of Power and Purpose (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969).

⁵⁰ Ibid. p. 81

⁵¹ Paul Baran and P. Sweezy, Monopoly Capital (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), p. 198.

⁵² H. Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism: The Economics of U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Modern Reader, 1969), p. 240.

In conclusion then the economic determinants of Nigeria's foreign policy is the basis of an inquiry into the study of the relationships of Nigeria's economic development and its foreign policy posture. It is a research dealing with the impacts of economics on foreign policy output.

The study denies the monocausal and pluralistic approaches because they are insufficient in explaining the concrete situation in Nigeria's example. Instead, it views economics as the overriding factor among other multivarious factors in the determinants of foreign policy.

SCOPE, LIMITATION AND DEFINITION

The scope of this study spans over a period of eighteen years (1960-1977). The specificity of the inquiry confines us to equate economic development with economic growth for the operational purposes of the model. We distinctively recognize the qualitative differences between the two phenomena.

French economist Francois Perroux distinguished growth from development. Economic growth he said consists of rising national and per capita income, while development entails a good deal more -- structural change, technological advance, resource recovery and closing sectoral and regional gaps.

But development in dialectics lies not in the infinite arithmetic addition of one unit to another, but in the emergence of new and higher forms which create within themselves the preconditions for further development. It is a chain of dialectical negations.

Kenneth Arrow, in "Mathematical models in the Social Sciences" asserts that the philosopher as a theory builder must necessarily concern himself with the meaning and implications of his activities. "This is a distinctive obligation."⁵³ We wish therefore to explain the meanings and implications of some of the critical concepts that we used to model the theory.

We adapt in this study, the national liberation theory -- praxis nexus to explain the objective reality in Nigeria and Africa. In practice, Nigeria has no revolutionary theory of national liberation, but it has revolutionary praxis. And since there can be no revolutionary praxis without a theory, we imply that certain Nigerian actions and non-actions in continental African politics fit the logic of the theory-praxis nexus.

⁵³ Kenneth Arrow, "Mathematical Models in Social Sciences", ed., May Brodbeck, Readings in the Philosophy of the Social Sciences (New York: The MacMillan Press, 1968), pp. 635-640.

By that we mean, Nigeria is either consciously or unconsciously engaged in the struggle for the national liberation, not from the standpoint of articulated body of doctrine such as postulated by (V.I. Lenin, Mao Tse Tung, Che Guevara, Regis Debray, and Frantz Fanon).⁵⁴ But it has evolved a body of consistent practice.

Nigeria's leaders, unlike Kwameh Nkrumah⁵⁵ of Ghana or Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, have not developed a radical theoretical construct of liberation applicable to neo-colonialism or de-colonization of Africa. Its concepts of liberation will be fully understood if it is taken to mean the total liberation of all oppressed black people in Africa, and indeed, anywhere else in the world. In practice, however, Nigeria's concern for African liberation has centered on the liberation of black people from oppression by white colonialists and a white minority. For Nigeria, liberation means the creation of genuine representative governments reflecting majority will and national self determination. It means national or even racial liberation and not class liberation.

⁵⁴ Each and every one of them postulated theoretical frameworks for waging wars of national liberation. See bibliography for their respective works on the subject.

⁵⁵ See Kwameh Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism (New York: Modern Reader Press, 1966).

With regard to the role of violence, Nigeria has backed away from the former conservative non-violence stance on decolonization issues. It now supports in theory and practice the guerrilla warfare for the decolonization of Southern Africa. Our adaptation, then, of the national theory -- praxis nexus in this study recognizes the role of violence or war as an instrument of foreign policy in conflict situations.

The ultimate recourse in disputes between nations is to military force. The threat of war, if credible, precipitates national action as nothing else does. And "war is a mere continuation of policy (foreign policy) by other means,"⁵⁶ and hence is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will by the application of the utmost use of force.

Again, the meaning and implication of the concept "radical" in this context should be understood in the systemic level. It should not be taken in isolation. It does not have a spontaneous existence out of the increased level of economic development in Nigeria. Its meaning and implication in this context would be appreciated if viewed not only in the general context of economic development, but along with the historical

⁵⁶ See Carl von Clausewitz, On War (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968), Vols. I & II.

development of Nigeria, Southern Africa, and Africa at large, with respect to the ongoing struggle for the national liberation. It is a philosophical category whose meaning and implication make up an integral part of the social phenomena we are trying to explain.

Since we are trying to explain the variations in Nigeria's foreign policy that has a functional relationship with the changes in the level of the economic development, it is reasonable to infer that radical foreign economic policies have an internal logic with the radical foreign policy (e.g., the support for the wars of national liberation).

THE SETTING

In Chapter One we laid out the theoretical framework and postulated that significant changes in the level of Nigeria's economic development will affect Nigeria's foreign policy towards other nations. We operationalized the key concepts and offered the Methodology for testing the hypotheses. Chapter Two surveyed the historical processes of Nigeria's foreign policy evolution under the typologies of 1) the structure of the political system, 2) the functions, and 3) the nature of the foreign policy.

Chapter Three looked at the economic structure

from 1960-1977, and detected the negative and positive growth processes that impinged upon the political system. The periodization of the levels of economic development was viewed in connection with the different phases of foreign policy evolution. In Chapter Four we formulated a macrometric power weight theory of Nigeria's perceived power. Holding economics as a determinant we analyzed other factors of national power as a mix of strategic military, economic and critical mass that may depict strengths and weaknesses in foreign policy.

In Chapter Five we empirically examined Nigeria's foreign policy in relation to her neighbor's, the OAU, the ECOWAS, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. We built systems of equations in Chapter Six and regressed economic growth indicators on the foreign policy variables. Chapter Seven gave the interpretations of the findings and the implications and Chapter Eight drew the conclusions based on our analysis of the qualitative and quantitative data.

NOTATION

₦ is the Nigerian currency.

₦ 1 = \$1.60.

CHAPTER I

THEORETICAL FORMULATION

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The subterranean economic rhythms in a national economy may generate internal economic socio-political configurations that result in changes in a fundamental attribute which in turn affects the political power. That is, the internal economic motions such as the break up or deviation from the neo-colonial pattern of production, distribution, and marketing may have a causal relationship with the political behavior of a nation state. Or the production of a relatively scarce commodity, with the resultant high level of political consciousness will facilitate a drift towards changes in the fundamental attribute (economic development) that is highly correlated with political power.

Hence we posit that significant changes in this fundamental attribute of a major continental power (Nigeria) will affect the behavior of that nation towards other nations and thus alter the overall relations among other major powers.¹

¹ See Nazli Choucri and Robert North, Nations in Conflict: National Growth and International Violence (Boston: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1975), Chapters 1, 2, and 3.

While we do not reject Lenin and North's assertions, we do make some modifications. We uphold that any growth (substantial growth in economic productivity) of a major developing nation will substantially influence international affairs. That is, increases in national income, national income per capita, trade, energy (fuel and non-minerals), population, agriculture, and industrial output will affect the relations of such a nation with other nations; not necessarily in a colonial status or patron-client relationship, but in terms of the capability of that nation to attain a quasi-economic independence and the utilization of that economic leverage for political ends (we shall develop this point later).

We recognize that the aggregate economic motions in a national economy are both influenced by exogenous factors and endogenous variables. The exogenous factors are made up of the international trade relationship which is broken down into export, import, balance of trade, balance of payment, commodities of trade, where they are going, and where they have come from. Also included in this category are the international and regional political environments. The nature of the international and regional political environments has a direct relationship with the

rate of aggregate economic motion.

Peaceful atmosphere is a necessary and desired political environment that tends to promote international trade. While war or threat of war is undesired and hence regarded as a negative factor to the flow of international trade, it does have some positive side effects to some of the non-belligerent nations whose commodities are critical to the survival of other nations.

For example, the Egyptian/Israeli War of 1973 saw the oil embargo placed on some of the major supporters of Israel by the Arab states. The shut down of the supply of this critical commodity from the major suppliers, reduced the world supply to increase the demand. The prices went up as a result. Those who supplied it indirectly gained from the politically rough environment prevalent in the Middle East.

The production of the critical and the non-critical commodities at home which enter the international system is determined in part also by the endogenous factors that are determinants of national power. A state's economic capability equals the productive resources that its society possesses: labor, technology, real capital, (in the form of factories, power dams, railroads, inventories of materials, industrial and agricultural manufactures) and the availability of natural resources.

Population and size of territory (critical mass)⁵ that a nation possesses make itself felt in world affairs. Increases in economic productivity, have a direct relationship upon labor which is supported by population and the size of the territory. But the quality of the critical mass is determined by the numeric economic strength behind it. China's critical mass is higher than that of the United States but the latter's critical mass is qualitatively superior because of its economic strength.

Military strength has a direct linkage to the critical mass and the economic capability. The production of military strength is dependent upon the economic potential and population of a polity. The level of technology is also an unquestionable asset.

The strategic location of a nation as perceived by the major powers, affects not only its military capability in relation to her neighbors, but her regional and continental alliances with other nations as well. These alliances may be in the form of economic regionalism as in the Economic Cooperation of West African States (ECOWAS), or a political union like the Organization for African Unity (OAU).

⁵ See Chapter 4 for the development of the concept of critical mass.

The consciousness or will of the people to rise beyond the domestic political partisanship into international political and economic concerns depends first on the level of its economic development, the political leadership it has, and the commitments of the resources by the leadership to raise the level of such consciousness. Consciousness could be expressed in ideological form as in the form of Pan Africanism. It is akin to the realism of political freedom for the African people.

History bears out that a people that have experienced a long history of subjugation, domination and colonization by alien powers, have a concept of political freedom not only in the partial granting of independence to some of its people, but in the total liberation of all of its people from colonial rule. The ideology of Pan Africanism has contributed to the proliferation of this concept. Thus consciousness reified in its abstract form as Pan Africanism could be expressed in support of such concretized form as national liberation struggle.

Thus a new nation born out of colonialism with some of its people still in that colonial bondage has all of the sympathies for the inhuman condition characteristic of that colonial bondage; and is morally committed to fight for the liberation of those people.

Fighting may take various phenomenal political forms. While putative military power may be one form, diplomacy and foreign policy exercise, is another. Its formulation then, has antecedents in the exogenous and endogenous factors, we thus have established a logical connection.

Foreign policy is defined as a strategy or planned course of action, developed by the decision makers of a state vis-a-vis other states or international entities, aimed at achieving specific goals defined in terms of national interest.⁶ The objectives to be achieved (depending on the state) vary from: 1) domination, 2) harmony, 3) sustained economic growth and development, and 4) liberation.

The policy of domination is often utilized by the big powers (the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union) to exercise hegemony over weaker nations. Domination through economic relations takes many forms. The overt form is colonialism and outright exploitation. France and Great Britain colonized most of the African countries and filtered resources to their

⁶ See Jack C. Plana and Roy Olton, The International Relations Dictionary (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston Press, 1969).

home bases, while the United States exploited Latin America and tapped the raw materials for the former's domestic advantage. The covert form adopts the mechanics of neo-colonialism and dependency.⁷ Foreign aid, foreign investment, and the classical and neo-classical doctrine of international trade that protect and buffer the strong vis-a-vis the weak are the machinations of continuous domination.⁸

Harmony exists, and is often interpreted when foreign policy goals and execution between two equal partners are exercised for the benefit of mutual co-existence. The United States trade with Canada, Europe and Japan, tends to follow this course. The benefits are mutually inclusive. The exchange might be unequal, but the political and psychological satisfaction derived from such relations is a compensating factor for the inequality in economic strength.

⁷ For a detailed analysis of economic exploitation and domination through dependency and interdependence see James D. Cockcroft, Andre Gunderfrank, and Dale L. Johnson, Dependence and Underdevelopment: Latin America's Political Economy (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1972).

⁸ Joan M. Nelson, Aid, Influence and Foreign Policy (New York: The McMillian Company, 1968), p. 1.

Every nation (developed or developing) aspires toward the goal of economic development and self-sustained growth, although few ever achieve it. The struggle to achieve this goal is the struggle for peace and war, the struggle for domination, harmony, and sometimes the struggle for so-called national liberation.

Nations interact with one another in many spheres of activities. Economics seems to be one of top priority. Diplomacy follows economics as the protocol that legitimizes the economic interaction. Political actions emerge as the power struggle for, "who gets what, when, and how."⁹ Empirical analysis shows that at the domestic, as well as at the international level, behind every diplomatic, political, or military move, hides a naked materialistic motive.¹⁰ The United States signed a treaty of friendship with China, not because China represents a threat to its national interest, but basically because 1) China's critical mass has a potential market of one billion consumers for the United States, and 2) its strategic location with the Soviet Union is of strategic

⁹ See Harold Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How? (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1958).

¹⁰ James D. Cockcroft, Andre Gunder Frank, and Dale Johnson, Dependence and Underdevelopment: Latin America's Political Economy (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1972), pp. 71-111.

importance to the new ally.

James D. Cockcroft has pointed out that at the international level, the naked, economically motivated ventures of a state are dressed with the ex post facto concept of economic instruments of national policy.¹¹ Robert Dahl, in "Who Governs", illustrates how power elite cliques are located within economically influential circles. Lenin, at the beginning of the century had noticed that all political actions spring from economic motives; and capitalism leads inevitably to imperialism. In other words, economic issues dictate politics. He (Lenin) attributed the causes of outbreak of the two world wars to economic factors.

Lenin and the Marxist school of thought have been attacked by the conservative right¹² as being economically deterministic and a unimodel. The conservative right asserts that the actions of states in the international system are governed and controlled by multivarious motives. Some of which are psychological, political,

¹¹ Cockcroft, Frank, and Johnson, Dependence and Underdevelopment: Latin America's Political Economy, pp. 115-149, 152-163.

¹² The conservatist right includes the whole western democratic pluralism and liberal democrats both intellectuals and academicians.

while others are sociological and cultural. Some theoreticians even tried to separate economics from politics (foreign policy). Richard J. Trethewey¹³ (1975) distinguished some aspects of international relations that are economic, from those that are political.

But when Lenin is revisited and contemporary international relations are analyzed, national interest, tends to sound stronger than international interest (if there is anything like that). It is often equated with national security, whose purpose, Frank N. Trager and Frank L. Simonie¹⁴ define as, "the creation of national and international political conditions favorable to the protection or extension of vital national values against existing and potential adversaries." Vital national values can never be anything more than the concern for national survival in a world where survival is guaranteed by being the fittest. That survival is historically and fundamentally rooted in economics.

¹³ Richard J. Trethewey, "International Economics and Politics: A theoretical Framework", in Robert A. Bouer, ed., The Interaction of Economics and Foreign Policy (Charlottesville: The University of Virginia Press, 1975), pp. 1-24.

¹⁴ Frank N. Trager and Frank L. Simonie, "An Introduction to the Study of National Security", in National Security and American Society, ed., F.N. Trager and P. Kronenberg (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas, 1973), pp. 35-48.

The peace treaty between Egypt and Israel which President Carter shuttled the Middle East for, was a political overture for peace in the Middle East. Behind that political demonstration is the real issue of an energy shortage in the United States. The survival and continuous economic growth of the United States and of any nation, depends in part on energy. Peace in the Middle East does not only mean the settling of life-long disputes between Egypt and Israel, but the settling, protecting, and consolidating of the sources of energy supply lines, vital to the United States' national interest. Economic development and growth, where it fails to have a topical expression in foreign policy objectives enunciation, is inherently equated or relegated to national interest or national security. The big powers are fond of doing this.

The policy of liberation (national liberation) often is relatively undertoned by some nations, as compared to the policy of economic growth and development. While the former has a radical connotation and implication that challenges the status quo, the latter is often the authentic goal generally appreciated and pursued, and sometimes, the means utilized by the powerful to propagate the status quo.

The foreign policy, "goal of liberation" in this context means an independent but radical foreign policy that is geared toward the realization of national interest.

It is independent because the uncompromising goal pursued is characterized by conflicting multi-national interests, and therefore, demands an autonomous policy that embraces only the Pan African ideals -- "the decolonization of Africa."¹⁵ Radical, because the means deployed to reach the goal, do not only call for radical foreign economic policy but also for military incursion. The support for a war of national liberation means the support for the justification of military violence to win that freedom.

Especially when the people fighting for that freedom and the people supporting that struggle are one and the same people; sharing the same habitat but demarcated by powers stronger than their will. Also in a dialectical context, it delineates the support for an ongoing struggle for universal human freedom.

The economic theory of national liberation is a point of departure from the traditional theories of national economic growth, which generate imperialism and international violence.¹⁶ It is a radical outgrowth of

¹⁵ The foreign policy themes of most of the African states reflect the decolonization principle adopted in the Charter of the Organization for African Unity. Nigeria has made this theme the cornerstone of its foreign policy goal.

¹⁶ Choucri and North, Nations In Conflict, pp. 14-25.

national economic expansion that generates national liberation theory and praxis. Raised to a high level of consciousness the theory transcends the national borders. The struggle for freedom is the struggle for decolonization, and the consciousness needed to sustain that struggle supercedes micro-nationalistic sentiment. Inherent in the specific struggle is the Pan African consciousness -- the African political freedom that has often found expression in Nigerian foreign policy statement such as "Africa is not free until all Africans are free."

The Nigerian engagement in such struggles as occurred in Angola, Mozambique and Equatorial Guinea¹⁷ is a manifestation of the support for the national liberation struggle in those areas. Again the conflicts in Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Azania demand the same weapon of the theory and practice -- the revolutionary theory praxis nexus that Nigeria is consciously or unconsciously committed to.

17 In each of these countries (Angola, Mozambique) that attained independence through revolutionary armed struggle, Nigeria gave military, economic and political support. When Spain tried to re-colonize Equatorial Guinea in 1974, Nigerian Army countered the attack. See James H. Polhemus, Revue Canadienne Des Etudes Africaines, "Nigeria And Southern Africa: Interest, Policy and Means" Vol. XI, No. 1, 1977, pp. 43-66.

Political commitment beyond national borders is not independent of the internal economic motions. Hence we posit:

HYPOTHESES

- 1) The level of Nigeria's economic development affects its foreign policy format.
- 2) The higher the level of economic development, the lower the economic and political dependency and the more radical the foreign policy output.

The growth tendencies in the Nigerian economy are influenced by endogenous and exogenous variables that we have already explained. The combination of these variables contributes to the changes in the fundamental attributes which has the causality with the foreign policy.

Our basic assumption is that Nigeria, like any other nation, pursues a policy of economic development. We are saying in hypothesis one, that an increase in the level of Nigeria's economic development represented by the GNP, the GNP per capita, balance of payments, foreign reserves, export trade, energy output, educational output, and social infrastructure, extends the range of political modernization, and positively affects the level of political consciousness. Modernization in this context is defined as a special case of economic development process with the

capacity to widen the range of human choice and alternatives.¹⁸

That is, with true economic modernization, the political system differentiates and moves sequentially from neo-colonialism to economic and political independence. The widening in the range of human choices and alternatives indicates the attendant maturity of the political system to mobilize its resources, and to formulate foreign policies that serve its national interest. This increase in the level of economic development increases the capacity to formulate alternative foreign policies. The logic of this argument can best be explained in the level of an increase in a nation's productive capability that would generate an increase in the political independence which would check a dependent socio-economic relationship.

The last hypothesis implies an inverse relationship between the level of economic development and the dependent foreign policy format. The former increases as the latter decreases. That is, as the political system differentiates, neo-colonialism and dependency decline.

¹⁸ David E. Apter, "Political Systems and Developmental Change", in Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, The Methodology of Comparative Research (New York: The Free Press, 1970), pp. 151-171.

The by-product of the inverse relationship is the radical foreign policy posture.

Radical because it attempts to control and consolidate national economic capabilities that spill over the international political and economic system. For example, the Indigenization and the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree are independent and radical policies of economic nationalism that limit and reduce foreign equity participation in certain key industries by more than 60 percent. It nullifies completely foreign investment in such areas as radio and television broadcasting, advertising, baking, and a list of more than one hundred items formally traversed by foreigners.

The drift toward radical foreign policy pre-empts a drift in the locus of quasi-economic independence utilized as a political bulwark to change the "probability of outcomes." It is akin to the production of a change¹⁹ in the probability distribution of events in colonial African enclaves (as was Angola), in the economic regionalism or continentalism (such as the ECOWAS and Economic Cooperation for Africa). Besides causality, the

¹⁹ Karl W. Deutsch, Politics And Government: How People Decide Their Fate (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1970), p. 24.

drift is an indication of consequence. A political consequence that recognized such psychological dimension as the African political leadership.

Nigeria has undoubtedly emerged as the political leader of Africa. The assumption of leadership among other things implies the assumption of the role-played as a leader. The financial (See Chapter Five), military, and political support of national liberation struggles in Southern Africa is a case in point. It grows as the need to assume that function grows. The need to assume the function is an imperative demand for leadership which Nigeria thus supplies.

While we do not deny the fact that the renewal of the demand for the military alliance structure (Africa High Command)²⁰ by Nigeria is a theoretical demand -- though a radical departure from its former conservative non-violence stance on African military defense strategy, but Nigeria's economic potentiality is an effective demand that has the capability of translating the theoretical demand into a practical demand.

20 See Nigeria Bulletin On Foreign Affairs, Lagos, Nigeria, October, 1971, pp. 8-13.

METHODOLOGY

The methodological application of econometric models to conceptualize on the science of politics in a cross-cutting interdisciplinary approach which political scientists are constantly researching. This research is committed to such an inquiry. We utilize these tools to describe, explain, and predict relationships between the economic and social phenomenas in their political interaction.

Implicit in our propositions is the idea that significant changes in the fundamental attribute of Nigeria will affect the behavior of Nigeria towards other nations and thus alter the overall relations among other powers. The theory we thus postulate must be reducible to manageable numbers of defensible propositions, and relations (See Theoretical Framework) must be operationally defined (See Chapter Six) so that they can be tested and whenever possible falsified. The methodology must not only be capable of ordering and managing the data in ways that will test the theory, it must also perform these functions according to procedures that are so defined and standardized that any number of investigations can apply them.

The complexities of the international system gives rise to the problem that confronts a researcher about the

choice of variables that are relevant, and those that are not, and what criteria exist for excluding some variables and examining others. If there exists such criteria, will not the selection of variables, measures, and methods of analysis, or the inclusion of certain data at the expense of others, bias the outcome? The answer is obviously, yes.

What we have done in this paper was to carefully examine and cautiously select the variables that describe and model the theory. What we tend to do is to advance our knowledge of regression analysis that links interrelated propositions (economic development and foreign policy). In developing this linkage, we have tried to capture the relationships which do not just explain variances in foreign policy and economic development in a purely statistical way. Such an effort is constrained in three ways.

There are theoretical constraints. There is for example, no single compelling theory that specifies even crudely, a comprehensive model of economic determinants of foreign policy. Therefore, the research process is rarely so straightforward. It does not depend on one level of analysis nor one kind of data. There is an enormous body of quantitative and qualitative literature in this work that deals in no particular unified way with the many facets of quantitative methodological approach.

In addition to the absence of theoretical convergence in the literature, there is a problem that characterizes the qualitative work -- that of ambiguity and circumlocution in style that makes the extraction of testable hypotheses difficult, and at times impossible. We have tried the best we could to explain what we could not quantify, and what we quantified, we still gave the explanation and rationalization.

Most of the quantitative studies to date that we have come across in the area of foreign policy research, have looked at models that incorporate linear, additive and hierarchical relationships.²¹ Exclusive reliance on models of this kind is overly restrictive, since the theories we wish to test and the real processes we seek to capture are clearly not linear, additive, and hierarchical in cause and effect.

The last observations bear on the methodological constraints that affected this research. Given our unwillingness to rely exclusively on any single line of theorizing, one of the major methodological concerns was

²¹ The behavioralists and the empiricists such as J. David Singer, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Heinz Fulau, Hayward Alker, Rudolph J. Rummel, Melvin Small, Dina A. Zinnes, Ole R. Holsti, Robert North, Richard Brody, and others are constantly applying interdisciplinary research tools to explain interactions of political, economic, cultural, psychological and sociological phenomenas.

to proceed in a way that allowed rigorous and systematic investigation of hypotheses that had theoretical merit without "denigrating into a gross fishing operation, posing as empirical research." We started with analyzing the aggregate data on economic development we collected over a period of eighteen years (1960-1977). We then developed political indicators, operationalized them and fit them into the macrometric power weight theory we have formulated. After we have empirically examined the foreign policy in Chapter Five, we developed in Chapter Six systems of equations and run regressions which rests largely on the notions of explained and unexplained variance.

The first refers to the extent to which estimated values for the dependent variable -- calculated by summing the products of each independent variable and its associated co-efficient coincide with political data. The second notion refers to the residual, that is, that portion of the variance in the dependent variable unaccounted for by the independent variables.

The specific relationship that concerns us can be explained in the form of equations that are expected to fit empirical data. The statistical measures employed to determine the extent to which an equation fits empirical data include: R^2 , the amount of variance in

the dependent variables accounted for by the independent variables; the magnitude of both the unstandardized and standardized beta or path coefficients; the significance of the individual coefficients as indicated by the t statistics; the statistical significance of the equation as a whole, as indicated by the F ratio for the regression.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The interrelationship between the level of economic development and the political characteristics of developing nations has been widely studied by scholars²² of international relations and comparative politics. Most of the work done in this area has been done cross-politically. The criticisms we often hear are that the concepts thus devised are "formulated at levels of abstraction that defy systematic comparative empirical application."²³

²² See Irma Adelman and Cynthia Morris, Society, Politics and Economic Development: A Quantitative Approach (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1971). See Patrick J. McGowan, ed., Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies, Vols. I & II (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1973). John V. Gillespie and Dinna A. Zinnes, Mathematical Systems in International Relations Research (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1971). R.J. Rummel, The Dimensions of Nations (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1972).

²³ Joseph LaPalombara, "Parsimony and Empiricism in Comparative Politics: An Anti-Scholastic View", in Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, ed., The Methodology of Comparative Research (New York: The Free Press, 1970), pp. 123-149.

The scholars' attempts to draw operational axioms from such theorizing and social model-building often result in curious justification for whatever patterns of power and administration are actually emerging in the so-called developing areas.²⁴

Until recently the conceptual frameworks most frequently used by political analysts tended to relegate economic relations to the periphery of inquiry. The interrelationship between domestic and international politics were not systematically examined, and interests other than those of states were virtually ignored. However, some recent developments²⁵ have brought the economic dimension of world politics back into focus. New conceptual orientations are fostering systematic analysis of the relationship between economics and political behavior in contrast with paradigms focusing exclusively on power and security aspects of world order. The dollar devaluation of 1971 and 1973, the Arab oil

²⁴ La Palombara, "Parsimony and Empiricism in Comparative Politics: An Anti-Scholastic View", The Methodology of Comparative Research, pp. 123-149.

²⁵ The re-politicization of economics (e.g., the energy shortage and the politics of crude petroleum) has brought the world's attention to the critical importance of economics in the relations of states.

embargo of 1973 were national economic issues with international and political configurations.

Instead of theories that focus on states as sole actors, we now have the conceptual schemes that focus on the attributes of states in the course of their dynamic interactions. In this paper we attempt to look at this dynamic interaction through a particular attribute. We acknowledge the relative importance of other attributes in the calculus of national power, but we posit that their potency is fundamentally derived from the changes in the primary attribute. We therefore hold economics to be a function of other derivatives of national power that a state possesses. (See Chapter Four).

National power is not a static phenomenon. It is the kinetic energy of the state reflective in multivarious national and international activities. One of such activities is foreign policy which we define as a planned course of action developed by a state vis-a-vis other states or international entities for the purpose of achieving specific goals. It involves a dynamic process of applying relatively fixed interpretations of national interest to the highly fluctuating situational factors of the international

environment to develop a course of action. The term, foreign policy, can be applied more precisely to describe a single situation (such as Nigeria's policy towards Angola) and the actions; military, economic, and political that a state utilizes to accomplish a limited objective.

The systems framework employed in this study is based on relations between two key concepts -- foreign policy and economic development.

Operationally, we define foreign policy in terms of:

1) Support for the National Liberation Struggle: i.e., the total naira value of the funds that Nigeria has committed to the liberation of Africa from colonialism.

2) Military Posture: That is the direct and indirect military expenditure and engagement utilized by Nigeria to deter, influence, or change the probability distribution of events outside her territorial borders. This includes her actualized and putative military forces (See Chapter Six).

3) Diplomatic Personnel: The numerical strength of the Nigerian diplomatic personnel in several key countries (such as the United States, the United Kingdom,

and the Soviet Union).

4) The United Nations Votes: That is, the patterns of Nigeria's votes in the United Nations in agreement with each of the superpowers with respect to issues affecting the Third World.

Conceptually, we specify the economic development variables as follows:

5) Foreign Trade; Export and Import: Nigeria's annual volume of trade with other nations. As an instrument of foreign policy it can be used readily to cement alliances, foster increased cooperation, and promote political integration.

6) Foreign Reserves: The international liquidity position of Nigeria in the form of gold, Special Drawing Rights, and foreign currencies.

7) Balance of Payment: The net balance between the total income and expenditure of Nigeria, both public and private, in its trade and financial dealings with the rest of the world.

8) Capital Inflow/Outflow: The rate and magnitude of capital inflow and outflow measures the degree of foreign economic interaction in the domestic economy. It also measures the frequency of foreign policy actions.

9) Gross National Product: The total value (naira) of goods and services produced in a year. GNP measures the economic and political capabilities of a nation; it is also the determinant of military expenditures.

10) Crude Petroleum: The aggregate annual value of the production of crude oil. As a relatively scarce commodity, with high inelasticity of demand and price, it has leverage derived from its scarce supply, and therefore is a political weapon for, "who gets what, when, and how."

11) Gross National Product Per Capita: The naira value of income per capita from 1960 to 1977.

CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter we laid the theoretical framework that significant changes in the fundamental attribute of Nigeria will affect its behavior in the international system and thus, alter its overall relations among other major powers. We broke down our fundamental attribute into the indicators of economic growth, and operationalized foreign policy in terms of: 1) the support given to the national liberation struggle; 2) the military posture; 3) the diplomatic personnel; and 4) the United Nation's votes.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

This chapter examines the structure and the function of the political system which evolved the foreign policy inputs and outputs of the First Republic (1960-1966). We begin with the assumptions that:

1) A nation bequeathed with a semi-colonial structure at the onset of independence, consciously or unconsciously, inherits the neo-colonial structure whose functions are by design intended to serve the status quo; that is, all of the institutional frameworks, political, economic, military, legal, and cultural that Nigeria acquired as an "independent package" from Britain, without any modifications or adaptations, devoid of any positive changes or radical deviations to entrench Nigeria's needs and aspirations was still serving the colonial or quasi-colonial functions after independence, as it had before independence.

2) The structure and functions, thus inherited, by necessity, shaped the foreign policy of this new nation. The Nigerian acquisition of the same form of British parliamentary democracy and the unidirectional trade structure with its Western industrial capitalist system (with Britain as the comptroller general

of commerce and finance) implied that Nigeria must have a defense treaty with her former colonial master, in order to keep the spread of communism (the cold war mentality) out of Nigeria. It also implied that Nigeria must develop foreign economic policies that favored the West and perpetuated the status quo even at the expense of Nigerian and African ideals.

3) The foreign policy of this new nation will, by virtue of its orientation, be inconsistent and contradictory. For example, Nigeria could not pursue a dynamic foreign policy of economic development while its foreign economic policies were derivatives of British colonialism, and therefore, negative to developmental change. A hundred years' experience of British colonialism (1860-1960) attests to that fact. Nor could Nigeria pursue a consistent policy of non-alignment while she had a military defense treaty with Britain.

Empirical examinations of the above three assumptions will set preconditions for the development of Nigeria's foreign policy during the first six years of independence. The essence of this development is to show that the imperialist economic forces at work, constantly impinged on the Nigerian political system and thus affected its political behavior. The pursuit of national interest as defined in the vocabulary of

economic development, conflicted with the competing national interests of other nations who were the main consumers of her raw materials. We set about to unfold these assumptions under an indepth examination of: 1) the structure of the political system, 2) the functions of that system, and 3) the nature of the foreign policy.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

Nigeria is a British imperial creation. Colonized by Britain in the nineteenth century, she became an independent nation in 1960; but maintained some of the paraphernalia of ex ante British colonialism (such as membership in the British Commonwealth of Nations, the organs of the political system that were British more in form than in content, the dependent economic system that was only outwardly oriented) such that she was characterized as a neo-colonial state.¹

¹ Here it is to be understood that neo-colonial state in reference to Nigeria's circumstances of its colonial history maintains the colonial patterns of dependency after the formal granting of political independence in 1960. The primary objective of neo-colonialism is to maintain the former colony as a controlled source of raw materials, a market for investment and the sale of goods manufactured overseas by foreign firms and their local subsidiaries. The realization of a mass market and the promotion of certain patterns of consumption are crucial to foreign investors. Thus, the Ford, Carneigie and Rockefeller Foundations had established offices in Lagos in the early fifties to prepare studies of feasibility for American investors. This is discussed in detail in Africa Research Group, The Nigerian Civil War (Cambridge: 1970), pp. 6-9.

The structure of the Nigerian economy in the early 1960's was related to pre-colonial cleavage. Prior to the independence, the old colonial policy of Indirect Rule² had divided Nigeria into three autonomous regions based on ethnic plurality (the Hausa in the north, the Ibo in the east, and the Yoruba in the west). A central concept of Indirect Rule was that each of the regions possessed indigenous leaders who wielded authority, who could demand a certain degree of obedience and respect, and who could also be coopted into the Native Authority System. (See footnote #2)

Nevertheless, the concentration of three main ethnic groups in each of the regions made the British division of the country, into three regions, appear logical. Yet, each of the resulting three regions; North, West, and East, was characterized by a cultural make-up which made the three-part division less than fully logical.

² The central tenet of Indirect Rule is the idea that traditional authorities in the colonies should be recognized wherever possible and that the metropolitan power should seek to coopt them into the colonial administration by calling them Native Authorities and ruling through them at the local level.

Although Nigeria has three main cultural groups, some 250 different ethnic groups³ live within its boundaries. Thus, in each region, a preponderant majority dominated a heterogeneous group of cultural and linguistic minorities.

The structure of the Nigerian economy was related to the colonial exploitation and post-independent colonial maneuvering. In each of the regions (west, north, and east) the British colonial rule introduced a major crop. There was cocoa in the West, groundnut in the North, and palm produce, in the East. The Marketing Board, which monopolized the export trade of the main cash crop, was established in each region. The key to the power system of Nigeria's first republic can best be explained in the functionalities of the marketing boards.⁴

The Regional Marketing Boards rapidly became major conduits of commercial patronage and thereby, instruments of political control. Marketing board funds deposited in regionally created banks could then extend

³ See Barbara Callaway, "The Political Economy of Nigeria" in Richard Harris, ed., The Political Economy of Africa (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1975), p. 98.

⁴ For more detailed analysis of the connection between the marketing boards and the politics in Nigeria see Richard L. Sklar and C.S. Whitaker, Jr. "Nigeria" in Gwendolyn Carter, ed., National Unity and Regionalism in Eight African States (Ithaca: 1966), pp. 128-206.

credit to Nigerian businessmen. The businessmen were then expected to support the party in power, both politically and financially. The regional marketing boards funded loan and development corporations which undertook various projects in cooperation with private business interests. These corporations and their related loan associations were invariably managed by politically reliable administrators. Those who received loans from the boards or banks were powerfully induced to support the regional government. In each region the mechanism of the marketing board thus served to forge tight and mutually supportive alliances of politicians and nascent businessmen, committed to maintaining the status quo.

The Nigerian market was dominated by a small number (seven) of large and highly integrated foreign companies: The United Africa Company (UAC), John Holt, Paterson-Zochonis, Compagnie Francaise de l'Afrique Occidentale (CFAO), United Trading Company (UTC), and Societe Commerciale de l'Ouest Africaine (SCOA).⁵ These

⁵ Peter Kilby, Industrialization in an Open Economy: Nigeria 1945-1966 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 53-80.

large merchant wholesalers provided credit to small scale Nigerian businessmen and market women, who were committed to buying their products for purposes of trade. In this way the foreign firms, in effect, controlled even small scale retail trade in addition to large scale trading and manufacturing firms.

Tables 2.1 and 2.2 show the total foreign investment in 1964 and the net inflow of foreign investment from 1961 to 1964, respectively. We show the net inflow of foreign investment to depict: 1) the structurally open economy that foreign private capital raided to exploit the mining and oil sectors for long term investment, 2) to delineate that the inflow of this period was greater by the amount of net inflow than the outflow.

The stock of foreign capital in mining and oil (N257.4 million, See Table 2.1) overtook that of the distributive sector (N202.7 million) in 1964. The flow of new investment is primarily into oil and manufacturing. Other shifts in the composition of investment was a withdrawal from the Agriculture and Forestry (-4%), a proportional reduced investment flow into water and road transport, and increased activity in large-scale construction projects. In 1961, 53.7 percent of the net foreign investment went to the distributive sector, 25% to mining and oil and 21% to manufacturing and processing.

TABLE 2.1

TOTAL FOREIGN INVESTMENT, 1964 (₦ millions)

<u>ITEMS</u>	<u>PAID UP CAPITAL & RESERVES</u>	<u>EXT. DEBT.</u>	<u>TOTL.</u>	<u>FIXED ASSETS</u>
Mining and Oil	86.4	171.0	257.4	292.4
Manufacturing & Processing	56.8	60.6	117.0	127.0
Agriculture & Forestry	7.8	3.0	10.8	11.8
Transportation	4.2	2.8	7.0	6.0
Construction	10.4	14.2	24.6	16.4
Trading and Services	81.0	121.0	202.0	95.0
Other	5.0	18.6	23.6	11.8
TOTAL	251.6	391.2	642.4	560.4

Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, Economic and Financial Review, volume 4, June 1966, p. 6.

TABLE 2.2

NET INFLOW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT ₦ millions

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>1961</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>
Mining and Oil	7.8	15.0	25.0	70.6
Manu. & Procs.	11.8	21.0	22.0	18.4
Agric. & Fores.	-2.2	-0.4	1.0	1.0
Transportation	0.6	0.4	0.4	1.8
Construction	1.4	5.2	4.8	2.8
Trading & Services	25.2	-30.8	23.2	9.0
Other	----	1.0	0.4	11.0
TOTAL	54.6	35.4	75.8	124.8

Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, volume 4, p. 6.

*Net inflow of foreign investment are additions to paid up capital, reserves and debt.

The reason for the high percentage of investment in the distributive sector could be attributed to the skepticism of foreign investors who feared that investing in long term projects would not yield immediate and liquid cash; rather they sought out the distributive sector that minimized risk, and yielded more immediate returns. More fundamentally, capitalist investment in a newly emerging nation, frequently seeks out the line of least economic resistance for a test market. When it becomes entrenched, it expands investments to the key sectors. For example, in 1964, when the crude petroleum market was being prospected, 56.5 percent went to mining and oil as compared to 7.2 percent for the distributive sector.

The distribution of foreign investment by country of origin in 1964 is shown below (See Table 2.3). As a former British colony it is not surprising that Britain controlled more than one half of the aggregate foreign investment in Nigeria. The four Western European countries (Holland, France, Germany and Italy) came second, and third was the United States. Lebanon and other Arab countries were basically involved in the distributive sector (retail trade).⁶

⁶ Peter Kilby has shown the vulnerability of the structure of the economy in his book.

TABLE 2.3DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTBY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

<u>COUNTRY</u>	<u>TOTAL %</u>	<u>INDUSTRIAL %</u>
England	56.5	63.6
France		1.8
Holland		4.6
Germany	23.6	1.5
Italy		3.3
United States	12.1	9.4
Lebanon		6.6
Other	7.8	9.2
TOTAL	100.0	100.0

Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, volume 4, p. 6.

All large trading and manufacturing firms were foreign owned. Nigerian firms were small. The high capital requirements of merchandise trading discouraged the development of indigenous commercial activity. The large firms pursued a policy of pre-empting the market by handling all ranges of merchandise. The large investment needed in storage and handling facilities and the long period required for capital turnover, discouraged investment by medium or small scale enterprises.⁷

Between the foreign investors and the Nigerians a keen competition developed. As the competition increased, the overseas manufacturers began financing Nigerian importers on the basis of ninety-day credit. Thus, the local Nigerian importers developed a symbiotic relationship with overseas manufacturers, who extended credit.

A few years after independence, in 1960, a new form of financing was available to Nigerian politicians cum businessmen, which enabled them to enter both the commodity and nascent manufacturing sectors. This was

⁷ See P.T. Bauer, West African Trade (New York: The Free Press, 1962).

known as, "suppliers credits to contractor-financed projects."⁸ Through this form of financing, Nigerian politicians made costly and unviable commitments to private foreign creditors. By 1965, the Nigerian government initiated contractor-financed projects which were the most important form of new investment in the country. In 1966, they accounted for 80 percent of the value of new plants under construction.⁹ The export economy was completely dominated by foreign capital; as long as the developmental strategy of the Nigerian government was incapable of breaking up the vicious cycle of the development of underdevelopment -- a characteristic phenomenon of neo-colonial states or center-periphery relationships.

THE FUNCTIONS

While the national scene was in this way dominated economically by foreign investment, the regions provided fertile grounds for the emerging indigenous political and economic interests. A political class developed in each

⁸ In such projects, the contractor sets the terms of the loans, which are notoriously disadvantageous to the contractor -- usually the government. The usual government controls and guarantees which normally accompany foreign aid or investment are absent in this type of financing. See Douglas A. Scott "External Debt Management in a Developing Country", in Tom Farer, ed., Financing African Development (London: Cambridge University Press, 1965), pp. 50-57.

⁹ Africa Research Group, The Nigerian Civil War, p. 12.

region with a vested interest in the maintenance of the status quo and a distaste for any fundamental restructuring of the society.

The political parties: National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC), the Nigeria Peoples Congress (NPC), and the Action Group (AG) based in the East, North, and West, respectively, became instrumental in the development of Nigerian foreign policy in their respective regions which ultimately spilled over into the national scene. Each party in power at a certain time and space at the national level adopted its own foreign policy postulate. There was confusion as (we shall see later) to what was concretely, Nigeria's foreign policy. In the midst of this confusion, one thing was clear. The need to develop economically was the cornerstone of all the major political parties' foreign policy. John J. Stremlau¹⁰ has indicated that, "Lagos sought unabashedly to maintain close relations with Britain and other Western governments in order to maximize economic development."

Lagos sought to maximize more than economic

¹⁰ John J. Stremlau, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, 1967-1970 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 5.

development. The close military alliance structure between Nigeria and Britain at pre-independence, culminated in a Nigerian-British defense treaty, after independence. This meant that after independence, in 1960, the standing army in Nigeria was the queen's regiment (although composed of Nigerians in British Army uniforms) and was thereby a contingent of the British Imperial Army. The supreme commander of this standing army was not the Nigerian President, but the Imperial Queen of England. Whatever the motives were for the military alliance, either to deter the spread of communism or to stand by as a shadow instrument of British colonialism, it was so highly criticized by the Nigerian public, that it was annulled in 1962.

Recalling that Nigeria sought "unabashedly" to relate economically with Britain and the Western world after independence as it had before, the desire for the relationship was dictated by: 1) the nature and content of the economic and political system that had been carved out before independence, and 2) the post-independence functions that system was designed to serve.

In the 1960's, 85 percent of Nigeria's exports were sold to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OCED) including South Africa, and close to 75

percent of Nigeria's imports came from that group.¹¹ Nigeria offered the largest market in Africa and its capitalist economy was among the most hospitable to Western investments. Earnings from these and other primary products financed most of the country's early development. Some of this revenue went to finance the political ambitions of politicians. A case in point was that of the controversial dealings between the NCNC and the African Continental Bank.¹²

The Nigerian political structure with its institutional set up was no doubt a carbon copy of that of Great Britain. The two Houses of Parliament (the Lords and the Commons) were replaced in Nigeria by the Parliament and the Senate. The constitution provided for the parliamentary democracy -- a blind adulation that tended to cover up the true indigeneous political culture. The true indigeneous political culture (though highly influenced by cultural imperialism for about 100 years) was the fragmented political dynasty (where the "emirs", "onis"

¹¹ Stremlau, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, p. 6.

¹² African Continental Bank (a joint owned business venture between the Nigerian nationals and the expatriates) was accused of financing the political campaigns of the NCNC; giving interest free loans to the politicians in order to buy favor from them and refusing to give loans to the minority tribes of Eastern Nigeria. See C.V. Brown, The Nigerian Banking System (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972).

ruled North and West, respectively with a tyranny of power, and the "ezes" governed the East with a tribal loyalty; feudalistic in content but not in form).

Nevertheless, whether in the North, East or West, tribalism was professed by our leaders of the First Republic as the pragmatic instrument of Nigerian unity. It permeated all aspects of public office and public policy. Economic, political, and social mobility of certain Nigerian's (particularly the minorities) became blocked because of membership in a given tribal group. Inter-tribal rivalries were waged along the lines of, "who gets what, when, and how" of the national economic capabilities. Considering the fact that the old colonial policy of Indirect Rule demarcated the country along tribal lines and loyalties for the purpose of colonial administrative convenience, we perceive the functions of these sub political groupings with respect to the national unity (tribal divisions) more as a source of divisiveness than a pragmatic instrument for Nigerian political consciousness.

Not only was the sub political groupings performing the neo-colonial function after independence, but the structure of our educational system was patterned to reproduce a colonial mentality and pseudo Britons.

Chinweizu in, "The West and the Rest of Us"¹³ has shown how a survey of all the imperialist agencies operating in Nigeria from the Ford Foundation to the Aid for International Development (AID), concentrated their major resources on building and staffing an educational system to train the middle class (the reason for this we shall see shortly). Simultaneously, they erected the institutions to employ them and to manage their lives.

The foundations and government agencies coordinated their efforts in this campaign. While the Ford Foundation provided a team of experts to write Nigeria's first six-year development plan (1960-1965); AID promised ₦400 million for financing its institution building process, which itself comes under the heading of nation building.¹⁴

Education played a crucial role in the organization of the market as a colony. It can not only be thought of simply as a process of acculturation or ideological training of the middle class, who later become the managers of the political economy, but it operates within a specific context where it serves a manifold technical function.

¹³ Chinweizu, The West and the Rest of Us: White Predators, Black Slaves and the African Elite (New York: Vintage Books, 1975), pp. 337-340.

¹⁴ Ibid.

Without mass education, the market system of the corporations can not function effectively, either in terms of the jobs it creates or the consumption patterns it establishes. Virtually all children, as Chinweize posits: "in urban areas at least are dressed in shirts and shorts or dresses. These children comprise an immediate market for children's and teenage clothing, and for European clothing of all sizes in the future."¹⁵

The issue is not whether our children should be clothed or not with European imports nor whether Nigeria should import more from her ex-colonizer. While the ability to import bears some positive relationship with the capacity of the economic system to pay for what is imported, the choice of "objective" trade partners becomes an issue if and only if that choice is limited to our former colonial masters and exploiters. That our major trade partners were our former colonial masters and exploiters can not only be explained in our foreign trade structure, nor in the negative impact of that trade relationship with our development strategy (See Chapter Three) but it must be viewed on a systemic level. Part of that analysis we

¹⁵ Chinweizu, The West and the Rest of Us, pp. 337-340.

have already given in the "structure of the political system", and the remaining part is embodied in our ongoing discussion.

The choice of objective trade partners became problematic because Nigeria could not diversify the sources of her exports/imports trade and tended to perform the same colonial functions after independence. The reasons for this must be examined in close ranks with the dynamics of policy formulations that perpetuated the structure which performed these archaic functions.

Already, we have shown that the Nigerian economy structurally provided the political class with many opportunities to entrench itself, both at the national and regional levels. To understand the matrix of the political class is more than to delineate the development of the Nigerian foreign policy by the political class who controlled the political parties; it is to understand the subjectivity of choice inherent in our foreign policy enunciations by our major political parties.

NCNC was the only political party in the early sixties whose origin and constituency was cross-national. Its political ideology extended beyond national sentiment, to continental politics and further on, to international.

concerns. A.B. Akinyemi¹⁶ defends this argument very strongly, and examines chronologically the ethnic biases inherent in the evolution of Nigerian foreign policy (by some of the political parties) alongside the sophisticated machinery utilized by Ghana.

The principal foreign policy enunciation of the NCNC was the declaration of a policy of non-alignment with "any particular axis of geopolitics, Eastern or Western so as to permit Nigeria the greatest freedom of action to choose those policies which would best suit her national interests."¹⁷ The NCNC favored Nigeria's membership in the Commonwealth, but was opposed to Nigeria's involvement in any kind of military pact although it added, somewhat inconsistently, that a position of neutrality in military matters might not be conducive to the national interest of Nigeria. Non-alignment, the NCNC manifesto made clear, was not to be confused with neutrality on foreign policy questions.

Within Africa, they pledged friendly relations with

¹⁶ A.B. Akinyemi, Foreign Policy and Federalism: The Nigerian Experience (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1974), pp. 75-98.

¹⁷ Ibid.

all states who believed in fundamental human rights. Gray Cowan¹⁸ indicates that the manifesto was curiously silent on the subject of Pan-Africanism. But Akinyemi's (1974) analysis consistently identified NCNC with the propagation of Pan-Africanism in Nigeria in the late fifties and early sixties.¹⁹

The foreign policy of the NPC (which became the ruling party in the First Republic) was generally conservative. The party favored membership in the Commonwealth and the creation of close ties with England and the United States. In Africa it advocated the maintenance of friendly relations with all states and made no mention of Pan-Africanism and West African Union.

The Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) took foreign policy positions which coincided almost completely with those of the NCNC. In addition, it favored the creation of an African Mutual Defense Pact, rather than a participation in any form of alliance cohesion with East or West.

¹⁸ L. Gray Cowan, "Nigerian Foreign Policy", ed., Robert O. Tilman and Taylor Cole, The Nigerian Political Scene (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1962), p. 125.

75-89. ¹⁹ Akinyemi, Foreign Policy and Federalism, pp.

Action Group advocated alignment with the Western democracies and declared its opposition to any form of political union among the West African States. It branded neutralism in African politics as an "unmitigated disservice to humanity" and concluded that "such a policy was no more and no less than the projection, conscious or unconscious of the deep seated prejudices which these nations have had toward some of the countries of the Western democracies."²⁰ Action Group saw no objection to Nigeria seeking aid from the West or the East. It favored cooperation between the states of West Africa on a restrictive non-political basis. That is, on the basis of the elimination of racial prejudice completely from the continent of Africa.

Predictably, the Action Group lost the 1959 national election. It became the opposition party, and its foreign policy enunciations became the unofficial Nigerian government policies in the 1960's. Reviewing the Action Group manifesto again, it is not difficult to observe contradictions. Cooperation among

²⁰ Tilman and Cole, Nigerian Political Scene, pp. 128. (quoted from) Obafemi Awolowo, Awo: The Autobiography of Chief Obafemi Awolowo (London: Cambridge University Press, 1960).

West African states (on a non-political level) which the party advocated, was in contradiction to support for the national liberation struggles and the elimination of racism, which in form and content are highly political objectives. Political issues such as support for the national liberation struggles and anti-racism policies can not exist on a non-political basis. The struggle for freedom and equality has historically been a political struggle that demands unified political cooperation, in order to succeed.

Aside from this contradiction, the supposition that Nigeria was free to seek aid from East or West sounded more like a non-aligned position (advocated by the other three parties) which the Action Group had labelled as "an unmitigated disservice to humanity" based on "deepseated prejudices" against Western countries. Nor was alignment with the "western democracies" that the party suggested consistent with the notion of East-West aid.

However, one thing that was consistent with the official Nigerian foreign policy was alignment with the Western countries. The ruling party had included the same policy in its manifesto. When the NPC and NCNC grand alliance took the reins of power in 1960, alignment with the West became the essential ingredient of Nigeria's foreign policy in the same way, NCNC's manifesto of

non-alignment passed into an official government foreign policy objective.

But the question we raised earlier and which we must recall now, is the question of choice for our trade partners. Given the empirical fact (based on our analysis) that it was an official government policy after independence to maintain close ties with England and the United States, then it became very obvious to see why Nigeria traded more heavily with the West than any other geopolitical area. It will become even clearer as we move into the analysis of foreign policy and observe that the development of nurture capitalism was very much tied to foreign aid and investment.

THE NATURE OF THE FOREIGN POLICY

Some cynics contend that Nigeria (1960-1966) did not have a foreign policy -- (Claude Phillips, 1963).²¹ Theoretically it might sound like a farce since every independent state interacting with other states in the international system must be guided by certain basic principles and objectives. These objectives naturally

²¹ Claude S. Phillips, Jr., The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy (Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1964), pp. vii-viii.

become its foreign policy. Nigeria, theoretically, had such principles and objectives.

But in practice they were inconsistent and contradictory, hence the general assertion that Nigeria had no refined consistent policy, no predictable reaction to beliefs and events outside its borders and that when it did, it followed the leadership of Great Britain. Claude Phillips advance two reasons why the critics maintained that posture:

1) That Ghana and Guinea had independence before Nigeria and therefore had been vocal in African politics earlier than Nigeria. The cynics became constantly surprised when Nigeria's opinion on African issues deviated from the more radical views of Guinea and Ghana. They immediately assumed that Nigeria must not truly be independent if it dared take a position less intransigent than any other African state, and that somehow Nigeria did not know where it was going.

2) That the patterns of Nigeria's foreign policy were not always clear, and sometimes not explained at all.²²

²² Phillips, The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy, pp. vii-viii.

Claude's assertions reinforce the inconsistencies we hypothesized. We shall attempt to delineate them as follows: The first official proclamation of Nigerian foreign policy after the independence was the policy of non-alignment. A policy of non-alignment meant that Nigeria would not ally militarily and ideologically with either West or East. But in the first year and a half of Nigeria's independence, Nigeria was more pro-West in her foreign policy leanings; a position that contradicted the principle of neutrality she professed.

One year after independence, the list of countries that had given aid to Nigeria had grown to ten, all in the Western camp: Australia, Britain, Canada, West Germany, Japan, Israel, Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, and the United States. Economic missions had made contacts primarily with the Western camp. The first foreign contacts of an independent Nigeria were overwhelmingly with the Anglo/American camp.

The prime evidence of the pro-Western posture has manifested itself in the following contradictions and inconsistencies: The Defense Pact with Britain; the Nigerian Prime Minister's support for the American decision to resume atomic bomb testing; the rejection of Soviet "Troika" principle for United Nations administration; the rebuff of Khrushchev's request for a summit meeting of

heads of government to discuss disarmament; the ban on subversive communist literature; the failure to establish embassies in any communist country; the refusal to attend the Yugoslav Conference of Non-Aligned States in September, 1961 (because it was held in a communist country); the refusal to grant passports to students wishing to study in the Soviet Union or other communist countries; rejection of Soviet scholarships; denial for the establishment of a Soviet embassy in Lagos; the strong reliance on private enterprise in the mixed economy; the failure to establish embassies in certain African socialist states such as Guinea and Egypt which were disliked by the West; the Exchange of Notes signed on October 1, 1960 by the British High Commissioner and Nigeria's Prime Minister in which Nigeria accepted the rights and obligations of all British treaties that had applications to Nigeria.²³

The Defense Pact which Nigeria signed with Britain in 1960 indirectly aligned Nigeria with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and it conspicuously violated the avowed policy of non-alignment. The anti communist posture in the foreign policy behavior can not only be

²³ Akinyemi, Foreign Policy and Federalism: The Nigerian Experience, pp. 74-90.

viewed from the angle of Nigeria's distaste for communism which she knew very little about, but from the external influence (Western propaganda) that had penetrated the nation's corridor of power, and soaked into the very fibre of rationality and objectivity. It was the same old colonial influence that dictated who should be our friends and our enemies. It tended to dampen our sovereignty as we started to regard even our African brothers as our enemies and produced policies that antagonized the progressiveness of Pan Africanism.

When we look at the Nigerian government's strategy on economic development as it was revealed in the first national economic development plan of 1960-1965, we tend to see a relationship between the Western influence and the Nigerian foreign policy posture. This relationship is traceable to economics. For instance, the first development plan called for a total budget of ₦1351 million, one half of which (₦667.6 million) actually came from the West. The United States provided 0.18 percent of the total aid, United Kingdom 0.11, Germany 0.05, Australia and Switzerland 0.08, and other multilateral donors accounted for 0.18 percent.²⁴ The significance of the Federal Government's

²⁴ Paul Streeten, Aid to Africa: A Policy Outline for the 1970's (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), pp. 156-157.

insistence that the internal economic policy must be geared to the attraction of foreign aid and investment was not separated from its foreign policy tactics.

The nature of the aid and foreign investment generated the development of nurture capitalism²⁵ with state capitalist and welfare tendencies. From 1960 to 1966 the major elements of Nigeria's economic development were reliance on private enterprise, intentions to nurture private business, nationalism and considerable government participation in the form of state monopoly capitalism. Such economic orientations found statutory backing and expression in foreign policy postures as in the "strong reliance on private enterprise in the mixed economy", which we have mentioned before.

When disillusionment with the indigenous capitalists was followed by disappointment with the poor

²⁵ Nurture capitalism is a development orientation characteristic of Nigeria and many other developing African countries. Economic activity in the directly productive sector of the economy is primarily the function of private enterprise while government provides a framework of law and policy. Government attempts transformation through the creation of congenial economic climates designed to assist and nurture private business whether foreign or indigenously owned. See Sayre P. Schatz, Nigerian Capitalism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).

performance of the public corporations (which politicians officiated as managers and chairmen of the board), the country began to place an increasing reliance upon foreign-owned enterprises for the development of a modern economy. The foreign firms were constrained to a limited degree by government pressures to Nigerianize middle and upper level staffs, to make minority holdings available at attractive prices to governmental or potential Nigerian stockholders. This shift to reliance on foreign investment in the modern sector amounted to a de facto change from nationalist to internationalist or economically dependent nurture capitalism. It must not be forgotten that it was in direct relation to the government's foreign policy.

Economic dealings with the Communist bloc (See Table 2.4) by comparison remained negligible throughout the 1960's. Little development assistance was sought and only 6 percent of Nigeria's imports came from the communist bloc. Barely 3 percent of the country's export's were sold to the Eastern bloc. The Soviet Union was admired for its science and technology (space achievements in particular) but criticized, first, because it was communist and totalitarian, and second, because "Russia had done nothing to help Nigeria." Nobody would doubt the fact that this kind of reasoning was not devoid of

a cold war mentality whose indoctrination Nigeria was ready to absorb and incorporate into policy.

When that indoctrination began to recede in 1966, Nigeria started to grasp the political realities of dependent nurture capitalism. Dependent nurture capitalism was nothing less than a generic disease of neo-colonialism that produced underdevelopment. At a certain stage of development, it developed its antithesis -- the political consciousness that questioned its rationality. The Nigerian civil war in 1966 was much less a tribal turmoil

TABLE 2.4

NIGERIA'S FOREIGN TRADE 1960 and 1966

(In Million US\$)

	EXPORTS		IMPORTS	
	1960	1966	1960	1966
USA	45	63	32	116
UK	226	295	256	214
Netherlands	60	73	0	0
Germany (FR)	36	78	43	77
Japan	0	0	78	40
Communist Bloc	2	9	11	27
TOTAL	475	793	-604	-718

Source: USAID Economic Data Book, Africa Revisions, No. 257, April 1971. p. 6.

or the Christian -- Muslim conflict; as interpreted in the West, than it was a function of an antithesis, of a reassessment of how Nigeria was to proceed in the general context of economic and political developments.

The political system finally broke down because the system stabilizers injected by the West failed to maintain the cohesion of the quasi sovereign state. It was ironic that the West who helped Nigeria build the dependent nurture capitalism in the early sixties, would rather see it fight and split apart than maintain a giant image on the continent, and the communist bloc which Nigeria criticized as being totalitarian would help Nigeria in the conflict, to stay unified. Perhaps the lesson Nigeria learnt was that "the realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere as the economist maintains his, and that interests, not ideas dominate the affairs of men."²⁶

The Soviets helped Nigeria, not with the spirit of proletarian internationalism. It too had some interests, and benefitted materially from involving itself in the conflict. The fact that as early as 1967 when the conflict had barely moved from a police action to a full scale war; the Soviets took 80 percent in a

²⁶ Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), pp. 4-14.

Nigerian company -- West African Automobile and Technical Company was an expression of interests, rather than ideas. By 1968 it had exported over six hundred passenger cars to Nigeria. In 1969, trade in non-military commodities, totalled ₦24.6 million.²⁷

Nigeria, on the other hand expanded its exports of cocoa, groundnuts and timber to the Soviet Union, but it also expanded friendship. For the first time, it became the official Nigerian policy to sponsor its students education to the Kremlin and accept the Soviet Union's scholarships, not minding the so-called Communist infection.

One of the greatest achievements of Nigeria in its relation with the Soviet Union was the demystification of the former's perception of Soviet Communism. The First Republic had dreaded it like an infectious disease. The military interregnum came to know that communism is an idea, the same way Ujamaa is (though they are qualitatively different). And that nations in their diplomatic, political, cultural and military relations with other nations struggle first

²⁷ Nigerian Review, May-June, 1968. p. 11.

for their economic survival (interest) before they struggle for ideology.

The development of the Nigerian foreign policy in the seventies was very much guided by the broader experiences it accumulated during the brief interlude of the war. The Soviets were termed as friends first, before they were communists. The Chinese (PRC) who lost our vote (in 1962) to return to the United Nations, won it back ten years later.

By the end of the Second Republic, July 1975, Nigeria recognized the Republic of China²⁸ and exchanged diplomatic missions. Economic Cooperation for West African States was launched in the same year. Following the advent of a new military government in July, 1975, the foreign policy posture of Nigeria took a dramatic turn from a weak, to a tough and effective stance. For the first time, Nigeria's foreign policy objectives were clearly enunciated and codified.

²⁸ Nigeria joined with the other Third World nations at the United Nations to vote for the admission of China into the UN. See Embassy of Nigeria, "Land, History, Economy and Foreign Policy of Nigeria and the United Nations position on the Middle East and South Africa." Washington, DC, 1977. pp. 11-16.

The new government realized that for too long Africa had been tossed about like a pawn in the power chess game of the big powers. And that even the not-so big powers (like Britain, France, Portugal and Spain) whose only claim to bigness was that they once ran an "empire that stretched into four corners of the world and on which the sun cannot set."²⁹ It (the new government) then declared -- "the centre piece of our foreign policy is Africa and its impact can not be felt outside Africa."³⁰ Whatever that means, the impact of Nigeria's foreign policy was felt outside of Africa; because nations relate to other nations in the global international system through linkage politics.

The wars of national liberation in Guinea Bissau in 1973, Angola and Mozambique in 1975, involved the Africans and the extra-Africans. They created tensions between the East and the West. That was an impact on the international system.

Given an alternative interpretation to Murtala Muhammed's foreign policy statement, we might say that it meant, "Africa for the Africans". But we hesitate

²⁹ "Land, History, Economy, and Foreign Policy of Nigeria", p. 12.

³⁰ Ibid. p. 13.

to impute interpretations to statements that may sound theoretical, until we can support it with practice. This dissertation then is partly an inquiry into the construction of social reality (decolonization) in Africa.

CONCLUSION

The evolution of Nigeria's foreign policy is classified in three phases; the first phase is characterized by the inconsistent and contradictory nature of the foreign policy of the First Republic (1960-1966). The nature of the foreign policy had a causal relationship with the dependent economic structure. The second phase (1967-1970) is the critical evaluation of the foreign policy during the military interregnum. The events of the civil war, such as the Nigerian-Soviet friendship pact, heavy reliance on Soviet military aid by the Federal government, and the refusal of the West to sell arms to Nigeria, broadened Nigeria's perspective on the formats of its foreign policy. The third phase begins with the Second Republic (1975 to ---). Africa is the center piece of the foreign policy. We shall discuss in the following chapters that the variations in the Nigerian foreign policy in the 1970's are explained by the changes in

the level of economic growth.

CHAPTER III

ECONOMIC DENOMINATORS

We re-assert the a priori proposition that there is economic development taking place in Nigeria. That proposition is reviewed under the typologies of major economic growth indicators; gross national product, income per capita, export, import, capital inflow, capital outflow, foreign reserves, and balance of payment. We examine these indicators in order to lend credence to our a priori postulate that there is economic development taking place in Nigeria. Before we examine them, we would like to lay a groundwork for the macroeconomic trends that delineate the interactive behavior of these indicators.

Macroeconomic Trends

Prior to independence (1960), on or before 1965, the Nigerian economy was predominantly agrarian. The average growth rate of the real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at 1957 prices was about 4 percent per annum¹.

¹Wouter Tims, Nigeria: Options for Long Term Development, p. 8.

The economy experienced a 7 percent rate of growth between 1951 and 1952; growth declined between 1955 and 1958, and picked up again from 1959 to 1964 at a rate of 6.3 percent².

From 1965 to 1970 (excluding the war years 1966-1969), the average growth rate was about 5 percent. Gross national product (GNP) per capita was growing at an annual rate of about 2.5 percent within this period. Gross National Product at constant 1970 prices increased from a little less than \$5 billion in 1960 to over \$23 billion in 1975 (graph 3.1). Per capita GNP accelerated more than 300 percent. It increased from \$100 in 1960 to about \$379 in 1975 (see graph 3.2). It will be noticed that both GNP and per capita income fell minimally during the civil war period.


GDP increased 200 percent in twelve years. It rose from ₦2,399.8 million in 1960 to ₦4,705.0 million in 1972 (see graph 3.4) and continued to accelerate at a faster pace in the following years. Commodity exports (petroleum and nonpetroleum), jumped from ₦200 million in 1960 to over ₦2 billion (see graph 3.3) at constant 1970 prices. Petroleum has been the major determinant of this

²Ibid.

\$billion

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT

(constant 1970 prices)




Source: Nigeria's Principal Economic and Financial Indicators, Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos, Nigeria

\$


Graph 3.2

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA

(constant 1970 prices)




Source: op. cit.



Source: Federal Office of Statistics, National Accounts 1960-1977, op. cit.

₪ #billion



Source: op. cit.



increase. More will be said on this later.

Sectoral Development

Positive shifts in the sectoral contributions to gross domestic product and shifts in the structure of capital accumulation since 1960 (graph 3.5) both indicate relative rapid growth in Nigeria's aggregate economy. Manufacturing and petroleum industries and the agricultural sector experienced structural changes. Between 1957 and 1958, the changes in the proportion of Gross Domestic Product originating from manufacturing and utilities, increased from the 1954/57 level of 1.4 to 2.4 percent. From 1957 to 1964, mining including oil, rose from 0.9 to 2.8 percent while agriculture and livestock fell from 61.4 to 59.2 percent³.


The dominance of the agricultural sector greatly affected the relative influence of the growth of non-agricultural sectors on the growth rate of the economy. In 1959/60 the agricultural sector grew by 1.1 percent while the non-agricultural sector rose by 16.2 percent at constant 1970 prices. The growth rate of the GDP was 4.3

³Federal Office of Statistics, Economic Indicators (Lagos, Nigeria, 1971), pp. 38-39.

Graph 3.5

GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY KIND OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

₪ #million




Source: Federal Office Statistics, Statistical Annals 1960-78

₪ #billion

EXPORT

Graph 3.6




Source: op. cit., 1970-1978



N #billion

Graph 3.7

IMPORT


(constant
1970 prices)

Source: op. cit.

N #million


Graph 3.8

BALANCE OF TRADE


(constant
1970 prices)


- Sources: 1) Central Bank of Nigeria, Economic and Financial Review 1970-1978, Vols. 1, 2, 3, & 4. pp. 78, 72, and 56 respectively.
2) Federal Office of Statistics, op. cit. 1970-1977.

NATIONAL SAVINGS
AS PROPORTION OF GNP




Graph 3.10





Source: Federal Republic of Nigeria, Economic Indicators Vol.12 no. 10-12, Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos, Nigeria

Graph 3.12
Agriculture/ Gross Domestic Product



Source: United Nations Yearbook of National Account Statistics New York, 1960-1977 Vol.I & II

percent during the same period⁴.

In 1960/61 the growth rates of the agricultural and non agricultural sectors and the GDP were 4.4, 4.9, and 4.6 respectively⁵. The reason for this big increase (400 percent) in GDP could be attributable to the political independence achieved in 1960. After the independence, the Nigerians were psychologically ready to manage their affairs. The government in power placed emphasis on increased agricultural production of export commodities to ward off the extravagant expenditures incurred during the independence celebration.

Agriculture was the mainstay of the economy. Most writers on Nigeria's economic development such as Eicher and Leidholm (1970), Babatunde Thomas (1975), Aboyade (1966), and Peter Kilby (1969) accede to this fact. Agriculture (see graph 3.12) amounted to 67 percent of the GDP in 1960 and 37 percent in 1972.

GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT

A number of specific economic characteristics with international implications are reflected within the global activity of the whole economy as measured by

⁴Wouter Tims, Nigeria: Options for Long Term Development, p. 11.

⁵Ibid.

the GNP levels. These economic strengths (though it is difficult; next to impossible to reduce GNP's to a comparable basis because of different systems of national accounts, different degrees of monetization of the economy, and the problem of exchange rate convertibility), tend to have special impact on the perceived image of national power in the international arena.

For instance, the total value of economic goods and services in the whole world in 1973 was about \$5,000 billion or five trillion dollars⁶. The United States alone produced and disposed of about 26 percent of the world product in 1973⁷. The Soviet economy has been operating for a number of years at a level below one half of the GNP of the United States. It should be stated here unequivocally that the economic systems of the two superpowers are qualitatively and fundamentally different. In 1973 the Soviet GNP was about \$625

⁶ See National Basic Intelligence Factbook, Docex (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, January, 1975). Also in Ray S. Cline, World Power Assessment, pp. 35-36.

⁷ Herbert Block, Political Arithmetic of the World Economies, (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic and International Studies (C515), 1974), pp. 79-80.

billion⁸. The two superpowers together thus accounted for nearly 40 percent of the world's economic output.

Judging from their economic power (GNP), it is no coincidence that the two nations individually or jointly exerted incredible pressures in world affairs, and control almost every traffic intersection of world politics. A study of power in world politics is not only the study of the capacity to wage war, but it is also in the genesis of things, an appraisal of the fundamentals of economic power from which other elements of national power spring. The relative importance of this vector (economic) in national and international forums depends on the rate of change of that vector itself.

Given that vector to be the GNP, the broadest way of calculating the extent of a country's mobilized economic strength is to assess the total economic goods and services produced annually or within another specific period. Applying this concept to Nigeria we can test the validity of our a priori assumption that there is economic development taking place in the country.

The Gross National Product of Nigeria was about

⁸ Ibid.

₦4.8 billion at independence (1960), \$7.8 billion before the civil war (1967) and \$25 billion by 1975⁹. Today conservative estimates count it at about \$40 billion (see graph 3.1). This was less than 300 percent from 1966 to 1977. It slackened between the war years (1967-1970) to about \$11.6 billion. The calculation in this period did not include the Eastern States which were directly affected by the war.

It picked up after the war (1970) and continued to increase through 1973 to 1977 at an annual rate of 12 percent. There are several reasons responsible for this increase.

First, since independence, the manufacturing sector (graph 3.5) has expanded very rapidly. The growth of value added has averaged 11 percent annually. In large scale manufacturing alone, it has risen over 15 percent annually since 1960 and about 20 percent during each of the past two years¹⁰. The petroleum

⁹See Nigeria's Principal Economic and Financial Indicators, 1970-1976. Also in World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfer 1966-1975. (U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, D.C. 1976), p. 42.

¹⁰Wouter Tims, Nigeria: Options for Long Term Development, p. 5.

explosion in 1965 has been the most significant factor that has expanded the economic, social, and political activities in this period.

From 1958 to 1961 Nigeria produced a very small quantity of crude oil which was completely controlled by the British Petroleum Company. The market then was very limited. It was basically the colonial market made up of Britain and Holland. From 1962 to 1969 a substantial increase in production appeared, followed by a diversity of market in Western Europe, North America and Latin America. In 1973 Western Europe including Britain was Nigeria's largest customer, taking about 51 percent; 27 percent went to the United States, 13 percent to the West Indies and 5 percent to Japan. In 1974 the United States figure had risen by 30 percent¹¹. In West Africa the market for Nigerian oil was growing in Ghana, Niger Benin, Togo, and Chad. Oil revenues doubled in 1971, and in 1971/72 budget, petroleum revenues accounted for ₦332.8 million out of a total budget of ₦382.8 million. Oil revenue accounted for 3 percent of government revenue in 1963; 17 percent in 1967; 75 percent in 1972 and over

¹¹Guy Arnold, Modern Nigeria, p. 51

90 percent in 1977. In 1970/71, actual savings had risen to ₦233.9 million¹². Both private savings and government surplus (graph 3.9) was a little more than 10 percent of the GNP respectively in 1970/71. Savings and investment (graph 3.11) expressed as a proportion of GNP rose from 5 percent and 10 percent in 1960 to 7½ percent and 12½ percent in 1965, respectively. From 1970 on, both witnessing a steep increase of over 20 percent each in 1977.

The multiplier effect of the government spending (excluding military expenditure) has greatly affected the Gross Domestic Product. The infrastructural development, for example, the building of new roads and bridges, the increase in the number of universities from 4 to 13, and a 60 percent indigenous participation in all foreign businesses operating in Nigeria and other structural economic reforms have added a new dimension to Nigeria's economic growth.

Another reason for the 300 percent increase in the GNP emanated purely from the international political situation. The Arab oil embargo of 1973 against the

¹²Ibid.

United States and some parts of Western Europe, caused Nigeria to increase its output from 1.68 million barrels per day (bpd) in 1971 to more than 2 million (bpd) in 1973. In 1974 it rose to 2.4 million (bpd). The resulting increased revenue from oil production had induced political and economic linkages. Suffice it to say that the immediate economic and political ramifications appeared in the winter of 1973 when Nigeria became the largest supplier to the United States.

Before 1973, the bilateral political and diplomatic relationship between the two nations was at a very low level because of the United States' support of the sucessionist Biafra during the Nigerian civil war. But the increasing American reliance on the comparatively low sulphur content of Nigerian crude oil, and the perceived political and strategic significance of Nigeria to the West as seen by the United States, necessitated the Nigerian friendship during the Nixon Administration and was followed up to its logical conclusion by Carter's regime¹³,

¹³ President Carter and General Obasanjo exchanged visits in 1977 and 1978 to mend the relationship between the two countries.

The rapid growth of investment expenditure is reflected in the increasing share of the fixed capital formation in the GNP (see table 3.1). Estimates for 1970/71 indicate a level of investment of about 19 percent of the GNP. Public sector investment was maintained at around 5 percent of the GNP from 1958/59 to 1970/71, with some minor year to year fluctuations. Private investment increased strongly because of the increase in petroleum. Expressed as a percentage of the GNP, private investment averaged 6 percent between 1958 to 1961 and reached 10 percent during the latter half of the 1960's. It reached as high as 15 percent in 1970/71. The share of private non petroleum investment in the GNP has risen consistently since 1958/59, except for a moderate decline during the civil war.

Savings and Investment

The Investment and Savings ratio derived from the national account identity of ex post savings and investment, and from balance of payments estimates of foreign capital inflow are presented in table 3.2. It is important to point out that the expanding share of capital formation in Nigeria's GNP, a decade after the independence, was largely financed by external savings

TABLE 3.1
GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION

(In millions US \$)
1970 Prices

	1958 1961	1962 1964	1965 1967	1968 1970	1971 1972
Gross Fixed Investment	240	330	500	488	900
Public	116	126	162	172	200
Private, non-Petroleum	124	196	252	222	470
Petroleum	---	8	86	94	230

AS PERCENTAGE OF GNP

Gross Fixed Investment	11	12	15	15	19
Public	5	5	5	5	4
Private, non-Petroleum	6	7	8	7	10
Petroleum	---	---	2	3	5

- Sources: 1. Federal Office of Statistics, Statistical Abstracts 1958/59 - 1968/69, Lagos, Nigeria.
2. Federal Ministry of Economic Development, Economic Indicators, 1968/70 - 1970/71, Lagos, Nigeria.

TABLE 3.2

INVESTMENT AND SAVINGS RATIOS

(Percentage of GNP in Current Prices)

	1958/ 1961	1962/ 1964	1965/ 1967	1968/ 1970	1971/ 1972
Gross Fixed Investment	11	12	15	15	19
Financed Through National Savings	6	8	9	8	10
Government Recurrent Surplus	2	1	1	-3	-2
Private	4	7	8	11	12
External Finance	5	4	6	7	9
Direct Private Invest,	2	2	4	4	7
Drawings On Reserves	2	2	---	1	---

Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, Economic and Financial Review, 1960-1973.

(see table 3.2). External savings represent foreign aid, loans, and grants. But from 1970 to 1975, capital formation was about 100 percent financed by national savings. The increase in national savings in the seventies depressed the external financing, such that in 1975, Nigeria discontinued with foreign aid completely.

In table 3.2 national savings financed more than 50 percent of the total investment from 1960 to 1970. Private foreign direct investment (excluding the oil sector) was 2 percent in 1960-1964, 4 percent the two succeeding years, and 7 percent in 1970. Government recurring surplus was 2 percent in 1960 and -2 percent in 1971. The decrease is attributable to the increase in the defense budget which took 5 percent of the GNP in the 1970's¹⁴.

NATIONAL INCOME PER CAPITA

National income per capita is another acceptable global economic index that theoretically measures the economic well-being of a society. Theoretical, in the sense that it does not concretely measure the prevalent

¹⁴ See World Military Expenditures, p. 42.

social reality created by the social matrix in any system of structured social inequality. It tends to measure quantitatively the economic goods and services produced annually in a given polity over the given population. It does not take into calculation the variances in the distribution of income.

The fact that the United States income per capita by 1975 estimates was \$6,490¹⁵ does not preclude the other fact (which is common knowledge) that there were millions of Americans whose annual income per capita of that year was much below half that amount. Income per capita as a measure of social category becomes an illusive measurement.

Cross politically, it exhibits the same illusive tendency. Qatar in the Persian Gulf has the highest income per capita (\$12,300) in the world in 1975¹⁶. This was almost double that of the United States. Theoretically, it could be assumed that Qatar was economically better off than the United States in 1975. But by all implications and deductions it was not. Its

¹⁵Ibid, p. 51

¹⁶Ibid, p. 44

income per capita is intimately related to its tiny population of about 140,000 inhabitants¹⁷, as opposed to the United States population of about 213 million¹⁸. Besides, its political structure is semi-feudalist, and income distribution follows the archaic structure of baron and serf.

Nigeria, though not feudalist, exhibits the same tendency in income distribution as Qatar and the United States. At independence the national income per head of population was \$100 (see graph 3.2). It climbed to \$200 in 1964, \$243 in 1966 before it fell to \$221 in 1968 due to the civil war. But in 1971 it accelerated to \$318 and now stands at about \$500¹⁹. The fastest rate of increase ever experienced was between 1970 and 1977. Taking 1970 as the base year and calculating the percentage increase for 1975, it shows 22.2 percent improvement over 1970 and a 4.4 percent annual rate of increase. It registers about a 40 percent aggregate increase in 1977 and a 5.7 percent average yearly rate

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid, p. 51

¹⁹ Nigeria's Principal Economic and Fiancial Indicators, p. 42.

of increase.

One explanation for this high rate of increase lies basically with the transformation of the economy, particularly by the increased production of crude oil to 2 million (bpd), after the civil war. Another explanation could be traced to the casualties (2 million deaths)²⁰ of the civil war that checked the consistent 2 percent annual rate of growth of the population increase in relation to a 400 percent jump in gross national product. The combining effect of these is the accelerative rate of income per capita.

International Trade

Nigeria is an integral part of the world capitalist system. Structurally integrated as a peripheral producer of primary raw materials for the advanced capitalist industrial states, she became 'extraversionally' (outward) linked. Richard Harris, in The Political Economy of Africa, indicated that this form of structural imbalance "creates balance of trade deficit." Extraversion, he said, created trade deficit

²⁰ It has been estimated that about 2 million people died during the Nigerian civil war. See John Stremlau The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, pp. 215-251.

but imports had to be funded by foreign sources, that is in the form of loans²¹.

Extraversion has to be explained not just by the external economic relationship between Nigeria and the capitalist world system, but by the political domain of that system that fixed the price of Nigeria's primary exports. In other words, the agricultural export-oriented Nigeria (1960-1965), with a high import content, was a design of dependency that dialectically generated underdevelopment. It was basically designed by the political superstructure of British Colonialism to be that way.

It was not a coincidence that Nigeria had a balance of trade deficit between 1960 and 1965, (-N88.4 million in 1960, -N69 million in 1962, -N13 million in 1965), and that net increase of official liabilities on Capital Account Receipts was quite substantial within the same period. This net increase of official liabilities represents a complicated mechanism of external financing of imports. The structure of the economy inevitably demanded that form

²¹Harris, The Political Economy of Africa. pp. 99-100.

of functional relationship. It would not just be enough to say that rising import demand, at high import prices for industrialization in Nigeria, contrasted with the moderate export revenue from relatively elastic demand of Nigeria's agricultural export produce, was the major cause of the deficit. Of course, such an explanation would be void of internal logic without illustrating the structural dynamics that is consistent with the consequence.

From 1966 to 1977, Nigeria started to experience a consistent balance of trade surplus (₦55 million in 1966, ₦138.4 million in 1969; for 1970/1977 see graph 3.8). The favorable balance of trade here does not mean that the neo-colonial economic structure (that is characterized by dependency and underdevelopment) has been radically changed, but it delineates the following observation:

1. Changes in the fundamental attribute (notably crude petroleum) from 1966 had impacted the economic and political structure positively. That is the first economic effect of petroleum production was felt in 1966 when Nigeria had a balance of trade surplus of ₦55.4 million as against -₦13.2 million a year before. Oil revenue accounted for 3 percent of the total government

revenue in 1963, 17 percent of the total tax revenue in 1967, 74 and 82 percent of the total exports revenue in 1971 and 1972, respectively²².

2. Changes in the fundamental attribute brought about changes in the economic and political processes that regulated and controlled the economic structure for the proper utilization of its functions, to the best advantage of Nigeria. That is, the increase in productivity generated the political consciousness that utilized the economic strength for political stakes. That implies the utilization of economic strength to change the probability of outcome in international politics.

Our specific interest limits us only to the change in Nigeria's economic matrix for the production of change in international politics (foreign policy). The rise in the export and import trade of Nigeria is broken down into their main component. (See table 3.3).

EXPORT

In the export column, crude petroleum accounted for 57.6 percent of total exports in 1970, 83 percent

²²Review of External Trade, p. 32.

TABLE 3.3

EXTERNAL TRADE ₦ Million

DESCRIPTION	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
EXPORTS							
Oil Sector	885.4	1293.4	1434.2	2278.4	5794.8	4925.5	6709.8
Petroleum	510.0	953.0	1176.2	1893.5	5365.7	4563.1	6281.1
Non-oil Sector	375.4	340.4	258.0	384.9	429.1	362.4	428.7
Major Commodities							
Cocoa	133.0	143.2	101.1	112.4	159.0	181.0	218.9
Groundnut	43.6	24.4	19.1	45.5	6.8	---	0.2
Palm Kernels	21.8	25.8	15.7	18.9	43.7	18.5	27.2
Rubber	17.4	12.4	7.4	19.4	33.2	15.2	14.3
Other Exports	159.6	134.6	114.7	190.7	186.4	147.7	168.1
IMPORTS							
Oil Sector	756.4	1079.0	990.1	1224.8	1736.5	3721.5	5139.7
Oil Sector	52.2	50.6	45.2	41.0	52.4	118.0	97.6
Non-oil Sector	704.2	1028.4	944.9	1183.8	1684.1	3603.5	5042.1
Major Commodities							
Machinery	84.7	136.9	129.2	133.5	196.9	469.3	
Cars (commercial)	50.8	56.2	47.0	59.4	61.4	229.7	
Medicine	25.5	41.3	21.9	39.4	46.6	86.0	
Passenger Cars	13.8	29.5	54.4	76.6	97.0	220.3	
Cement	8.1	17.4	11.7	17.1	34.0	71.1	
Others	521.3	747.1	684.7	857.8	1248.2	2527.1	

Source: Federal Office of Statistics, Nigeria's Principle Economic and Financial Indicators 1970-1977, Lagos, Nigeria. p. 6.

in 1973, and 93.6 percent in 1976, and continues to dominate the export sector as the only significant engine of growth. The non-oil sector comprising cocoa, groundnut, palm produce, rubber, timber, tin metals and others, fell in absolute value between 1970 (₦375.4 million) and 1975 (₦362.4 million) because of price fluctuations in the world market and decline in the domestic production of these commodities within this period.

Non-oil commodities accounted for only 7 percent of the total value of exports in 1974. This is contrasted with 41.9, 25.5, 17.0, 16.2 percent for 1970 through 1973, respectively. It shows a steady decline throughout the period. Its value (see table 3.3) was ₦375.4 million in 1970, ₦258.0 million in 1972 and ₦428.7 million in 1976.

The difference in the contribution of oil and non-oil sectors, to the aggregate economy, is the leverage derived by the Nigerian government from large oil revenue. The value increased meteorically from ₦885 million in 1970 to ₦6.7 billion in 1976.

One characteristic feature of the Nigerian petroleum industry is it is state owned. Increase in the value of crude oil means a direct increase in the

revenue of the government, and hence provides the raw ingredients for the conduct of foreign policy. The support for the wars of national liberation is indirectly linked to the export of petroleum, which releases foreign exchange, that is used for the execution of the wars. The increase in the numerical strength of the Nigerian diplomatic personnel (see Chapters 6 and 7) abroad, has a direct relationship with the increase in the prices and revenue from the crude oil. A rise in the prices of export crude oil increases the total revenue.

In other words, the flexibility in the conduct of foreign policy in the 1970's has been provided by the increased export of petroleum. And that flexibility has a logical explanation in the highly critical and political nature of the petroleum itself. Petroleum, as an element of structural vulnerability will be discussed in Chapter Four.

IMPORTS

The value of imports increased by more than 40 percent in 1971 over the total value of ₦756.4 million in 1970. This increase reflected the liberalization of controls after the civil war for the purpose of

reconstruction. Imports value in 1974 (see table 3.3) was more than twice that of 1970. There were higher increases in the imports of capital goods, raw materials and transport equipment (70.9 percent) than consumer goods (26.2 percent) in 1975 and 1976. The variations in the value are directly related to the changes in the volume of export. While import volume increased by 40.0 percent in 1971, it fell by 13.1 percent in 1972, picked up again by 7.3 percent in 1973 and increased further by 11.2 percent in 1974.

Manufactured goods, machinery and transport equipment (table 3.3) dominated imports with 60-70 percent of total imports. Food items and beverages accounted for about 10 percent.

The oil sector in the import section represents the import of refined petroleum and petroleum accessories. The value decreases from 1971 to 1974. It doubled in 1975 relative to the changes in the export in 1974 and 1975. The reason for this two-fold increase can be explained by the third national economic development plan which was launched in 1975. Increased revenue from exports released the needed foreign exchange, for increased import.

The structure of Nigeria's imports delineates in a certain way the loci of Nigeria's foreign policy. Nigeria imports more from the United Kingdom than any other single country in the world. Imports from Britain were 29.5 percent of the total imports in 1972, 27.1 percent in 1973, 23 and 23.2 percent in 1975 and 1976, respectively²³. From 1972 to 1976 the average annual imports from the United States were about 11 percent while the imports from the Eastern European countries including the Soviet Union were 3.5 percent²⁴, cumulative (1972-1976). Similarly, Nigeria interacts politically and culturally more with the United Kingdom and the United States than she does with the Soviet Union, in spite of the fact that the Soviets won the monopoly of Nigeria's friendship during the civil war years (1967-1970). There are reasons for this.

First, the Nigerian economic structure is a derivative of British Colonialism. Although the content (the growth process) has changed dramatically in the 1970's, because of the increased level of economic development, the form (that is, the pattern of trade

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid.

relationship remains the same.

Second, the fall of Great Britain as the metropole of world capitalism after World War II witnessed the ascendancy of the United States as the new center of the Capitalist World System of which Nigeria is inevitably an integral part. The structure of Nigeria's imports is a manifestation of this relationship.

The point we are trying to convey is that, Nigeria's propensity to influence events in the world is greater in the West with her exporters than in the East where she interacts relatively less. But, the parameter of that influence, we must admit, is limited by the high imports content in Nigeria's international trade structure. In other words, leverage derived from exporting the critical non-renewable natural resource is counterbalanced by the dependency on the imported technology.

That is, the full autonomy of the Nigerian foreign policy is limited by its dependency on the imported technology for economic development. The interdependency of the international system induces cooperation among nations and also constraints in the national-international behaviors of state. Nigeria has these constraints, and subscribes also to the principle of international enmeshment among nations.

Given the range of risks and costs, one would

suppose that the Nigerian government would attempt to structure national participation in international enmeshment with a view to ensuring, if not maximizing the receipt of net gains. It would be clear to Nigeria that some disadvantages of interdependence are the price paid for deriving the benefits; and she would choose a level and structure of interaction in different functional areas that promised a satisfactory, if not the best possible overall outcome in the long run.

CAPITAL INFLOW/OUTFLOW

Table 3.4 shows capital inflow, capital outflow, net flow, country and region of origin. Capital inflow is the amount of foreign private investment that enters a country as capital asset to the receiving country. Outflow represents a loss in capital asset transferred abroad in the form of profits, interest, rents, wages, payment on capital import or capital investment overseas. The net flow is the difference between the inflow and the outflow.

Capital flows to the regions where the expectation for profit maximization is greater. Some of the factors that induce capital inflow are political stability and conducive economic climates. Developing countries tend to create a favorable economic climate in the form of a tax haven to attract foreign capital for investment. Nigeria created one in the sixties, and foreign capital moved in

TABLE 3.4

FLOW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT CAPITAL
BY COUNTRY OR REGION OF ORIGIN
(₯ million)

<u>COUNTRY/REGION OF ORIGIN</u>	<u>INFLOW</u>	<u>OUTFLOW</u>	<u>NETFLOW</u>
<u>UNITED KINGDOM</u>			
1965	85.0	63.6	+21.4
1966	53.0	49.8	+3.2
1967	33.4	41.6	-8.2
1968	68.0	27.2	+40.8
1969	36.2	46.0	-9.8
1970	94.6	47.2	+47.4
1971	207.2	59.6	+147.6
1972	236.0	58.3	+177.7
1973	265.8	174.6	+91.2
1974	119.7	147.8	-28.1
<u>UNITED STATES OF AMERICA</u>			
1965	39.0	2.2	+36.8
1966	12.2	1.8	+10.4
1967	59.4	3.0	+56.4
1968	18.8	0.4	+18.4
1969	56.2	54.2	+2.0
1970	74.6	48.2	+26.4
1971	151.4	44.0	+107.4
1972	17.1	67.8	-50.7
1973	174.3	153.0	+21.3
1974	151.1	159.0	-7.9
<u>WESTERN EUROPE (EXCLUDING UK)</u>			
1965	39.0	26.2	+12.8
1966	26.8	20.2	+6.6
1967	9.8	10.4	+0.6
1968	11.6	5.8	+5.8
1969	39.4	14.8	+24.6
1970	58.0	28.4	+29.6
1971	92.6	56.4	+36.2
1972	150.9	44.9	+106.0
1973	91.7	43.5	+48.2
1974	172.6	128.0	+44.6

TABLE 3.4 (CONTD.)

COUNTRY/REGION OF ORIGIN	INFLOW	OUTFLOW	NETFLOW
<u>OTHERS UNSPECIFIED</u>			
1965	13.0	3.6	+9.4
1966	9.2	3.2	+6.0
1967	4.4	8.6	-4.2
1968	8.0	---	+8.0
1969	18.8	4.0	+14.8
1970	23.8	5.6	+18.2
1971	38.4	10.0	+28.4
1972	28.8	13.5	+15.3
1973	46.0	14.1	+31.9
1974	63.7	24.0	+39.7
<u>TOTAL</u>			
1965	176.0	95.6	+80.4
1966	101.2	75.0	+26.2
1967	107.0	63.6	+43.4
1968	106.4	33.4	+73.0
1969	150.6	119.0	+31.6
1970	251.0	129.4	+121.6
1971	489.6	170.0	+319.6
1972	432.8	184.5	+248.3
1973	577.8	385.2	+192.6
1974	507.1	458.8	+48.3

Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, Economic and Financial Review, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1973 and Vol. 15, No. 1, 1977. pp. 30-32.

from all over the capitalist world system to take advantage of it. Table 3.4 indicates an accelerative and sustained rate of capital inflow into an open economy. The rate of capital inflow is related to the rate of increase in the export sector. Petroleum makes up more than 90 percent of the total volume of export, and the concentration of foreign capital is basically in the petroleum production and distribution sector. This is however, a characteristic feature of foreign capital domination and exploitation, of the national economy.

The incapacity of the regime of the First Republic to have evolved a consistent foreign policy is reflected in the foreign economic policies that open up the economy to attract foreign capital investment whose net flow in 1965 was ₪80.4 million and was ₪73.0 million in 1968. The sensitivity of foreign capital to internal political turmoil could be depicted in the decline of total capital flow between 1967 and 1969 (the war years). The amount of inflow decreased in this period. After the war the great rush was on. The inflow increased 67.3 percent in 1970, over the figure for 1969. In 1971 it increased even more, 94.8 percent over 1970, and continued to increase through 1974.

Total outflow of foreign private capital also rose sharply. At ₪119.0 million in 1969 it doubled the average ₪57.3 million for 1966-1968. The outflow in this

period is attributed to the relaxation of the foreign exchange controls with respect to repatriation of dividends, profits and management agency fees. The outflow was also sensitive to the instability of the political system at the time.

Another point to be mentioned is the fact that the structural changes in the economic system in the 1970's reflected the aggregate rise in all three categories of foreign capital in the seventies. It should be noticed that the level of increase in the inflow of capital from the United Kingdom and the United States had a political connotation besides the overt exploitative economic tendency.

As an instrument of foreign policy, it can be seen as a foreign "trade carrot", it was used to promote detente between previously antagonistic states. The diplomatic relations between Nigeria and the United Kingdom, and Nigeria vis-a-vis the United States were low-ebbed during the civil war. The rise in the capital inflow after the war, specifically for Britain, denotes preferential economic treatment, chosen as a means to consolidate the bilateral relationship.

For companies of the United Kingdom origin, capital inflow rose from ₦36.2 million in 1969 to

₪94.6 million in 1970, ₪207.2 million in 1969 to ₪94.6 million in 1970, ₪207.2 million and ₪265.8 million in 1971 and 1973, respectively. That of the United States increased from ₪56.2 million in 1969, to ₪151.4 million, and ₪174.3 million in 1971 and 1973 respectively.

Both the levels of inflow and outflow increased sharply for companies of Western European origin. The inflow for this group increased by 88.2 percent, from the level in 1973, to ₪172.6 million in 1974. The outflow figure indicates an increase of 194.3 percent from the 1973 level to reach ₪128.0 million in 1974. As a result, a net inflow of ₪44.6 million was recorded in 1974, as against ₪48.2 million in 1973.

There was also an increase of both inflow and outflow of investment with respect to companies owned by nationals of "unspecified countries". Both inflow and outflow increased by 38.5 and 70.2 percent from their respective levels in 1973 and 1974, resulting in a net inflow of ₪39.7 million in 1974.

The components of net capital flow, analysed by region or country of origin, indicate unremitted profits (excluding those of oil prospecting countries) increased by 2.4 percent to ₪85.9 million in 1974, compared with an increase of ₪15.3 million or 6.8

percent to ₦83.5 million in 1973. As in the previous years, re-invested profit (investible surplus) was the major source of investment funds of foreign owned companies in 1974.

There was a total net outflow of ₦39.3 million in foreign share capital in 1974. The bulk of the outflow (₦43.1 million) was accounted for by the United Kingdom companies. A net outflow of ₦8.8 million and ₦0.7 million was recorded for the United States for 1973 and 1974, respectively. The overall net outflow of ₦39.3 million, reflected the impact of the Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Decree (1972), which required indigenous participation of at least 40 percent in the equity capital of foreign-owned companies.

Net inflow from trade and suppliers credit declined by 81.4 percent from the level in 1973, to ₦81.6 million in 1974. This reduction was due to a sharp decline of 81.4 percent from, ₦99.2 million in 1973, to ₦18.5 million in 1974, in the inflow of companies of the United Kingdom, and a net outflow of ₦29.9 million in the companies of the United States. Nevertheless, there was an increased level of inflow of ₦84.1 million compared with ₦24.9 million a year before in respect to companies of Western European

countries and ₦8.9 million compared with ₦5.9 million from "unspecified countries".

The cumulative foreign private investment by companies of the United Kingdom and the United States declined by 3.3 and 2.6 percent, respectively from 1973 to 1974. That of the Western European countries (excluding UK) was ₦459.8 million showing an increase of 10.7 percent over the level of 1973. "Unspecified countries" indicated an increase of 22.2 percent over the preceding year.


FOREIGN RESERVES

The pattern of influence and power in international politics is directly related in part to the structure and accumulation of external assets that provide the flexibility for political action. The financial and military support that Nigeria gives to the national liberation movements requires that financial payment and military procurement must be paid in foreign currency or gold. Not any foreign currency, of course, but a strong international currency that has a high international liquidity; the United States dollars or the German mark for example.

A strong export economy is characterized by the

Graph 3.13

External Assets



Source: Nigeria's Principal Economic and Financial Indicators
1970-1977, op. cit.

volume of foreign reserves it earns. Nigeria demonstrates this characteristic in the 1970's. Graph 3.13 shows the rise in foreign reserves from ₦176.7 million in 1970 to ₦438.5 in 1973, ₦3.5 billion in 1974, ₦3.7 billion in 1975 and ₦3.5 billion in 1976. In 1977 it slipped to about ₦3.2 billion. Gold and foreign exchange contributes 76.7 percent of the total external assets in 1970, 74 percent in 1972 and about 96 percent of total assets²⁵ in 1974. Special Drawing Rights and International Monetary Fund Gold tranche position make up the difference in total assets for these years.

The dramatic increase in the reserves, from ₦409.2 million in 1973 to ₦3.5 billion, was a consequence of the economic sensitivity to the political situation in the Middle East, in that year. Selective Arab oil embargo on some Western industrial nations in 1973 induced Nigeria to increase its crude petroleum production. Much of the Nigerian oil was sold to the United States and Western Europe. An increase in the prices of crude oil per barrel from \$4.0 in 1970 to \$14.20 in 1974 was basically the leading significant

²⁵ International Monetary Fund. International Financial Statistics (Volume XXXI, No. 4, April 1978) pp. 272-275.

factor that explained the meteoric increase in the external assets.

Nigeria's independent and radical foreign policy in the seventies was also sensitive to the accumulation of foreign reserves in relation to the aggregate economic performance which was excellent (the GNP growth rate in 1974 alone was 20 percent). The generosity of bilateral military and financial aid to the struggle in Guinea Bissau in 1973, Mozambique and Angola in 1974/75, and the ongoing guerrilla warfare in Southern Africa, was made possible by the increased accumulation of the foreign reserves.

BALANCE OF PAYMENT

From 1970 to 1976, balance of payment shows a cumulative surplus of ₦477.2 million (see table 3.5). The country's external resource balance (net export of goods and non factor services) shows a surplus on ₦285 million in 1971, despite import payments that were 120 percent higher than the level only two years earlier. In 1972 and 1976 Nigeria had negative balances, of -₦39.6 million and -₦241.6 million, respectively²⁶.

²⁶ Nigeria's Principal Economic & Financial Indicators, 1970-1976, p. 7.

TABLE 3.5

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

₦ million

DESCRIPTION	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
CURRENT ACCOUNT	-50.0	-229.4	-327.7	52.7	3062.5	42.6	-219.9
MERCHANDISE							
(Visible Trade)	173.0	285.0	477.5	1166.9	4439.3	1487.1	1301.5
SERVICES	-268.0	-516.2	-785.9	-1078.8	-1314.7	-1367.7	-1432.0
UNREQUITTED							
TRANSFERS	45.0	1.8	-14.3	-35.4	-62.1	-76.8	-89.4
CAPITAL ACCOUNT	49.2	293.4	269.2	144.8	5.9	141.1	12.5
ALLOCATION OF SDRS	12.0	10.4	10.4	---	---	---	---
ERRORS AND OMISSIONS	47.4	54.4	3.7	-23.1	45.6	-26.2	-34.2
OVERALL BALANCE							
SURPLUS (+)	+58.6	+128.8	-39.6	+174.4	+3102.2	+157.5	-241.6
DEFICIT (-)							

Source: Nigeria's Principal Economic and Financial Indicators,
Federal Office of Statistics, 1977. p. 7.

Nigeria's balance of payment in the 1970's represents symptoms of economic growth. The deficits are planned. As we have seen in the export/import section that we have discussed already, the ratio of capital goods to consumer goods imported is almost 2.6 to 1. Commodity exports have run well in excess of imports capacity, in the seventies.

The rate of capital inflow has surpassed the rate of capital outflow in the last decade (see capital inflow and outflow). This means, in addition to the positive capital account receipts, imports of capital goods for investment does not necessarily have to be curtailed at the cost of an increased economic development program at home.

The stoppage of foreign aid and loans in 1975, meant a reduction in the capital outflow for the servicing of the loans. But the re-borrowing, (\$1 billion) in the European market in 1977/78 does not only mean a new beginning for a new loan re-servicing, it connotes credit worthiness viewed from the standpoint of emerging economic strength. That perception itself has material and non-material gains.

The material is the pure economic advantage that guarantees the loan. The desire to give the loan

and the absorbtive capacity at home to utilize the funds to generate more development are the material gains derived from such credit. The non-material is the psychological category. The feeling that a nation is credit worthy is the feeling of strength - economic strength that transmutes into politics. Nigeria has felt that way in the seventies.

When Murtala Muhammed (Nigeria's Head of State) cancelled the irrevocable letters of credit in 1976, and suspended all demurrage payments on contracts involving the purchase of 20 million tons of cement from approximately 80 different foreign suppliers²⁷, he did that from the position of economic strength. His actions, no doubt, conflicted with the received international laws. And such a default was virtually unheard of in international banking circles, and had prompted suits against Nigeria's banks and agents in Western courts²⁸.

Subsequently, the Nigerian government called

²⁷"Nigeria: Setting Its Own Rules for Banking and Trade"., Business Week, November 3, 1975. p. 40.

²⁸Ibid.

its suppliers to Lagos, unilaterally imposed contract changes, cancelling orders for undelivered cement and agreed to pay only 60 percent of the contract price for the cement²⁹.

The relevance of our argument is that, the rational character of the irrationality of Muhammed's actions is the derived psychological notion - the notion that his actions were rational because he was credit worthy and hence would not be penalized in the international system. In actuality he was not.

While such actions make history, they also make addendum to the multivarious behaviors of states in the international system. We must hint, however, that the psychological factors of national power are some of the parameters of our macrometric power weight theory which we are going to discuss in the next chapter.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter we have empirically examined the a priori postulate that 'there is economic development taking place in Nigeria'. The rising economic indicators

²⁹ International Economic Studies Institute. Raw Materials and Foreign Policy, (Washington, D.C. 1976), pp. 359-360.

that we have examined tend to support this argument. The Gross National Product increased from \$5 billion in 1960 to about 40 billion in 1977. GNP per capita rose from \$100 to about \$400 in the same period. Savings and investment have experienced spectacular increases from 1970 to 1977.

Crude petroleum accounted for 57.6 percent of total exports in 1970, 83 percent in 1973, and 93.6 percent in 1976. Total exports rose from ₦885.4 million in 1970 to ₦6.7 billion in 1977. Imports accelerated from ₦756.4 million to ₦5.1 billion in the same period. The value of capital inflow reserves and balance of payment showed irregular increases.

CHAPTER IV

POLITICAL INDICATORS

We recognize other elements of national power that are instrumental in the making of foreign policy. We hypothesize that these other elements are not independent of the economic potentialities that invigorate their potency and interaction in the national-international arena. We therefore construct in this chapter a macromatrix power weight conceptual framework in order to unfold the functional relationship of the economic determinants of the perceived power of Nigeria. It will guide us to understand the combinations of the relative political weight of Nigeria in the international system.

For instance, a rapid rate of economic growth and development indicates the presence of another property that tends to enhance economic potential for producing military strength, and for exploiting it for dispatch. This is what may be called an economic resilience or flexibility that promotes quick adjustment to new tasks of production.¹ Nigeria may not have the required

¹ Clark A. Murdock, "Economic Factors as Objects of Security: Economic Security and Vulnerability", ed., Klaus Knorr and Frank Trager, Economic Issues and National Security, pp. 67-96.

technology to concretely produce military weapons and hardwares, but she has the economic capability that produces military strength.

The deployment of Nigeria's troops cross-politically in Angola, Equatorial Guinea,² (between 1973-1975) and in Lebanon³ in 1978 was an exhibition and indication of putative and actualized military power (that was fundamentally economic in backbone) to influence foreign affairs. It would not have been possible to raise mobilized (actualized) forces for military action without outside assistance if the economy was not healthy. It would not have been possible either to create and nurture a 350,000 man army⁴ at a time when Britain, the United States and other Western allies refused to come to Nigeria's rescue (1967-1969) if Nigeria was not economically viable to get the weapons she wanted from alternative sources.

² See West Africa, London, October 24, 1977, and also James H. Polhemus, "Nigeria and Southern Africa: Interest, Policy, and Means", Revue Canadienne Des Etudes Africaines, pp. 43-66.

³ The deployment of troops in Lebanon in 1978 was a response to the demand of the United Nations contingent forces in the Middle East. See International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1979-1980 (London: Bartholomew Press, 1979), p. 52

⁴ World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1966-1975, p. 42.

National power then is realistically described as a mix of strategic, military, economic, and political strengths and weaknesses. It is determined in part by the military forces and the military establishment of a country, but even more by the size and location of territory, the nature of the frontiers, the populations, the raw material resources, the economic structure, the technological development, the financial strength, ethnic mix, the social cohesiveness, the stability of political process and the decision making, and finally the intangible quantity usually described as national spirit.⁵

To minimize the risk of circumlocutions of describing elements of international power in their various combinations, we parsimoniously represent them as follows:

$$p^P = (C + E + M) \times (S + W)$$

where

$$p^P = \text{perceived power}$$

$$C = \text{critical mass}$$

⁵ National spirit refers to the uniqueness of the political system to identify itself as a cohesive entity. It is more often demonstrated when the security of the nation is threatened from outside. For more information see Ray S. Cline, World Power Assessment 1977, pp. 11-96.

E = economic capability

M = military capability

S = strategic purpose

W = will to pursue national strategy

All the elements in our system of equation will become clearer as we shall try to take up these elements one by one to explain our conceptual framework for measuring real power in the international arena.

Perceived power denotes the macrometric power weight concretized by peoples' exploitation of the raw economic resources of the territory they inhabit and develop the political and social traditions that shape national cultures. In their interaction with nature they change their environment through the production of material resources, and they themselves dialectically become changed. The quality and quantity of the individuals in the society thus count as much as or more than concrete and material resources of a nation.

CRITICAL MASS

Critical mass⁶ (population and size) of a country is an important element of national power. This perception is based on the amount of territory under a

⁶ Cline, World Power Assessment, 1977, pp. 11-96.

state's control and the number of people supported by that territory. While it may be hard to quantify, there does seem to be a kind of critical mass -- a reflection of population over the size of the territory that a nation must ordinarily possess to make itself felt in world affairs.

We do not hear much about the political potentialities of Gabon, Jamaica, Peru and Qatar (even though the latter is economically very rich) as we hear about Brazil, Mexico, and Nigeria in world affairs. Not only because these countries are relatively smaller in their respective critical masses, they are economically weaker and thus internationally less influential than Nigeria, Mexico, and Brazil.

Again, India commands an enormous population and size that might make its critical mass very high, but India's critical mass in relation to its economic strength (measured quantitatively by GNP, and GNP per capita) is a negating factor to its overall perceived power. However, in common perceptions, very large populations cause countries to be taken seriously by other nations. For example, the Peoples Republic of China, weak in most regards other than population and a strong government, is treated as a great power almost universally.

Nigeria has a population of about 80 million people.⁸ Twenty five percent of approximately 325 million (total population) Africans are Nigerians. Demographically she wields a lot of influence and power within the politectonic zone, and internationally as well. Forty percent of the population is between the ages of 15 to 40. The density is about 70 per square mile for the total size of 375,000 square miles.⁹

While the population itself can not be viewed in isolation, the economic underpinning of the population and size of the territory gives an added weight to the relevance of our critical mass assumption. The rationale behind this concept lies in the philosophic implication and interpretation of the development of the critical mass itself. The qualitative and quantitative production of this mass is related to the strategy and tactics of economic development pursued by the state.

Briefly, we state that the concept of a minimum rate of investment which measures the rate needed to prevent per capita income from falling in the face of

⁸ It is contained in a major foreign policy statement published by the Nigerian Embassy, Washington, D.C. titled "Land, History, Economy and Foreign Policy of Nigeria", November 5, 1979.

⁹ Ibid.

population growth, is one tactic of transmutation of quantitative critical mass to qualitative¹⁰ via the strategy of economic development. A rate of investment somewhat above this minimum is the lowest target at which any economic development plan should aim, though this may involve a heavy effort when the population is growing as rapidly as India.

A second concept is that of a practical maximum rate of investment. In theory, a maximum rate of investment may refer to a level of capital accumulation which involves saving and investing at least all income above a subsistence level. A practical maximum may therefore be determined (depending on the extent of the economy) differently in the light of the extent to which the population would be willing to accept austerity now, so as to enjoy a higher standard of living in the future.

The third concept is that of the highest rate of investment consistent with absorptive capacity. Absorptive capacity depends on natural resources, taxes, the labor supply, the level of labor, technical and managerial skill, entrepreneurial and the extent of


¹⁰ The transmutation of quantitative mass to qualitative mass involves the dialectical process of changing from the lower form to a higher form.

technology mindedness of the population. Maximum absorptive capacity may of course permit a higher rate of investment than that allowed by the ability of the population to save. The question now remains whether the rate of Nigeria's economic growth has affected qualitative production of the critical mass. The answer is yes, and we defend it in the following way.

The Nigerian economy was growing between 1970-1979 at an annual rate of about 10 percent. This growth rate was capable of absorbing a 2 percent annual rate of growth of Nigeria's population. If economic development is measured (which of course it is not) by the rate of economic growth, then economic development is concretely taking place. If it is measured by how the growth has affected the development and production of the critical mass then the quality of the population is definitely having an upward leap that is positively linked with the level of economic development.


Next, we examine the effect of economic growth on the production of the critical mass. We begin with the primary school enrollment followed by the secondary school and finally the university. We are not saying or implying that education is the only determinant of the qualitative changes in the critical mass, rather we are logically establishing the economic determinant

Primary School Enrollment (1970-1977)




Graph 4.2

Secondary School Enrollment (1970-1977)



Graph 4.3
Total Enrollment in Nigerian Universities (1970-1977)

Thousand




Source: 1) Economic Indicators op. cit.
2) National Universities Commission Report, Lagos, Nigeria, 1973-1977

of education in the production of critical mass.

Graph 4.1 shows 3.5 million primary school enrollment in 1970, 5.1 million in 1974, and about 7 million in 1977. Secondary school enrollment increased from 300,000 in 1970, to more than 600,000 in 1974. In 1977, it exceeded one million (Graph 4.2). Graph 4.3 shows a rise in the number of college and university students' enrollment from 1970-1977. Enrollment was more than doubled in 1975 to 32, 286 against 12,000 two years earlier. The reason for this could be explained in the increase of the number of universities from 4 in 1970 to 12 in 1975. The free educational policy pursued by Murtala Muhammed's regime in 1975 was also a factor. The increase in the number of universities reflects the increase in the rate of economic growth. The rate of economic growth does not only indicate the quantitative economic index of economic activities but when measured against the background or rising social indicators (like education and health) it represents the degree of transmutation of quantity into quality. For example, from 1970-1977, a change in one unit of economic growth generated a change in 6,600 units of university enrollment.¹¹ This denotes a positive change in the


¹¹ See Nigeria's Principal Economic Indicators, p. 11.

Graph 4.4
Health Establishments



Source: Nigeria's Principal Economic Indicators, op. cit., p.XIII

Graph 4.5
Hospital Beds, Nurses and Medical Practitioners



Source: op. cit.

process of transmutation of quantitative mass into qualitative critical mass -- itself a critical instrument in the measurement of political power.

Graph 4.4 denotes an increase in the number of health establishments -- hospitals, medical schools and clinics, maternities, dispenseries, and infirmaries. Their number increases as the number of medical practitioners, hospital beds and registered nurses (Graph 4.5) increases. Their role in the production function can never be underestimated, and hence the difference they make in the economic productivity makes the difference in the political process.

In constructing an equation for the perceived power of a nation, $P_p = C$ would be too crude a method if other elements of national power were left out. Economic capability is generally the measuring rod in international affairs of tangible political power.

ECONOMIC CAPABILITY

The universal acceptable method of measuring a nation's valid economic strength (mobilized economic strength) is to calculate the total value of economic goods and services produced and marketed annually, that is the gross national product. A state's economic strength equals the productive resources that its society possesses: labor, technology, natural resources,

real capital (in the form of factories, power dams, railroads, inventories of materials and manufactures); and claims on the real output of other societies inherent in reserves of international liquidity (gold, foreign currencies and investments).

GNP is a standard of concrete measurement made familiar by repeated worldwide use in the information media. As a political machinery its rate of growth and decline reflects the effectiveness and ineffectiveness, respectively of the government's domestic and external economic cum foreign policies.

When President Carter lost a major ally (Iran) on the Persian Gulf in 1979, the first major assessment of the losses was the economic significance of Iran to the United States. It was said to cost billions of dollars in revenue. President Carter's foreign policy was attacked by some members of Congress, the Senate and the press as being non-directional, weak, and undefined.

When we watched the scenario of the Iranian revolution, the attendant evacuation of the United States' nationals and the anticipated economic losses emanating from foreign policy failures, the linkage of economic and foreign policy becomes very revealing. The loss of Iran will undoubtedly affect the United

States' bilateral trade relationship. It will result in a bilateral trade loss. The evidence of that trade loss will ultimately bring about a fall in the rate of economic growth and the overall aggregate value of the United States GNP.

Thus the loss of Iran (a foreign policy failure) is synonymous or equal to the economic loss measured quantitatively by the fall in GNP caused by such loss. But a constant fall in GNP is an indication of the erosion of an economic power which is a critical determinant of a state's perceived power. GNP then becomes not only an economic index that measures goods and services produced annually, but a political denominator that measures the rise and fall of foreign policy loss and gain.

We now extend our concept of perceived power to include economic capability ($P^D = C + E$). Nigeria's economic capability measured by GNP (See Chapter Three) shows a 10 percent average yearly growth rate in the seventies as against a 4 percent or under in the sixties. GNP rose from about \$4.5 billion in 1960 to \$9.9 billion in 1969; and from \$12.6 billion in 1970 to \$40 billion in 1979.

As an aggregate measure, GNP necessarily conceals many special features in an economy. In a developing

economy like Nigeria not all of the productivities get into the accounting process. The barter economy in the rural areas, the services of the housewives and the subsistence means of existence shy away from the gross national product accounting. For this reason we have shifted greater reliance on GNP as an absolute measure of national power to other specific, accurate and essential details. We have selected five broad factors which can be used to modify or adjust for the effectiveness of measurement solely based on GNP. We shall look at the production of these materials: energy, minerals, industrial strength, agriculture, and foreign trade. Others would be useful additives, but these five are recognized and highly visible elements of national economic capability.

ENERGY

One of the most vital components of economic and political power is energy. One special aspect of energy can easily and profoundly affect both present and potential economic, political and military power. Countries producing a surplus of energy, which they export have under such conditions leverage over some other nations. The case of Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Iran, and Kuwait is an example.

We specifically focus on oil as the critical source of energy because it has been highly publicised as a critical natural resource since the 1973 embargo. Its shortage impinges on the consumer as well as on the industrial producer very directly. Its producers are not necessarily its major consumers. But the two top, world producers (the USSR and the US produce 9.6 and 8.4 million¹² bpd, respectively) consume more than they produce.

Its geopolitical distribution is uneven. Where it is found in a large quantity, as in Saudi Arabia, its relative scarcity and the rigidity of supply tend to supplement for the balance of power between the weak and the strong. The increase in the quantity demanded against its characteristic as an exhaustible non-renewable natural resource created suppliers' monopoly (OPEC) Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. The political influence of OPEC as the world comptroller of production and distribution of critical energy is unquestionable.

Nigeria is a member of OPEC. She is the fifth largest producer of crude petroleum (after the USSR, the US, Saudi Arabia, and Iran). It produces more than

¹² Cline, World Power Assessment 1977, pp. 35-52.

2.4 million bpd and consumes much less than it produces. It is the number one producer in Africa and in the Commonwealth of nations. Nigeria ranks first as the world's highest producer of low sulphur content crude oil, followed by Libya and Algeria.

Table 4.1 shows the value and volume of crude petroleum production from 1962 to 1977. It rises from ₦34.4 million naira in 1962, to over ₦7 billion naira in total revenue in 1977. The value of the petroleum almost doubled in 1971, and in 1973, it became the strongest international trade political weapon. That is, the Arab oil embargo introduced a new mathematics into the politics of oil as a political instrument of coercion, punishment, mediation, arbitration, and conciliation. The Israeli-Egyptian non-belligerent position today follows in part the calculus of political variation necessitated by oil.

None of them produces oil at commercial or self-sufficiency level. But all of them exchange their structural vulnerability with their major dependents (Saudi Arabia and the United States) who, inversely depend on each other for technology and oil. The price paid for the current conciliation between Egypt and Israel is calculated not merely in terms of lives lost in constant wars or material energy

TABLE 4.1

CRUDE PETROLEUM PRODUCTION
Nmillion

YEAR	VALUE	VOLUME
1960	N/A	N/A
1961	N/A	N/A
1962	34,420	24,623,691
1963	40,354	27,913,429
1964	64,112	43,996,825
1965	136,194	99,431,000
1966	183,940	152,430,000
1967	144,772	219,300,000
1968	157,996	180,000,000
1969	621,904	150,000,000
1970	509,622	4,308,000,000
1971	953,036	5,256,000,000
1972	1,152,562	7,156,000,000
1973	1,893,541	7,716,000,000
1974	5,365,729	6,711,000,000
1975	4,629,605	6,808,000,000
1976	6,196,188	7,292,000,000
1977	7,086,696	8,111,000,000

- Sources:
1. Central Bank of Nigeria, Economic and Financial Review, Vol. 7. No. 1, Lagos, Nigeria, June 1969; also vol. 13, No. 2. December, 1975.
 2. Central Bank of Nigeria, Monthly Report January 1970 to December 1978.
 3. Digest of Statistics, Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos, Nigeria, Vol. 25, 1976.

expended, but on finding the right equation for the flow of oil, technology, and peace. That formula is still on the drawing board. It becomes very complicated to draw a single solution when Nigeria, Iran, Canada, Mexico, Libya, and Venezuela are the other sources of the United States' energy resource. Much more complicated when all these countries excluding Canada, are members of the OPEC.

However, we became interested in the generality of this discussion because it touched upon energy as one of the most vital components of economic and political power of Nigeria. Coal is another source of Nigeria's energy resource that could be used to correct the world energy insufficiency.

CRITICAL NON-FUEL MINERALS

Before the production of crude oil, Nigeria was heavily reliant on coal for domestic energy consumption and export. Table 4.2 shows the rise and fall in the production of coal, tin metal, and gold from 1968 to 1976. It also shows the steady increase in the productivity of limestone and marble. The demand for limestone and marble changes as the economy moves from agrarian to industrial. These non-fuel minerals are critical to the industrial production

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TABLE 4.2

PRODUCTION OF CRITICAL MINERALS
(In tons unless otherwise stated)

YEAR	COAL	TIN METAL (refined)	LIMESTONE	GOLD (ozs.)	MARBLE
1968	N/A	9,940	657,837	6,067	147
1969	19,840	8,881	690,864	8,449	1,169
1970	60,912	8,068	688,399	3,515	1,830
1971	192,990	7,359	813,425	964	4,765
1972	341,217	6,744	1,406,033	370	3,557
1973	321,131	5,983	1,801,174	648	---
1974	304,035	5,545	1,810,870	197	5,936
1975	248,791	4,295	1,650,264	256	5,680
1976	220,103	3,937	1,553,527	5	1,435

Sources: 1) Central Bank of Nigeria,

2) Digest of Statistics, Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos, Nigeria.
Vol. 25, October 1976. pp. 17-18.

of the country. Nigeria may not be producing some of them for export but it produces enough to meet the adequacy of the nation's domestic uses. Iron ore which is not included in the list above is produced at home, and much of it is imported from the OAU market for the iron and steel industry.

INDUSTRIAL STRENGTH

The gross magnitude of national steel production is one of the most appropriate measurements of the strength of an industrial nation. This is where Nigeria has one of the greatest weaknesses. It does not produce any steel at this point in time. Its first iron and steel plant will start production at the end of the year. Nigeria has a total of 1,034 heavy and light industries in 1974 that employed about 174,675 people whose wages and salaries were ₦145 million a year. The gross output of the industries in 1974 survey was ₦1.4 billion, and value added was ₦682 million.¹³

FOODS

Nations that must import food suffer from the uncertainty of dealing on sometimes tight international markets, and may have to endure domestic disruptions if

¹³ See Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos. Digest of Statistics, Vol. 25. October 1976 and 1977.

TABLE 4.3

IMPORT AND EXPORT OF FOODS ₦ '000

YEAR	IMPORT	EXPORT*
1970	4,808	13,976
1971	7,322	13,956
1972	7,924	10,464
1973	10,525	13,407
1974	12,898	16,575
1975	24,825	18,049

Source: Digest of Statistics, Vol 25, Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos, Nigeria. pp. 26-28.

*Export refers to foods grown, produced or manufactured in Nigeria.

TABLE 4.4

IMPORT OF PRINCIPAL FOOD ITEMS
₦ '000

YEAR	SUGAR	CONFECTIONARY	COMMON SALT	FISH	MILK
1970	950	62	484	244	1140
1971	1494	168	618	222	1810
1972	1798	132	590	440	2062
1973	530	123	822	509	1852
1974	82	157	826	612	2105
1975	162	240	1002	3223	4372

Source: Digest of Statistics, Vol. 25, p. 37.

food is inadequate, and in any case use valuable foreign reserves that could otherwise purchase minerals, machines, technology and weapons. Alternatively, nations that produce a surplus of food commodities are insulated from the vagaries of the climate and the international market. They also possess potential bargaining power in international relations.

Nigeria produces 80 percent of the foods that it needs.¹⁴ They range from cassave, rice, yams, corn, millet, beef and poultry. Between 1970 and 1974, she exported more food products (N86.4 million) than she imported (N43.4 million, See Table 4.3). Beginning from 1975, when the income from oil revenue was increasingly felt by different sectors of the economy, increased demand for food resulted in imports tipping over exports by 27 percent. From then on Nigeria imported more foods than she exported until it was halted in 1978 by stricter foreign exchange impositions. The "rice scandal" in 1975-1977 owes an explanation to the increased demand for food caused by a rise in income and increasing standard of living. The rise in the

¹⁴ Digest of Statistics, Vol. 25, October, 1976 and 1977.

effective demand for fish and milk (See Table 4.4) jumped in 1975 to 426.6 percent and 107.6 percent, respectively over the schedule for 1974. Operation Feed the Nation in 1977-1980 was an economic program adopted to reverse the trends of food importation. Unless Nigeria is practically involved in increasing investment in the food sector in order to raise the productivity of foods and food related products, her emerging political power will weaken considerably once her international interdependence on food reduces her leverage on oil.

TRADE

Foreign trade is a good indicator of power or leverage exercised in international economic relations. Leverage derived from domination of world trade in certain regions or in certain commodities, mainly through exporting sought-after goods (such as crude petroleum or food) and services gives the producer extensive penetration in the business activities of foreigners.¹⁵ Saudi Arabia dominates the world crude petroleum as Japan and the United States dominate world

¹⁵ Klaus Knorr and Frank N. Trager made similar arguments in Economic Issues and National Security, pp. 1-19, 99-127.

production and distribution of electronics and heavy machineries. The extent of the Saudi's penetration of the United States' market is determined by the magnitude of foreign reserves (dollars) released by the export of crude petroleum. In the same way Japan and the United States have penetrated the non-socialist economies extensively because of the uniqueness of their manufactured goods and the increased demand for them.

If any country is the major supplier of some vital commodity to another, the former has economic leverage over the latter; alternatively if the country is the major producer of another's primary export, it too has a certain kind of leverage. Perceptions of nations as major traders in the world economy contribute to an image of power that connotes not only economic productivity but also the political ability to influence access to the raw material resources, marketplaces and sea-routes. The trade variable thus crudely represents a nation's influence as a supplier or user of the world's valued goods and services.

Nigeria engaged in 0.9 percent¹⁶ of the total

¹⁶ The percentage must have definitely gone up now. Herbert Block in Political Arithmetic of World Economies did this calculation in 1974. See Block, pp. 70-80.

trade in 1975 and occupied a 25th position out of a rank list of 63 countries surveyed in 1975. Besides the low ratio of participation in aggregate world trade, she produces one of the critically most sought-after commodity (crude petroleum). She is the largest producer of palm oil and kernel, and third largest producer of world cocoa.¹⁷

The Nigerian economy is totally dominated by the production of petroleum which supplies 93 percent of export earnings, 90 percent of government revenues, and 47 percent of the gross domestic product. However, the more a society is dependent on foreign trade and capital transfers, the more of its welfare is at stake in a cross-boundary transactions. Because volume of trade relative to the size of GNP is one source of structural vulnerability, it is interesting to note how greatly countries differ in this respect.

In 1972, Israel's exports plus imports were equivalent of 89 percent of its gross domestic product, Jamaica's 80 percent, Denmark's 58, and Nigeria's 57 percent. At the middle range was 43 percent for West Germany and 44 percent for Great Britain. At the other

¹⁷ Digest of Statistics, Vol. 25, October, 1976 p. 13.

extreme was 12 percent for the United States.¹⁸

The less the ratio of foreign trade to gross domestic product, the less vulnerable the political system is in periods of war, trade embargo, or any form of international conflict that tends to limit a nation's capacity and capability to export and import the necessary goods and services. The growth in Nigeria's indigeneous domestic capital (42 percent in 1974, See Chapter Three) for equity participation in foreign investment has substantially reduced dependency on capital transfers as a source of structural vulnerability.

But structural vulnerability of a monopolistic supply of critical non-renewable commodity with relatively high inelasticity of demand is like a double-edged sword. The reason being that most economic relationships usually involve the simultaneous existence of both economic vulnerability and economic power for the actors involved. The precise balance depends on the relative costs in changing the relationship for the involved parties. Dependence on imported raw materials is a vulnerability, but it is

¹⁸ See Klaus Knorr, The Power of Nations, pp. 84-85.

also a source of economic power over an exporting country that may depend upon its foreign exchange earnings from the sale of raw materials to procure necessary military weapons.

MILITARY CAPABILITY

There is a close relationship between GNP and military expenditures of states. Klaus Knorr has shown how in 1970 the ten states ranking first in economic output, in descending order of magnitude -- the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, West Germany, France, the United Kingdom, China, Italy, Canada and India related their military expenditures to their GNP. Together they produced 79 percent of world GNP and accounted for 87 percent of world military expenditures. All economically developed countries small and large produced 83 percent of world military spending. The United States and the Soviet Union together contributed nearly 50 percent of total world production and 70 percent of world military outlays.¹⁹

Because GNP reflects size of population and stage of economic development, some countries of large population (e.g., China and India) produce large

¹⁹ Cline, World Power Assessment 1977, pp. 35-40.

GNP's and large military expenditures, even though they are economically underdeveloped or developing, while other countries of moderate population like France and West Germany rank high in GNP and military outlays, because they are economically developed and rich.

Over time, national economic bases of military strength change directly with the rate of economic development and the expansion of industries and services vital to arms production. Britain's military pre-eminence during the first half of the nineteenth century resulted from her lead in industrialization.²⁰ By the beginning of the twentieth century, other Western societies, especially Germany and the United States, had caught up enough with Britain industrial capacity to challenge her military lead. If the United States emerged from the World War II as the greatest military power, it was made possible by her enormous economic, industrial, and technological superiority.²¹

Realizing then that the ultimate determinant of national power in conflict basically lies in its

²⁰ Knorr, The Power of Nations, p. 85.

²¹ Ibid.


military capability -- putative, actualized, threat or deterrence, we expand our equation thus:

$$p^D = C + E + M$$

Graph 4.6 indicates the growth in Nigeria's military expenditures relative to the growth in gross national product. Military expenditure expressed as a percentage of GNP in 1966 was only 1.25 percent. From 1967 to 1969 it rose at an average yearly growth rate of 5.69 percent. The civil war at this period was responsible for the increase. In 1977 it was about 6 percent. The peace time increase in the military expenditure from 1975 to 1977 was about 50 percent of the 1975 figure (Graph 4.7). The Southern African conflict (particularly the wars of national liberation in Angola and Mozambique) could be responsible for this enormous increase. Another explanation for this was the importation of military hardwares from the United States, the United Kingdom, and France in 1977.

The numeric strength of the armed forces was reduced from 350,000 in 1971 to about 220,000 in 1977 (Graph 4.8). Military expenditure per armed force skyrocketed during the war years (Graph 4.9). It fell in 1970 to about \$3,500 per man and then almost evened out in 1975 to 1977. Nigeria's military forces


Graph 4.6
Military Expenditure/ Gross National Product



- Sources: 1. Compiled from World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfer 1966-1975, op. cit., p.42
 2. Ruth Leper Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures, Washington, D.C. 1978 p.
 3. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1979-1980, London: Adlard & Son Ltd., Bartholomew Press, 1979, p. 52

Graph 4.7

MILITARY EXPENDITURE IN CONSTANT 1970 U.S. MILLION DOLLARS




Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfer, op. cit.

Graph 4.8


ARMED FORCES

(Thousand)



Sources: 1) World Military Expenditures, op. cit.
2) Ruth Leger Sivard, op. cit.

Graph 4.9



Source: World Military Expenditures, op. cit.

have experienced combats outside of its territorial boundaries. It was deployed in the Congo in 1961, in Tanzania (1964) and now in Lebanon as the United Nations' peace keeping forces.

NATIONAL STRATEGY AND NATIONAL WILL

People join together in a nation because they share common purposes over and above their individual goals in life. Not every one in a nation need agree on all of those broader purposes but there is a general direction or trend discernible in every community whether or not it is clearly articulated. In international affairs the common purpose ought to include a strategy for dealing with other nations in ways that protect and enhance one's own goals.

A nation may either be efficient or inept in carrying out its policies, depending on the strenght of the political will of the people as expressed in their national decision making (the political leadership). National will may be unified and enthusiastic in support of a particular strategy, or it may be sluggish and uncertain.

It was sluggish and uncertain in Nigeria with the First Republic. Certain divisive cultural and psychological factors could be cited in order to make

this point. The leadership of the First Republic had to deal with the political system that was fluid, devoid of political cohesiveness and therefore very vulnerable. The ethnic make-up in Nigeria is multipluralistic, about 250 cultural groups who owed their allegiance first to their tribe and second to the state.

The engineering of the political system to articulate these values became political actions of the leaders of the First Republic, and such actions were manifested in such statements as "tribalism is the pragmatic instrument of national unity." When there emerged the first national leader, he emerged into a state with many nations. The will to lead was there, but the logical impossibility of generating national consciousness in order to move the nation predicated in domestic conflicts.

Nigerian foreign policy at this time had no direction, no well defined objectives. Many mistakes were made. Latin America, Eastern Europe and Asia (except India and Pakistan) were ignored. No interest was shown in the Kashmir dispute, the Algerian/Moroccan dispute, the China-India border dispute. Relationships with the United Kingdom,

the United States, Israel and Western Europe were stronger than relationships with the African nations.

Although Nigeria protested and broke diplomatic relations with France when the latter tested the atomic bomb in the Sahara desert, its foreign policy was limited, conciliatory, non-involvement in African disputes, peaceful negotiation and moderation, even on emotional issues such as apartheid. It was part of the moderation of the Abubakar Tafewa Balewa's regime (1960-1966) to prefer peaceful solutions to the problems in Southern Africa that ended his regime and his life in 1966.

Next came the military interregnum, and from it emerged General Gowon (1967-1975). As a soldier he was authoritative, and later on moderate. The motions in the Nigerian economy were changing. The evolution of the country through the civil war, the disappointment with the West, the new Nigerian-Soviet military, economic, and diplomatic relationships and above all the economic resiliency broadened and toughened Nigeria's global perspective on foreign policy. Diplomatic relations were established with all the socialist states in the international system

The perception of Nigeria by the major powers

changed from that of statistically (population-wise) significance to that of strategically importance. It changed because the perception of "self" to Nigeria changed with respect to its objective role in its politectonic zone, in the international system with other major powers and particularly in the control of its domestic economy. The Indigenization Decree and the Nigerian Enterprise Promotion Decree were radical manifestos of economic nationalism. The military aid to Guinea Bissau in 1973 was as important as the Nigerian regiment (one battalion) which was sent to Tanzania when that country was faced with insurrection in 1964.

After General Gowon came General Murtala Muhammed. His regime was short and brief, but it was the most exciting and concentrated. Radicalism started right from the domestic front. Radicalism here should be viewed as a social phenomena that has a historical process. The moderation of General Gowon entrenched corrupt military and civilian practices that tended to negate the reasons that caused the first military take over in 1966.

In 1975, General Murtala Muhammed hatched a new revolution of rising expectations. More than 50

percent of the Nigerian civil servants (both Federal and State) were fired for reasons of corruption, inefficiency, and old age. Almost all of the states' military governors were either fired, retired, or replaced depending on the nature and gravity of the offenses each committed while in office. Law and order for the first time were restored in Nigeria.

If his domestic policy was radical (See Chapter Five) his foreign policy was more radical. Nigeria, for the first time became practically involved in the national liberation struggle in Southern Africa. Diplomacy and violence with respect to the problems in Southern Africa were the legitimate foreign policy posture. Nigeria's experience had taught him that all politically rational participants want to win, and that in the "decisive contests of politics and war, victory is an indivisible unit."²² There would not have been a united Nigeria if the Federalist had lost the civil war. He knew there might not be any independent Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Azania if the revolutionary forces struggling to decolonize these

²² W.H. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).

areas were not actively supported. It was in that same notion that Africa became the center piece of his foreign policy.

When Lt. General Olusegun Obasanjo filled the vacuum that Murtala left, Nigeria was once again in search of charismatic leadership. It is for this reason, and for other reasons that we have mentioned above that we construct a formula which calls for a coefficient, a multiplier, reflecting these two factors, S and W. Our equation now reads:

$$P^P = (C + E + M) \times (S + W).$$

The dearth of political leadership in Nigeria intuitively compels us to arbitrarily assign a multiplier of 1 or less than 1 to S + W. If the multiplier is one, the value of the formula is unchanged. It is an arbitrary scale of measurement but it has the advantage of leaving most numerical weights unchanged, while focusing on deviations above and below the expected behavior pattern.

CONCLUSION

The perceived power of Nigeria is a mix of critical mass, economic capability, military capability, national strategy, and national will. Underlying the

mobilized strengths of these factors is the economic capability that determines their variations in national and international politics.

CHAPTER V

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY

There has been a striking evolution in Nigeria's foreign policy since 1970. First, changes in the national economy have significantly widened the range of options for the exercise of Nigeria's foreign policy in Africa, and inter alia, the world. These changes we have discussed at length in the past two chapters. Second, increased Nigerian sensitivity to these changes has affected its political behavior towards other nations and thus, altered the overall relations among other major powers. In this chapter we shall empirically analyze the resultant effects of those changes on foreign policy in relation to: 1) Nigeria and her neighbors, 2) economic cooperation for West African states, 3) the Organization for African Unity, 4) the United States, 5) the United Kingdom, 6) the Soviet Union.

Conceivably, a country generating national growth may also generate "lateral pressures"¹ in the form of conflict, domination, and violence. Hence we question:

¹ Choucri and North, Nations in Conflict: National Growth and International Violence, pp. 1-11. See this work for a detailed discussion on lateral pressures. It is specifically used in this context to denote the expansion of internal conflicts generated by economic growth and culminating in external ones.

Has the process of Nigeria's national economic growth generated lateral pressures culminating in territorial expansion, conflict, rivalry, competition and violence between Nigeria and her neighbors? Or despite her proclamations of non-intervention and genuinely expressed foreign policy goal of peaceful intentions with other African nations, has her growing economic assertiveness and the flexing of her muscles politically, not collided with the spheres of influence and interests of other states?

If it has, how has Nigeria resolved its politectonic zone conflicts, crises, and war that at least she may not have initially sought? In what ways have her growing economic potentialities affected the calculus of the political equation in Africa and the world?

We will attempt to weave the answers of these questions to the subject matter under discussion. In this attempt we will show that the level of Nigeria's economic development affects its foreign policy format, and that the higher the level of economic development, the lower the economic and political dependency and the more radical the foreign policy output.

NIGERIA AND HER NEIGHBORS

Nigeria has four territorial neighbors and one oceanic. Situated on the northeast and southeast frontier

is the Cameroon, on the north and northwest is Niger, with Chad on the far northeast frontier, with Benin on the southwest and northwest, and Equatorial Guinea off the southern border washed by the Atlantic Ocean.² Two brief observations should be made about these artificial boundaries. First, although they were arbitrarily drawn and often represented a compromise between the British and French colonial interest, they have been accepted by the Nigerian and other African governments. The only exception to this state of affairs (which does not basically need any elaborate exposition here because it has not generated potential conflict) was the undemarcated border between Nigeria and the Republic of Cameroon.³ (A.B. Akinyemi on the "politics of irredentism" has discussed this elaborately).

Second, Nigeria's territorial boundaries were drawn by the colonial masters across ethnic groups. That is, the frontier with Benin splits the Gun and Egba peoples, who belong to the Yoruba ethnic group.⁴ The same frontier in the northwest cuts across the old Borgu Kingdom. In both cases, Nigeria possesses the larger

² Akinyemi, Foreign Policy and Federalism, p. 3.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

portion of the peoples divided. Situations like these would generate pressure for political unification, or political conflict across national boundaries as it has happened at the Horn of Africa (between Somalia and Ethiopia, Sudan and Kenya). But there have been no serious boundary disputes nor cross-boundary political claims of nationalities based on ethnicity between Nigeria and her neighbors. The reasons for that might be attributable to Nigeria's elements of power that are relatively intimidating and greater than that of each of her neighbors. For example, the population of Nigeria is 81.2 percent of the total population of her neighbors (including Nigeria).⁵ Economically she has a higher GNP per capita (about \$500) than any of her neighbors. Militarily she outweighs them in all respects. There is no doubt that the giant size of Nigeria and her relative wealth have had an enormous restraining influence over her neighbors.

Whatever that influence, Nigeria did not exploit it for its advantage, not even for the greater advantage of its neighbors in the decade of the sixties. She was economically incapable and politically reluctant to use her size and wealth to influence events in her neighbor's

⁵ Arnold, Modern Nigeria, p. 140.

territories for fear of her intentions being misinterpreted as imperialist. With her neighbors she pursued a policy of good neighborly relations.

The irredentist rhetoric that occasionally appeared in the federal legislature of the First Republic, notably with regard to the Nigerian annexation of the Spanish island of Equatorial Guinea where thousands of Nigerians worked as immigrant laborers, disappeared with the coming of the military government.⁶

When the governments of the Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea expelled Nigerian immigrant workers and highly skilled multinational Nigerian employees for economic and political reasons, the Nigerian labor force at home absorbed them. The Nigerian government in turn, did not take any punitive action to expel the Cameroonians who were employed in many facets of economic activities in Nigeria. Events like that could have triggered economic or political sanctions or even re-alignment of Nigeria's foreign policy with her neighbors, but they slipped through the federal government without any reaction.

From 1960 to 1966, Nigeria was politically conservative and economically dependent (See Chapter II). She had diplomatic missions and trade pacts with only

⁶ Akinyemi, Foreign Policy and Federalism, p. 3.

nine African countries (Togo, Benin, Cameroon, Senegal, Guinea, Niger, Mali Egypt, and Zaire).⁷ Equatorial Guinea and Chad (two of her immediate neighbors) were not even included in these relationships. In African politics she was eclipsed in the same period by the flamboyant personality and leadership of Kwameh Nkrumah of Ghana. From 1966 to 1970 her influence and leadership role were over-shadowed by the events of the civil war even though the economy was growing.

After 1970, Nigeria's political behavior towards other nations changed dramatically for several reasons: 1) Although the federal government came away from the civil war victorious, and with a booming economy devoid of any external debt, she learned a lesson in political realism from the major powers (who except for the Soviet Union did not support Nigeria, initially). A lesson that distinguished in politics what is true objectively and rationally, supported by evidence and illuminated by reason as opposed to what is a subjective judgement, divorced from the facts as they are and informed by wishful thinking and prejudice.⁸ Nigeria's perceived

⁷ Olajide Aluko, "Nigeria's Role In Inter-African Relations, African Affairs, p. 153.

⁸ Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 4-12.

power was an objective reality, but the dependency of that power, as it was in the First Republic, on the capitalist world system to change events in Africa to the favor of Africans was wishful thinking -- an idealism.

2) It recognized also that the main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power.⁹ That is, in order for Nigeria to objectively achieve its goals it must maximize its power. That this concept of power provides the link between reason (trying to understand international politics) and the facts to be understood. The facts to be understood, Nigeria knew; the method to approach them she, under-utilized. For the first time in regional African politics, Nigeria moved beyond the level of appearances to concreteness -- that is, beyond the realms in idealistic pan African rhetoric (that characterized the 1960's) to realistic and actualized actions that illuminate the concepts of the 1970's.

The stage had been set by her economic resourcefulness. With her immediate neighbors, she re-aligned her foreign economic policies that tended

⁹ Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 5.

to optimize the foreign policy of "maintenance of good neighborly relations with all states in general and with our immediate neighbors in particular; and of dedication to fostering systematic evolution towards unity in the Continent."¹⁰ To Nigeria, economic cooperation has always been preferred as a nucleus for political union. It was the same economic platform that trade, loans, aid, increased communication and perception of Nigeria's national interest in relation to her immediate neighbors, took a dramatic turn (I shall explain this later) in the 1970's.

Between 1972 and 1976 (See Table 5.2) Nigeria exported about ₦38.3 billion worth of goods and services to her neighbors. In turn she imported ₦26.5 billion of merchandise (See Table 5.1). Exports to Benin and Niger averaged 3.5 percent and 25.7 percent of the total export, respectively within the same period. Imports were 45 and 4.3 percent of total imports, respectively. In 1976, the total value of exports and imports were ₦10.6 billion each. This represents an enormous increase in trade flows between the two entities, considering the fact that exports and imports, were valued at only ₦1.3 billion and ₦105.7 million, respectively in 1968.

¹⁰ Stremlau, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, p. 13.

TABLE 5.1
TRADE WITH NEIGHBORS 1968-1976

IMPORT (THOUSAND NAIRA)

COUNTRIES	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
BENIN	44.37	44.68	177.3	209.0	290.0	121.3	1411.2	4987.2	3279.0
NIGER	5.53	26.27	81.88	77.81	62.10	89.24	20.05	357.9	5246.0
CAMEROON	19.06	55.51	268.84	177.78	177.70	55.15	726.0	1717.8	956.2
EQUATORIAL CUSTOMS UNION	105.7	353.16	74.12	29.65	324.03	1372.7	1834.0	2259.9	1158.2
TOTAL	174.7	481.6	602.14	494.24	853.83	638.39	3991.2	9322.8	10635.8

Source: Compiled from Review of External Trade, Lagos, Nigeria, Federal Office of Statistics 1968-1976. pp. 14-15, 34.

TABLE 5.2
TRADE WITH NEIGHBORS 1968-1976
EXPORT (THOUSAND NAIRA)

COUNTRIES	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976
BENIN	109.7	117.19	49.05	64.03	240.72	99.42	413.73	115.04	373.87
NIGER	420.14	49.8	6.24	176.29	545.08	1607.8	2436.5	2293.2	3226.2
CAMEROON	189.8	149.2	79.41	62.34	18.32	162.7	308.2	35.22	608.2
EQUATORIAL CUSTOMS UNION	633.9	26.9	63.8	204.35	2062.5	6543.5	6579.7	5118.4	6400.5
TOTAL	1353.5	343.1	198.2	506.9	2066.6	8413.4	9038.1	7561.1	10608.7

Source: Compiled from Review of External Trade, pp. 14-15.

This increase does not only reflect a causal economic factor traceable to the increase in the economic development, but also the consequential political variable that utilized that factor as the means to maximize the foreign policy posture.

There is no doubt that multilateral trade relationships between Nigeria and her neighbors has fostered some form of economic cooperations. Economic cooperation between states enlarges the size of international economic transactions which is one determinant of economic power. The establishment of the ECOWAS in 1975, can not be ruled out as a positive consequence of that development. The political significance of such a development (multilateral trade relationships) goes beyond the statistical analysis of the terms of trade. It resides basically with trade as a means of economic leverage for Nigeria to objectify its foreign policy.

Let us, then, test our assumption -- whether the level of Nigeria's economic growth reflected in the increased trade with her neighbors affected her foreign policy format? We posit thus: Multilateral trade relationships between Nigeria and the Equatorial Customs Union underwent qualitative changes from 1970-1976. The total value of trade (export plus import) moved from ₦739.6 million in 1968, to ₦2.4 billion in 1972 and

₦7.5 billion in 1976 (See Table 5.1 and 5.2). In the same period, Nigeria accumulated a balance of trade surplus of over ₦20 billion from the Equatorial Customs Union.

In 1974, Spanish troops invaded Equatorial Guinea, which is Nigeria's southern oceanic neighbor and also a member of the Equatorial Customs Union.¹¹ Sequentially, Nigeria countered the invasion by mobilizing its own troops to rout the Spanish incursion.¹² But it must be recalled that Nigeria does not have any military pact or defense treaty with Equatorial Guinea. The principle of the OAU charter, 1963, (non-intervention in the domestic affairs of another member state) limits

¹¹ See West Africa, London, October 24, 1977, and Polhemus, "Nigeria and Southern Africa", ;. 43-66. I interviewed the authorities at the Supreme Military Headquarters, Lagos, and Messrs. A. Yusufari, Assistant Ambassador, and Ahmed K. Sambo, Second Secretary, (both of the Nigerian Embassy in Washington, D.C.) Both the Supreme Military Headquarters and the Embassy officials regarded it as a top military secret, which they were not able to give me any useful information on.

Nigeria on the one hand has consistently denied any dispatch of troops to any foreign territory in violation of the Organization for African Unity Charter, or the United Nations Charter; on the other hand, public statements by Nigerian leaders on the issue, tend to validate suspicions to the contrary.

¹² Aluko, "Nigeria's Role in Inter-African Relations", pp. 140-150. See also, Daily Times, Lagos, Nigeria, December 4, 1975.

Nigeria's military action cross-politically as much as it would any other member of the union, unless duly invited.

Nigeria was duly invited by Equatorial Guinea. The political will of Nigeria to commit its troops to counter foreign aggression in the neighbor's territory must be raised beyond the level of economic incentive (depicted by the ₦20 billion balance of trade surplus) though that will is not independent of economic forces. That will exemplifies the logical extension of Nigeria's foreign policy which inculcates the doctrine of Pan Africanism, demonstrably in the struggle for the eradication and elimination of colonialism, neo-colonialism and racism in Africa.

The presence of Spain as a colonial power next door to Nigeria would have been a contradiction, not only to the latter's political ideals, but to the command effectiveness of its revolutionary potentials elsewhere in Africa. So, when Nigeria intervened, it was much less an intervention in the domestic affairs of another state (because the aggressor was perceived as a common enemy by both states) than an intervention to protect Nigeria's vital national and security interests. A challenge to the territorial integrity of her neighbor from outside, directly or indirectly, would have been a threat to the

perception of her sovereignty, capability and her ability to utilize that capability to protect her sovereignty and that of her neighbors.

When Nigeria intervened, she did not attempt to impose her will on Equatorial Guinea in spite of the fact that more than one half of the latter's population are Nigerians. Yet such intervention sealed up the bid for the revival of Spanish colonialism in Africa. It reinforced the activism of Nigeria's African foreign policy. While it has increased Nigeria's vigilance over her neighbor's sovereignty, it opened the borders for increased flow of trade, diplomacy and mutual confidence in the military and security system.

Within the same period, Nigeria made some grants (N2 million) each to Benin and Niger to help balance their budget and reduce their dependence upon France.¹³ Reduction in neo-colonial cleavages among her neighbors would increase the level of economic and political relationships cross-politically at home, if Nigeria created alternative economic and financial opportunities for her neighbors. This could encourage economic cooperation and cohesion. Cohesion tends to be stronger

¹³ Arnold, Modern Nigeria, p. 140

if one member predominates in economic size and enjoys a position of leadership or domination based on political, economic, or military power.

Nigeria advanced interest free loans of about ₦150 million to these countries and reached a bilateral agreement on the financing and construction of trans Nigeria-Niger and Nigeria-Benin highways.¹⁴ The economic and political significance of such means of communication can really be appreciated when compared with the present increase in communication flow, and contrasted with the background information that ten years after independence, Nigeria and her neighbors had different diametric railroad gauges that made communication almost impossible. The effective demand in cross-political communication indicates a change (positive change) in the level of economic development that sustains the political system. That change is inversely related to the neo-colonial posture of the 1960's. It is tantamount to the creation of a broader based economic regionalism that Nigeria and Togo championed in 1975.

NIGERIA AND THE ECOWAS

The Economic Cooperation of West African States emerged first as a consequence of Nigeria's economic

¹⁴ Arnold, Modern Nigeria, p. 140

insurgence and her foreign economic policy expansion in the geopolitical area. Its harmonious foreign policy with its neighbors was a test for the exercise of putative and actualized economic power in an effort to influence events or change the probability of outcome across its national borders. The success that accompanied that test motivated a broader venture for economic cooperation that incorporated all the West African states with a population of 125 million.

Another reason for such a venture was motivated by the growing concern of the West African states, particularly Nigeria and Togo for a search for economic avenues that could foster political understanding between the French and English speaking Africans that had been split apart by their diverse colonial experiences.

Following a prudent diplomatic maneuvering, Nigeria brought the 15 West African states to sign the ECOWAS Treaty, establishing the Economic Cooperation of West African States on May 28, 1975.¹⁵ A month after the endorsement of the treaty, ten of the fifteen states ratified it. The treaty provides for free movement of goods and people, the abolition of visas, the right

¹⁵ Arnold, Modern Nigeria, p. 142

to reside anywhere in the community, to work, to undertake commercial or industrial activities without resident permits. It provides for the adoption of common road, rail, and coastal shipping practices, as well as common legal jurispractice.¹⁶

The treaty, in content reflects a political document that tends to prescribe a loose confederation of states. The neutralization of the national barriers, and visas is suggestive of a political union. Free mobility of labor and commodities has a characteristic of an indivisible economy directed by one power body politik. Unquestionably, the fifteen member states still maintain their autonomy and sovereignty while they are economically cooperating. Unquestionably too, the treaty stands out to be a major foreign policy breakthrough for Nigeria and her allies in the decade ahead. The immediate economic and political significance of the treaty to Nigeria and the 15 members can be summarized as follows:

1) Nigeria has become the critical intersection through which the Trans-Saharan and Trans-African Highways criss-cross. The economic effect of this means of transportation and communication to the multilateral

¹⁶ Arnold, Modern Nigeria, p. 142.

economic growth is depicted (See Tables 5.4 and 5.5) in the export/import growth of these countries (Senegal, Ivory Coast, Togo, Benin, Niger, Chad, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Mali, Ghana, Guinea, Equatorial Customs Union, and Mauritania) to and from Nigeria which totalled ₦2.5 million and ₦17 million, respectively in 1972. In 1976, it increased to ₦29 million and ₦125 million, respectively.¹⁷ Heavy reliance of trade by each member state will shift the patron-client relationship of the post colonial structure of the 1960's to partners in trade among the African states. It will generate political consciousness that will be positively related to increased economic growth and development. Nigeria, at the centre of this traffic will have to redirect the flow of trade in conjunction with its African policy to the best interest of the ECOWAS.

2) Nigeria per se had an immediate vested interest (which was basically economic) in joint ventures for improvement in ports and land facilities among the economic community. The Nigerian port's congestion of 1975 created by the economic boom, induced Nigeria to vie for ports and land outlets elsewhere, to handle her imports.

¹⁷ Review of External Trade, pp. 14-15.

However, the undisputed fact remains that those countries (Ghana and Benin) that handled the excess of Nigeria's imports benefitted from it economically since jobs were created in the process.

3) The support of the Treaty by such radical heads of state as Sekou Toure of Guinea, who for years has labelled Nigeria as a conservative, and by a conservative such as Houphouet Boigny of the Ivory Coast, who provides asylum for Nigeria's Biafran rebel leaders is an accomodation of ideological pluralism. Houphouet Boigny for years has been traditionally against such groupings as unrealistic and Sekou Toure's African Democratic Socialism has been at odds with other African modes of production that practise a different ideology.

In concrete terms, the bilateral trade relationship between Nigeria and the ECOWAS has increased by over 50 percent of total OAU trade from 1975 to 1976. It has increased from 38.0 percent in 1975 to about 74.3 percent in 1976. Nigeria's exports to the ECOWAS in 1976 amounted to about 85.7 percent of the total exports to the Organization for African Unity, while import over total import was 62.9 percent.¹⁸ Most of Nigeria's imports to

¹⁸ Review of External Trade, p. 15.

this block were purchased by the following countries: Ghana, 42.2 percent; Ivory Coast, 18.1 percent; Senegal, 14.6 percent; Sierra Leone, 3.5 percent; Niger, 2.3 percent; and Equatorial Guinea, 2.3 percent. The following countries supplied 61.4 percent of Nigeria's imports from the block: Senegal, 15.7 percent; Ivory Coast, 11.8 percent; Niger, 11.4 percent; Ghana, 9.0 percent; Benin, 7.2 percent; Togo, 5.0 percent; and Equatorial Guinea, 1.3 percent.¹⁹

Nigeria has experienced a 22.8 percent bilateral balance of trade surplus with the ECOWAS.²⁰ To compensate for the deficit she has invested heavily in joint economic ventures in those countries that have continuous negative balances. She exports crude petroleum to Sierra Leone's refineries in exchange for the latter's high grade iron ore, for Nigeria's steel industry. Sierra Leone also imports Nigeria's coal and Nigeria took Sierra Leone's scrap rails for its coal mines.²¹

Nigeria has invested ₦65,800 in Guinea's iron and ore mines, acquiring a 5 percent holding in the

¹⁹ Review of External Trade, p. 15.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Mayall, "Oil and Nigerian Foreign Policy", p. 326.

in the Guinea company.²² The political significance of this investment weighs more than the economic remunerations which the two states stand to gain. The Guinean acceptance of Nigeria's investment is a trade off of its radical political activism (based on scientific socialism) for a capitalistic Nigerian venture. Perhaps it would be wrong at this point to assess that the motive behind Nigeria's investment is that of exploitation, or that Guinea's moderation connotes the shelving of its revolutionary praxis.

Whereas Nigeria of the post 1970's has propagated and perhaps executed a pragmatic foreign policy of Pan Africanism for which Guinea and Ghana for years had been the "devil's advocates"; Guinea in the late 1970's has tried to revise its dogma and started to accommodate ideological differences among other African states. It would be defensible then to assert that the pursuit of the goal objective of the two differing ideological nations has circumstantially converged on African nationalism. The means utilized to reach that goal is no less economic.

In 1975, Nigeria established jointly owned sugar and cement producing complexes in Benin and Togo,

²² Arnold, Modern Nigeria, p. 141.

respectively.²³ Also in Togo, she constructed a ₦30 million oil refinery which was commissioned in 1977. Today Nigeria imports phosphates from Togo in exchange for crude oil.²⁴ The construction of a refinery in Togo is no doubt a major import substitution to Togo that creates jobs and alleviates balance of payment deficit. It also represents a symbolic structure of Nigeria's bid for African unity. While such a structure might weaken and loosen the Francophone post colonial polarization, by decreasing external dependency and increasing economic interdependence among African states, it also remains an edifice for political and economic cooperation.

The Ivory Coast has been antagonistic towards Nigeria's size, population, and foreign policy since the late 1960's. Its negative attitude toward Nigeria was manifested during the Nigerian civil war when it openly supported the secession of Biafra. Houphouet Boigny collaborated with France (who supported Biafra) to send weapons to Biafra through the Ivory Coast. Biafra lost the war. The Ivory Coast offered a refuge for the Nigerian rebels. After the war, Nigeria's accommodative foreign policy was extended even to the Ivory Coast.

²³ Mayall, "Oil and Nigerian Foreign Policy", pp. 326-327.

²⁴ Ibid. p. 325.

Lagos reopened diplomatic relations with Naimey soon after the war.

In spite of the economic interest and mutual understanding that tends to be proliferating between Nigeria and the Ivory Coast through diplomacy, the latter seems to be ambivalent towards Nigeria's leadership in Africa. It has openly alleged that "Nigeria is the new African imperialist power"²⁵ that should be watched carefully. This is a strong assertion made by one of the respected French speaking moderates. But it is an allegation that has no constituent. While we might posit that the Ivory Coast's perception of Nigeria's emerging power and influence in the continent implies a direct threat to its leadership in the Francophone, but perhaps nothing in Nigeria's foreign policy in the ECOWAS might be termed imperialist.

Yet there lingers an element of pessimism in the assertion. Pessimism that could be empirically validated in history if we raise the general meaning of imperialism to the level of theory. The theory (imperialism theory) was first introduced by J.A. Hobson, followed by V.I. Lenin, then the liberals and the dependency school. The imperialism of the nineteenth

²⁵ Mayall, "Oil and Nigerian Foreign Policy", p. 326.

and twentieth centuries supplied the empirical data that fits the theory. History confirmed the cases of Britain, Germany, Spain, Portugal, France, and the United States, that natural growth generated lateral pressures that culminated in imperialism.

Nigeria's foreign investment in the Ivory Coast might fit the definition of the latter's imperialism, but it certainly does not fit the logic of the theory. Whatever standpoint the evolving pattern of Nigeria's investment in the ECOWAS could be looked at, rationality can not reduce the logic of imperialism to foreign investment. Imperialism in its form and content is a complicated process of economic domination, exploitation, cultural assimilation, and destruction through economic, political, and military violence.

Nigeria might have economic and military capability superior to the Ivory Coast and many other African countries, but nothing in Nigeria's foreign policy indicates the greed for territorial expansion, violence, and conflict with her African neighbors. Not even the level of her economic development (which is relatively low by world standards) can support the imperialism thesis. Its military capability and combined economic and political strength might be frightening to her African neighbors, but that is only relative to Africa, West Africa

to be very exact.

Its foreign economic policy in ECOWAS is a policy of economic co-existence with the African states. Its purpose is to negate the externally oriented neo-colonial African economies. That external orientation has affected negatively each nation's economic development and hence constrained political development in the area. What Nigeria is doing then is to raise the level of African nationalism through the medium of economic interdependence.

NIGERIA AND THE ORGANIZATION FOR AFRICAN UNITY

The founding of the OAU in May 1963, was one of the greatest landmark achievements of the decade by the African states. In the 1960's it remained almost politically inactive (except for few selective instances) for several reasons:

1) The illusion of political independence (attained by many African nations) in the 1960's brought with it economic dependence that affected true political independence. Their economies were still heavily dependent upon, and badly underdeveloped by their post colonial relationships (that is on their ex-colonial masters). Their bid to develop and the concern for economic development tended to overshadow the demand for political action that might jeopardize the cause for economic development.

2) The cause for economic development was inherently thought to consist of foreign aid, foreign investment, and technology transfer. The demand for political action (by the OAU) was consistently the support for the elimination of colonialism and racism in South Africa. The two did not always converge. Since Africa's perception of economic development was dependent upon foreign aid, and the giver (givers) of foreign aid were aggressively persistent in maintaining the status quo in Southern Africa, the conflict of interests diluted the African political activism.

3) Until the 1970's most African nations believed that a country had to be economically developed (like the Western economies) in order to be economically powerful. Portugal is economically more developed than Nigeria, but Nigeria is, in global terms, more economically and hence politically powerful, than Portugal. Power after all includes putative and actualized control over the destinies of others. Nigeria is so endowed. But Portugal is not in the 1970's.

4) The shortage of African political leadership in the 1960's was another major constraint on the effectiveness of the OAU. Ghana emerged early on the scene to provide that leadership, but Nkrumah's conception of Africa's political reality was far ahead

of his time and his contemporaries. His perceptions often contradicted with the pressing African economic problems. Nkrumah even found to his dismay that his political activism did not have its own independent existence outside foreign aid, foreign investment, and the demand for technology transfer.

Nigeria emerged in the 1970's as a new comer; not new to the African political scene but new to the leadership role that had been left in a vacuum for a long time. She emerged not only to seek the "African political kingdom" but to utilize her economic resources as a means to seek that kingdom. Nigeria's African policies in the 1970's were both regional (West African) and continental. Since all West African States belong to the OAU, the two necessarily interact.

Thus, for example, while Nigeria was primarily responsible for persuading the European Economic Community (EEC) to negotiate with the OAU as a collectivity²⁶ (and hence resolved one of that organization's most intractable problems, namely its inability to find a common platform in foreign economic relations), the negotiation of the Lome Agreement contributed indirectly to the establishing of the ECOWAS Treaty. Both represented achievements for

²⁶ Mayall, "Oil and Nigerian Foreign Policy", p. 326.

Nigerian diplomacy, and both reflected in many ways changes in the fundamental attribute that induced changes in the external environment within which African states conduct their foreign relations.

At the continental level, a major obstacle to agreement with the EEC was the size of the European Development Fund. Although the size of the enlarged Development Fund remained less than the African states had hoped for, they were partly reconciled to it by the fact that Nigeria was in a position to forgo financial assistance altogether. There was, however, one exception to this exclusion. Nigeria is ineligible for financial aid where this is committed to regional cooperation projects, and for the first time a proportion of the Fund (10 percent) has been reserved for this purpose.²⁷ While the level of Nigeria's economic growth took her out of the competition for external aid, the problem of settling for what they could get was eased for the weaker African states, while Nigeria's attitudes provided some evidence that her promotions of West African cooperation and continental African unity was not a masked form of expansionism.

The Economic Commission for Africa is a specialized

²⁷ Mayall, "Oil and Nigerian Foreign Policy," p. 326.

agency of the OAU which was established in 1963. Up to 1970 Nigeria made no serious effort to persuade other African states for the necessity of economic cooperation. But since 1970, Nigeria has vigorously campaigned at OAU summit meetings to get the other African nations to cooperate economically. In 1972 the specialized commission (ECA) met for the first time since 1964. The level of increase in the OAU's multilateral trade relationships in the 1970's (which we shall show later) is no doubt indicative of such efforts by Nigeria.

Nigeria has used extensively the intergovernmental agencies to foster economic cooperation in Africa. In 1964, Nigeria joined Niger, Cameroon, and Chad to form the Chad Basin Commission, and about the same year had established the River Niger Commission (comprised of Chad, Benin, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mali, Upper Volta, Cameroon, and Niger). Both organizations were economically dysfunctional in the 1960's when foreign aid was terminated by their primer donors.²⁸ In 1972, it was Nigeria's initiative that led to the Summit meeting of the Heads of State to reincarnate the commission. General Gowon, the Nigeria Head of State proposed to the Summit an increase in the contributions

²⁸ Aluko, Nigeria's Role in Inter-African Relations, p. 152.

of member-states to the commission. He emphasized that the development programs of the commission should be largely dependent on funds provided by member-states rather than on foreign aid.²⁹ It was thus, Nigeria's proposal that led to the establishment of the development fund for the commission.


But skepticism still remains in as much as such inter-state organizations as the Chad Basin and the Niger River Commission are profoundly equally poor. The smaller states feared that if Nigeria accepted a greater share of the financial burden as it has, she might exercise an unacceptable influence in policy. That suspicion has not been proven right so far, but it would be hasty to dismiss it.

Nigeria has expanded its trade significantly to the OAU countries in the seventies. The number of countries has increased from two outside West Africa in the sixties, to all forty one of them in the 1970's.

Export to OAU was ₦5.9 million in 1970, ₦40.2 million in 1973, and ₦138.2 million in 1976. Imports ranged from ₦9.9 million, ₦8.3 million, and ₦45.8 million, respectively in the same period (See Graph 5.1 and 5.2). Nigeria had a deficit balance of trade with the OAU


²⁹ Aluko, Nigeria's Role in Inter-African Relations, p. 152.

Trade With OAU 1970-1976



Source: Review of External Trade, op. cit., 1972-1976 p.4

Graph 5.2



Source: op. cit., p. 34

between 1968-1970. Two reasons were responsible for this:

- 1) This was the war period. Productive resources were diverted to non-economic enterprises (military production) that constrained exports.
- 2) Domestic production of food was undercut by the importation of food from OAU countries.

Graph 5.3 shows Nigeria's balance of trade surplus with the OAU jumped from ₦8.9 million in 1971, to ₦85 million in 1974 and peaked to ₦92.4 million in 1976. 1976 figures show an increase of 43 percent over ₦64.4 million recorded in 1975. The drop in the 1975 figure over ₦85.4 million recorded in 1974 occurred because of the reduction of the purchase of Nigerian exports by Morocco, Algeria, Senegal, Ghana, Cameroon Republic, Republic of Benin, Liberia, Equatorial Customs Union, and Zambia. The reasons for import reduction may be attributable to the Sahelian draught, the high oil prices, and the poor performance of the world economy in 1975. In 1976, Morocco, Algeria, Senegal, Ghana, Cameroon, Zaire, and Equatorial Customs Union stepped up their purchases.

In international politics, trade is often the instrument of foreign policy that settles issues short of war. It could be used readily to cement alliances as Nigeria did with the Francophone, or to promote detente between previously antagonistic states. Nigeria readily opened up trade relations with Tanzania, Zamiba and the

Ivory Coast who were antagonistic to her and supported Biafra during the civil war. As a gesture for good diplomatic relations, Nigeria imported more from Tanzania and Zambia than she exported. With the Ivory Coast she stepped up the export of crude oil (See Tables 5.3 and 5.4).

With Ghana, trade was used as an instrument of coercion. More than 50 percent of Ghana's oil comes from Nigeria.³⁰ Following the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council insurrection in Ghana, in 1978, many Ghanaian officials were killed and many more were detained. Nigeria warned Ghana that oil would be cut off if the detained General Akuffo was executed as General Acheampong and Utuka has been the week before. The execution of General Akuffo took place the next day and Ghana had no oil from Nigeria³¹ until the civilian government came into power in October, 1979.

Coercive wielding of economic power by means of trade reprisals is rarely successful, because even states of great economic strength do not command a compelling degree of monopolist or monopsonist control in their foreign trade. Also the punishment that can be imposed by these means, do not inflict enough pain on the one hand;

³⁰ Africa, The International Business, Economic and Political Magazine, No. 96, August, 1979. pp. 14-17.

³¹ Ibid.

and it tends to arouse the will to resist on the other. Ghana resisted and got its oil from elsewhere.

Between 1968 and 1972 (civil war years inclusive) Nigeria imported more from Egypt than it exported. Imports from Egypt were 33.9 percent of the total imports from OAU (See Table 5.4) and exports totalled only 3.2 percent of total Nigerian OAU exports. Several reasons are responsible for this. Much of the imports were military hardware and personnel who helped Nigeria in the execution of the war. The Egyptian air force physically engaged on the Federal side of the Nigerian civil war as Israel, South Africa and Portuguese air forces involved on the Biafran side.³² Nigeria at the time could not penetrate the military weapons market of the Western world, it therefore resorted to importing locally from the OAU market.

Egypt at the time was a client state of the Soviet Union, and the latter was the only external military weapons market open to Nigeria. Treaties of friendship between Nigeria and Egypt, and Nigeria and the Soviet Union brought arms to Nigeria from both countries. Egypt capitalized on the Nigerian conflict to get rid of its obsolete weapons in the Nigerian import market. The resultant effect of this to Egypt was its increased pressure

³² Ali Mazrui, Africa's International Relations (Colorado: Westview Press, 1977), p. 137

TABLE 5.3

DIRECTION OF TRADE WITH OAU COUNTRIES
EXPORT (THOUSAND NAIRA)

COUNTRIES	1976	1975	1974	1973	1972
MOROCCO	233,264	950	10,150	1,960	2,414
ALGERIA	1,371,179	5,000	15,791	2,120	240
TUNISIA	215	360	27,924	5,566	21,198
EGYPT	31,658	805,532	561,444	141,190	442,088
SUDAN	---	80	---	749	---
SENEGAL	20,163,500	14,157,061	18,333,460	4,770,735	3,154,488
IVORY COAST	25,001,008	29,588,764	30,482,517	7,154,965	3,617,350
REP. OF BENIN	378,870	115,041	413,731	99,429	240,724
NIGER	3,226,262	2,293,258	2,536,569	1,607,815	545,084
GAMBIA	11,071	6,246	6,266	35,120	4,842
GUINEA	9,620	10,000	2,570	8,600	244
SIERRA LEONE	11,810,698	11,616,630	10,675,394	4,006,516	3,342,028
LIBERIA	41,328	77,550	184,022	187,058	180,468
GHANA	58,291,226	33,370,961	35,210,185	14,701,550	4,524,416
TOGO	18,487	77,277	23,484	33,439	25,226
CAMEROON	608,211	35,227	308,276	162,739	18,326
EQ. CUST. UNION	6,400,591	5,118,495	6,579,780	6,543,546	2,062,570
ZAIRE	8,487,299	1,387,777	842,292	368,292	592,380
MALAWI	---	---	190	240	---
ZAMBIA	---	1,380	9,932	11,849	6,546
TANZANIA	1,330	1,700	2,880	1,069	2,326
UGANDA	500	70	20	910	5,950
KENYA	17,899	15,301	11,878	39,635	19,878
ETHIOPIA	1,662	13,090	203	340	131,024
OTHERS	2,194,592	13,321	20,502	345,728	119,196
TOTAL	138,296,470	98,711,001	106,443,979	40,431,586	19,058,916

Source: Federal Office of Statistics, Review of External Trade, 1977. p. 34.

TABLE 5.4

DIRECTION OF TRADE WITH OAU COUNTRIES
IMPORT (THOUSAND NAIRA)

COUNTRIES	1976	1975	1974	1973	1972
MOROCCO	8,380,425	3,589,270	2,586,661	1,485,040	1,008,170
ALGERIA	---	2,734	433,172	40,294	39,768
TUNISIA	41,603	42,856	7,055	9,974	79,090
EGYPT	783,138	961,860	1,527,238	965,261	2,043,976
SUDAN	4,529	3,236	65,698	2,123	11,556
SENEGAL	7,179,615	1,398,623	422,190	607,385	600,562
IVORY COAST	5,388,072	4,346,891	1,013,314	857,299	407,162
REP. OF BENIN	3,279,054	4,987,238	1,411,239	121,351	290,054
NIGER	5,246,048	357,922	20,051	89,240	62,106
GAMBIA	8,541	2,523	8,778	6,316	5,920
GUINEA	40,413	---	8,899	2,519	2,398
SIERRA LEONE	113,938	107,013	205,984	71,614	48,040
LIBERIA	526,709	1,053,361	261,428	65,005	27,416
GHANA	4,120,278	1,624,111	531,924	649,347	808,034
TOGO	2,343,863	1,703,668	128,339	20,580	7,726
CAMEROON	952,613	1,717,835	726,096	55,152	177,706
EQ. CUS. UNION	1,158,247	2,259,971	1,834,044	372,754	324,082
ZAIRE	3,436,927	4,173,482	3,536,575	2,176,103	1,615,814
MALAWI	4,111	106,712	5	10,064	3,754
ZAMBIA	12,967	5,649	1,373	2,001	702
TANZANIA	12,638	126,927	19,117	23,019	30,388
UGANDA	10,060	7,667	4,708	10,578	2,146
KENYA	844,643	1,323,942	314,149	262,168	204,766
ETHIOPIA	8,736	3,749	4,403	32,144	15,574
OTHERS	1,933,970	4,417,126	5,871,731	497,861	543,280
TOTAL	45,831,048	34,324,366	20,944,171	8,435,192	8,360,140

Source: Federal Office of Statistics, Review of External Trade, 1977. p. 35.

on the Soviets to modernize its (Egyptian) weapons system to a degree comparable with that of its opponent -- the Israelis. While Nigeria's absorptive capacity for Egypt's obsolete weapons increased relative to its (Nigeria's) ability to pay for them, plus the length of the conflict, trade between the two countries accelerated significantly (See Tables 5.3 and 5.4).

Another significant point to be raised is that beyond the Egyptian readiness to supply arms over Nigeria's effective demand for them, the subtle economic cum military relationship that developed touched off a delicate political imbalance in the OAU. Dealings with Arab states had been complicated by the federal government's initial oppositions to any attempt to draw the OAU into the Arab-Israeli conflict and by Nigeria's willingness to allow the establishment of an Israeli embassy in Lagos³³ in the early part of the 1960's.

Nigeria had developed a close economic relationship with Israel. In spite of the fact that Israel supported Biafra during the war, the diplomatic relationship between the two countries was not severed, basically because the farm settlements that were established in Nigeria were directed by Israel. Israel's economic and industrial aids

³³ Stremlau, The International Politics of the Nigerian Civil War, p. 19.

were reflected in the second national development plan.

Nigeria came out of the war with a growing economy. After 1970, she re-aligned her foreign policy to coincide with the African reality -- the decolonization of Africa. She could not have pursued an effective African policy without coming into direct conflict with those countries who were opposed to that policy. Israel was inevitably opposed to that policy because of the Israeli's economic and ethnic links to South Africa.³⁴

The subtle economic cum military relationship that forged out between Nigeria and the Arab world during the civil war merged into the continental politics of the OAU and international politics of the United Nations. Within the OAU, the Arabs (some of them) were also Africans, and they identified with the cause (decolonization) of other Africans south of the Sahara. At the United Nations new forms of alignments were emerging between African and the entire Arab states. In brief, these were dramatized in two controversial decisions of the General Assembly in 1974 -- the decision to invite Yassir Arafat of the Palestine Liberation Organization to the Assembly, and the suspension of South Africa from the General Assembly for the rest of that session.

³⁴ Mazrui, Africa's International Relations, p. 138-155.

A quid pro quo approach had already been emerging between Arab and African members of the United Nations. Acclaim for Arafat was acclaim for liberation movements everywhere. The African nations voted overwhelmingly with the Arab states to bring Arafat. The Arab states in turn backed the African resolution to oust South Africa.

In both occasions Nigeria's influence was simmering in the background. When Nigeria joined the forty other African nations to break diplomatic relations with Israel in 1973, it did so because by that time she had displaced Israel in extending economic aids to the other African nations. Nigeria increased her share of capital in the African Development Bank from \$38 million to \$50 million. At the same time the Nigerian Government contributed \$80 million to the African Development Fund to be used in advancing soft loans to needy African states.³⁵ She picked up a 30 percent budget of the ECOWAS. Bilaterally she advanced a ₦500,000 independent gift to Guinea Bissau in 1972, a ₦50,000 gift to Mali, a ₦2 million relief aid to Ethiopia and Somalia in 1973. In 1974, she increased her commonwealth fund to \$1 million.³⁶

³⁵ The Nigerian American Relations, published by the Nigerian Embassy, pp. 83-84.

³⁶ Arnold, Modern Nigeria, pp. 133-143.

Aid is a quid pro quo for international influence. For example, it could be for a military base, a vote in the United Nations General Assembly, or at the OAU. Nigeria did get votes at the UN and the OAU in the 1970's to radicalize the African stance on the issue of national liberation in Southern Africa. For instance, in 1948, when Yugoslavia wished to escape domination by the Soviet Union she received aid from the United States, which was interested in reducing the international power of the Soviet Union.³⁷ In the same way, Nigeria's aid to some of the African countries helped reduce (a little bit) the dominant Western influence in Africa that characterized the 1960's.

Nigeria's aid may be smaller and different from the Western aid, but it is similar. The donor (Nigeria) is interested in assisting in the economic development of the recipient country, because this is expected to permit an eventual expansion of mutually beneficial trade; a consequence that is equally welcomed to the recipient. But it also induces support from the recipient. The expansion in the export/import trade of the OAU countries with respect to Nigeria is a concrete example of mutually

³⁷ Knorr, The Power of Nations, pp. 172-173.

beneficial trade, while the improved unity of voice and action in the OAU is a political action derived from it. Such political action was demonstrated in June, 1971, when Nigeria's Minister of Economic Affairs severely criticized the budget of about ₦2 million approved for the Liberation Committee for the 1971-1972 period. He described it as a "pathetically paltry budget.... which would cover not more than a day's expenditure for a moderate army."³⁸ After his speech, King Hassan of Morocco promised to make a personal contribution of \$1 million, and the OAU Liberation Committee voted again to increase the budget by 50 percent.³⁹

If Nigeria's aid has influenced a political action within the OAU, Nigeria's political action outside the OAU has influenced aid into the OAU. Nigeria and Algeria are the strongest voices for African interests within the Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). There is a de facto reverse representation of the Arab League within the Organization of African Unity. After all, nearly half of the members of the League are also members of the OAU. The OAU on the one hand, is becoming

³⁸ West Africa, July 9, 1971; See also, Nigerian Bulletin of Foreign Affairs. Lagos, Nigeria, No. 1. p. 39.

³⁹ Aluko, African Affairs, p. 144.

a mechanism by which the Arabs can politically influence black Africans; on the other hand it (OAU) is evolving into a mechanism through which black Africans seek economic concessions from the Arabs.

The politics of the Arab League indeed interact with the economics of the Organization for African Unity, and Nigeria is at the centre of it. In 1974, the Arab Bank for African Development made a capital outlay of \$200 million available to the OAU. In the same year, the OPEC gave away \$2.5 billion in official aid programmes to the Third World.⁴⁰ Partly because OPEC is so Islamic in composition, and partly because the poorest countries are disproportionately Muslim, about 80 percent of OPEC's aid went to the Muslim countries. Outside Africa, this has included Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Within the OAU, Muslim recipients of Arab aid have included Mali, Somalia, Senegal, Guinea, and the Sudan. Nigeria's population itself is 75 percent Muslim, and has the largest African Muslim population south of the Sahara. Although it did not share in the distribution of the aid, as a member of the OPEC, and OAU, it influenced the allocation and distribution immensely.

⁴⁰ Mazrui, Africa's International Relations, pp. 151-155.

Nigeria has emerged as the most vigorous advocate of African unity. Its foreign policy, amply demonstrated at Libreville, has represented a rare blend of militancy and economic pragmatism, free of any ideological bias which would allow us to call Nigeria of the 1970's either pro East or pro West. Zdenek Chervenka indicates that, "Nigeria is above all pro African".⁴¹

Before we illustrate the "rare blend of militancy" in Nigeria's foreign policy we must briefly show first the economic pragmatism. The growth rate of the GNP of the Nigerian economy has accelerated from 3.5 percent between 1966-1969, to 9.6 percent in 1970-1971, and more than 12 percent average from 1972 to 1977.⁴² Petroleum oil has been the engine of this growth rate. The first national development plan (1962-1968) budget was ₦3.1 billion, more than one half was externally financed; the second plan (1970-1975) took ₦10 billion, about one third was foreign aid. The second development plan was not effectively implemented due to the civil war. It was re-incorporated in the post war reconstruction and rehabilitation 1970-1975. The third national development

⁴¹ Zdenek Chervenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity Africa and the Organization for African Unity (New York: Africa Books, Inc., 1977), p. 18

⁴² Odetola, Military Politics in Nigeria, pp. 109-141.

budgeted \$60 billion.⁴³ It was self financed, not a penny came from outside in the form of loans or aid.

From 1975 the Nigerian government dispensed with foreign aid altogether.⁴⁴ Nigeria therefore, became one of the very few developing countries which can contemplate an ambitious development plan irrespective of the aid climate and pressure from outside. From 1972 it discontinued external debt.⁴⁵ Graph 5.3 shows the relationship of external debt to the total debt. Total debt is both external and internal. External debt was about 14 percent of the total debt in 1970, 20 percent in 1972 and 1974, respectively and 12.4 percent in 1976 and 1977, respectively. The decrease in external debt brought about a simultaneous increase in internal debt which depicts a healthy economy. It (internal debt) increased from ₦1 billion in 1970, to about ₦3 billion in 1977.⁴⁶ The economic insurgency evolved into economic independence, at least a quasi independence in the 1970's.


⁴³ Asikpo Essien-Ibok, "Nigeria's Commercial Banks in State's Economic Development: An Analysis of Problems, Performance and Scope" (unpublished M.A. Thesis, Howard University, 1976), pp. 5-20.

⁴⁴ Mayall, "Oil and Nigerian Foreign Policy", p. 327.

⁴⁵ International Finance Statistics, International Monetary Fund, Vol. xxxi, no. 4., 1978, pp. 274-275.

⁴⁶ Nigeria's Principal Economic and Financial Indicators, 1970-1977, p. 5.

Graph 5.3
External Debt/Total Debt



Sources: 1) Nigeria's Principal Economic and Financial Indicators, 1970-1977
2) International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund, Vol. XXXI, No.4 1978 pp.274-275

In the aforegone we have shown the variance in Nigeria's foreign policy format which is a consequence of the level of its economic development. We have also demonstrated that the higher rate of its economic development has reduced the dependency nature of its economic and foreign policy output. The quality of Nigeria's relationship with her neighbors, ECOWAS, and the OAU we thus far have empirically established, support this contention. Now we must inquire whether the foreign policy output is radical.

We define "outputs" to refer to the actions and nonactions taken by Nigeria to change or maintain the relationship between its domestic and international environment. These outputs constitute the behavioral content of Nigeria's foreign policy. They are the dependent variables -- the phenomena to be explained (See Chapter Six for a more detailed discussion). Radical is qualitative. It qualifies output but distinctively specifies the nature of the output. In this context we mean:

- 1) Militancy -- the support to or actual engagement in wars of national liberation in Africa.
- 2) Aggressive foreign policy that contradicts the status quo, that is, the pursuit of a foreign policy goal that conflicts with the competing interests of other powers.

Its purpose is to protect and enhance Nigeria's global national interest.

To what extent then is Nigeria's foreign policy output radical in the 1970's. We approach the answer to this question with Events Data.

In 1970, General Gowon, Head of State of Nigeria, became the president of the OAU. Gowon resumed the debate for the establishment of an African High Command and the promotion of regional defense pacts. From it evolved the OAU Defense Commission (under the chairmanship of Nigeria from 1970-1971), and the structuring of the Frontlines States which Nigeria sent direct military assistance.⁴⁷ In the same year, Portugal invaded Guinea. Nigeria called an extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers of OAU in Lagos to discuss the African response to the invasion. Gowon personally offered troops, but the conflict was resolved before external action could be mobilized.⁴⁸

In 1971, Gowon stated that he was ready to supply manpower for the liberation struggle in Southern Africa.

⁴⁷ Aluko, "Nigeria, The United States and Southern Africa". pp. 147-151.

⁴⁸ Aluko, "Nigeria, Inter-African Relations" pp. 147-160.

He did not supply manpower but he supplied trucks, military hardware, medical supplies, food and clothing, to Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe.⁴⁹ Whatever vantage point this action could be viewed from, it was a radical deviation from the non-violent posture of the 1960's. Nigeria boycotted the Munich Olympics in 1972 because South Africa was allowed to take part in it.⁵⁰

Nigeria refused to increase oil exports to Britain in 1973 at the latter's request because Britain violated the commonwealth trade embargo and sold helicopters to South Africa.⁵¹ Such action in the 1960's would have been inconceivable since Nigeria would have feared the British reactions in the form of reduction or elimination of foreign aid and investment. Nigeria reacted still more strongly in 1974 when it took a 60 percent majority share holding of the British oil company, and cancelled indefinitely Queen Elizabeth II's visit to Nigeria, in 1975.⁵²

⁴⁹ Polhemus, "Nigeria and South Africa". pp. 46-66.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 57.

⁵¹ African Confidential XIV, No. 25., December 25, 1973. pp. 4-6.

⁵² Ibid., p. 5.

Cancellation of the Queen's visit is tantamount almost to an act of rebellion and rebuff. Rebellion against Britain, it was not, because Nigeria was no more a loyal subject of the emperium. Rebellion and rebuff against the Commonwealth, it was, because Nigeria contributes to the rights and privileges of this old colonial legacy. Yet again, 1975 epitomized the radicalism in Nigeria's foreign policy. Much of this radicalism we attributed to the changes in political leadership (See Chapter Four). We hold that the dialectics of such changes are not independent of the economic resilience.

In 1975, nationalization of Gulf Oil Nigeria, Ltd. was threatened when Gulf refused to pay royalties (for the production of oil in Cabinda) to the MPLA government in Angola. Gulf did pay the royalties. In April, the Nigerian government acquired a 60 percent share in the Anglo-Dutch Shell marketing organization. She changed the Shell BP emblem and replaced it with Nigeria's insignia.⁵³ Thus began a prelude to the actual nationalization of the Shell BP oil company in 1979.

Multinational corporations operating in Nigeria, were asked to choose between business in Nigeria and

⁵³ African Confidential XIV, No. 25., December 25, 1973. pp. 4-6.

business in South Africa, for they could not have both since Nigeria was opposed to South African apartheid policies. Some opted for business in Nigeria and withdrew from South Africa. Others did not. But they received stern economic sanctions such as Shell BP did.

Nigeria financed (spent ₦20 million on) the execution of the war of national liberation struggle in Angola in 1975.⁵⁴ Antecedent to the war: Portugal withdrew from Angola in November, 1975. Competing liberation movements declared two rival independent governments, each with its own constellation of African and extra-African supporters. General Murtala Muhammed, the Nigerian Head of State at the time, rejected the United States plea to align with the FNLA (Front for the National Liberation of Angola) which the United States supported.

General Murtala Muhammed published the text of what he regarded as President "Ford's overbearing directive to the head of state."⁵⁵ He published as well the text of a reply to the United States rejecting "completely

⁵⁴ Polhemus, "Nigeria and South Africa", p. 60. See also New Nigeria (Kaduna) September 15, 1975.

⁵⁵ Polhemus, "Nigeria and South Africa", pp. 44-66.

this fatuous attempt by the Ford administration to insult the intelligence of African nations and scorn the dignity of the black man", and totally repudiating "the false logic which equates the presence of Cuban and Soviet advisors in Angola with that of South African regular troops, their fellow soldiers of fortune and motley mercenaries."⁵⁶

Invariably, Nigeria backed the MPLA which the Soviet Union supported and galvanized extra support from the other members of the OAU which split even on the first ballot. When the MPLA finally defeated the FNLA in the battlefield, the emergent socialist revolution in Angola became the single most credible foreign policy victory that Nigeria has ever won since its independence. Among other things, the victory contributed to changes in the keener perception of Nigeria by the United States and the Western world. It emboldened Nigeria and awakened her into fuller realization of its power potentials and the maximization of such potentials to achieve her goals and objectives.

Yet again, in 1975, Nigeria barred the annual

⁵⁶ Polhemus, "Nigeria and South Africa", pp. 44-66.

meeting of the International Press scheduled for Lagos because it admitted white delegates from South Africa. In the same year, \$32,750 in addition to \$5 million yearly contribution was given to the African National Congress in Zimbabwe for the ongoing struggle for the liberation of Azania (South Africa). Troops were deployed in Equatorial Guinea to repel the Spanish invasion.

After the liberation of Angola and Mozambique in 1975, Nigeria mounted diplomatic and war efforts for the liberation of Zimbabwe in 1976. She condemned the terms of settlements proposed by the United States for Zimbabwe, and consequently denied visits to Nigeria by the United States' Secretary of State. Nigeria organized the OAU's boycott of the Montreal Olympics in 1976 because of the presence of New Zealand which had not prevented a private football club from making a tour of South Africa. Rhodesia and South Africa had been barred from the 1976 Olympics.

By 1977, Nigeria provided arms, ammunition and the services of her two C-130 Hercules military transport planes, and one 707 Boeing civilian aircraft to the national liberation movement in Zimbabwe.⁵⁷ In June, the

⁵⁷ Aluko, "Nigeria: The United States and Southern Africa", p. 94.

same year, the Chief of Staff of the Nigerian Army, Lt. General T. Danjuma announced that the Nigerian government was ready to send troops to assist the freedom fighters.⁵⁸ Later, General Obasanjo, the Nigerian Head of State said with some tint of exaggeration that "if the apartheid regime used nuclear weapons to defend the apartheid system, Nigeria was ready for it."⁵⁹

Such a statement in the 1960's might have been taken in its content as being calculatedly exaggerated because Nigeria made some similar statements before and none was put into action. But the events of the 1970's would have proven such calculations a miscalculation, because in the same year (1977) Nigeria contracted agreements with France and West Germany, respectively for the construction of two nuclear energy plants in Nigeria. That undertaking repels at least the psychological intimidation presented by South African nuclear capability. Whatever the purpose is for the Nigerian nuclear energy plants, there are signals that Nigeria is bent to balance the power in South Africa if she must objectify her purpose.

⁵⁹ See West Africa, October 24, 1977.

Thus, these are the actions and nonactions that Nigeria has taken to maintain or change the probability distribution or outcome of events, (particularly) in the OAU in the 1970's. These actions, nonactions, their implications and interpretations have been consistent and concrete and devoid of the rhetoric of the 1960's. In form and content they are militant and aggressive, and hence radical. The success story of their workability and practicability is the success story of the changes in the fundamental attribute that has generated the independent or quasi economic independence which gives a radical birth to the new Nigerian foreign policy.

NIGERIA AND THE UNITED STATES

The state of Nigeria's foreign policy vis-a-vis the United States is functionally related to the rhythms of economic development in Nigeria. First, it rises when the rhythm of the economy falls. Second, it falls when the rhythm of the economy rises, and third, it fluctuates when the increased momentum of the rhythm establishes a functional relationship with the subordinate global system.

That is, from 1960 to 1966 when the Nigerian economy was growing at an average annual low rate of 4.4 percent, its relationship with the United States was at its optimum. Of course, the explanation and implication is not as simple as that. To fully grasp the complexities

of it is to recall first, "the nature of the foreign policy 1960-1966" that we have enunciated in Chapter Two. The dependent nature of the political system on the United States' loans, grants, and aid for economic development; induced subserviency, compromise and conformity in Nigeria's foreign policy with that of the United States.

It was not a coincidence then that Nigeria voted with the United States to block China's (PRC) admission into the United Nations in 1962⁶⁰ even though China and Nigeria professed neutrality (non-alignment). The ban of communist literature, the failure of the Nigerian government to establish embassies in any communist country in the first half of the sixties, reflected an increase in Nigeria's relationship with the West and a polarization against the East.

Next, the structure of dependency does not only generate underdevelopment dialectically, it generates a close relationship between the center and the periphery. The inverse relationship between the low rate of Nigeria's economic growth and the rise in foreign relations between the two countries at this period (1960-1966) is a characteristic feature of this phenomenon.

⁶⁰ See Index, United Nations Documents Index, Series B, Country Volume II, Cumulative Edition, 1963.

From 1967 to 1970 the rhythm of the economy was rising gradually but the relationship was falling very slowly. The cumulative average rate of growth was 5.2 percent annually. The "crude oil explosion" that was touched off in 1965 was making an enormous contribution to Nigeria's economic development. But an uneconomic phenomena (the civil war) injected conflict into the relationship, to negate it.

The refusal of the Ford Administration to sell arms to Nigeria, and the United States' pro Biafran tendencies shifted backwards the equilibrium which was established in the first half of the sixties. Next to that, the uncompromising style of the Nixon and Ford Administrations in dealing with Nigeria or the OAU, on the issues of Southern Africa helped reduce the momentum in the relationship. For example, the American importation of chrome from Rhodesia in defiance of the United Nations sanctions led to an anti-American outburst in Nigeria.

Admist these incidences, Nigeria emerged out ot the civil war with a growing economy (more than 10 percent average annual rate of growth) from 1970 to 1977 but with a growing bitterness against the United States. Not the kind of bitterness that has a

distaste for the latter's economic and political institutions which the Nigerian's own institutions themselves reflect, but bitterness for the United States' foreign policy towards Africa.

Since independence, Nigeria regarded the abolition of colonialism and white minority regimes in Southern Africa as its interest, and that was conflicting with the United States' interest in the same area. Initially the assessment of Nigeria was based on emotional and moral principles deriving from the fact that Nigerians themselves were black African peoples who had first hand experience with colonialism. But the civil war of 1967-1970 gave a more concrete dimension to Nigeria's perceived interest in Southern Africa. Among the lessons of the war was the fact that the existence of the minority dominated regimes in Southern Africa is a direct threat to Nigeria's security. Portugal and South Africa had helped Biafra to fragment Nigeria.

From the war, Nigeria learnt a lesson in political realism -- a lesson of power and influence attributable to the increase in the level of economic development. The utilization of that power and influence to change or influence events in Africa and the world marked a new era of Nigeria's independent


and radical foreign policy.

Specifically reviewing the economic relationship between the two countries we can establish the (functional) inverse relationship between the high rate of Nigeria's economic development and the resultant low level of dependency that generates independent and radical foreign policy output.

Nigeria exports primarily crude petroleum to the United States. In 1972, export to the United States expressed as a percentage of the total of Nigeria's export was 21.0 percent (See Graph 5.4). It increased to 27.5 and 34.9 percent in 1974 and 1976, respectively. The high percentage of Nigeria's export content to the United States tends to reflect structural vulnerability to Nigeria. But it does not. Not even to the United States who depends on the imported raw materials. The reason is that economic power has a simultaneous existence with economic vulnerability. The actual vulnerability of the importing nation will depend not only upon its own ability to cope with its dependence but also on the ability of the exporting nation to cope with its dependence.


Nigeria imports much less from the United States than she exports (Graph 5.5). Import was 10.4 percent

Graph 5.4
TRADE WITH THE UNITED STATES



Source: Review of External Trade, Nigeria, 1976 op. cit. p. 32

Graph 5.5
IMPORT/TOTAL IMPORT



Source: Review of External Trade, op. cit. p.32

of total import in 1972, 12.3 in 1974 and fell to 10.9 percent in 1976. In 1977 it was 12 percent compared to 23 percent from the United Kingdom and 15 percent from West Germany.


From 1961 to 1970 the combined economic and military assistance from the United States was \$18.9 million in 1961, \$44 million in 1965, and \$48.3 million in 1970 (See Graph 5.6). After 1970, it started to fall from \$37.3 million in 1971, to \$0.6 million in 1976 and then vanished completely in 1977. The fall in the dependency on the United States' loans, grants, and aid is a consequence of, and synonymous to the rise in the level of economic development in the 1970's.

The interactions of the above two phenomena generated political actions (in Nigeria in the period) that were opposed to the interest of the United States. The national liberation of Southern Africa became the most prominent objective of Nigeria's foreign policy in the decade. The United States has opposed Nigeria on any question of self-determination for Africa from Guinea Bissau in 1973 to Angola and Mozambique in 1975.⁶¹

⁶¹ See UNDEX, Volumes III, cumulative edition, 1975.

Graph 5.6

COMBINED ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM THE UNITED STATES



Source: Aid, Statistics and Reports Division U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations. Obligations and Authorizations July 1, 1945 to September 30, 1976. Washington, D.C. 1976.

When Nigeria supported and fought for the self determination of the above nations it did so against the will of the United States. When Nigeria tilted its alliance militarily towards the Soviet Union and increased immensely the proportion of its international trade with the Eastern bloc of countries, the United States was skeptical and rushed to mend the fluctuating relationship between the two countries. Perhaps she was amazed to notice a comment like this from the Nigerian Head of State: "Nigerian development could be attained only by remaining in the system of world capitalism." Whatever that means, our usage of "development" here is technically defined to mean growth and the reason we are using the terms interchangeably.

When the fallen relationship was finally rescued in 1977, Nigeria's political activism was progressive. Seven times in 1977 she had submitted documents and made statements in the United Nations' debates for the elimination of apartheid and decolonization of Southern Africa, and seven times the United States has opposed them. Nigeria has allied with the radical Arab states and raised resolution upon resolution for the self determination of the Palestinians. She has collaborated with the other

members of the Third World countries to evolve the working principles for the New International Economic Order which led to the passage of a resolution in 1977 at the General Assembly on the developing countries' permanent sovereignty of their natural resources.

But the most critical and irritating issue has been the Southern Africa issue. The fact that Nigeria stepped up its bilateral aid (about \$5 million a year), and increased military weapons to that area was a signal to the United States that Nigeria is economically, militarily, and politically committed to the liberation of that area. That signal we hoped the United Kingdom picked up first, since this conflict is the antithesis of its dead colonial empire.

NIGERIA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

Unquestionably, the British government picked up the signal when it declared at the Commonwealth conference in Lusaka, Malawi, in 1979, that the aim of the government was to "bring Rhodesia to legal independence on a basis which the Commonwealth and the international community as a whole finds acceptable."⁶²

⁶² African Research Bulletin, No. 93, September, 1979. p. 16.

The Prime Minister's comment depicted the softening of the initial position of the government to resume international trade transactions with Rhodesia. What tended to be the government's invincible stand on Rhodesia was probably one of the reasons responsible for the nationalization of the British Petroleum's assets in Nigeria, as an indication of how strongly Nigeria felt about Southern Africa.

While the British consequent action was a reaction to Nigeria's action (the nationalization of the Shell BP's assets) the latter's action implied coercion. That is, the wielding of coercive economic power for political concession. In this instance it worked for Nigeria in as much as it achieved the objective (decolonialization of Rhodesia) it was meant for.

More to the nationalization of the British interest was the fact that Nigeria was distrustful of the British Petroleum ever since the "Bingham Reports" revealed in 1978 that the company had a part in supplying Rhodesia with oil in defiance of sanctions. Although Nigeria seized a tanker with South African crew at Bonny (Nigerian sea shore), believed to be owned by South Africa, Shell BP denied the claim.

However, the immediate cause of the nationalization was the "swap arrangement" concluded by BP under which the North Sea oil would be sold in the European market in return for an equivalent quantity of oil from another country being sold to South Africa. The Shell BP had asked the Labor Government to approve of it, but had not received any positive reply. When the Conservative government of Mrs. Thatcher came into power, it readily gave the approval.⁶³ Nigeria reacted with stern economic sanctions towards that approval. Nationalization of assets was just one measure.

The floating (sale) of Nigeria's foreign reserves (held in the British sterling pound) was another. Nigeria auctioned about a third (£200 million) of the sterling reserves it held in London for other foreign currencies.⁶⁴ This action brought the value of the British pound down in the London exchange market. In addition, the Nigerian government denied contracts to the British offers. Some that were made previously were cancelled or threatened to be cancelled.

⁶³ African Research Bulletin, No. 93, September, 1979. p. 16.

⁶⁴ This was contained in the speech delivered by the former United States Ambassador, Mr. Andrew Young at Crampton Auditorium, Howard University in 1979.

These actions were far too radical, and hurting to the British interests in Nigeria. However, they were meant to be that way, and were supposed to produce the effect it is now producing in Zimbabwe. But to fully articulate the radical nature of the actions is to recall the dramatic changes in the economic development (fundamental attribute), that we have discussed at length in this paper. The capability of Nigeria to impose stiff economic sanctions against its one time imperial power, and to get away with it, is an "exemplum decorum" of economic determinants of foreign policy. The imposition of sanctions itself was an economic instrument utilized to produce a political change. The effectiveness of that instrument can be measured in the production of the specific change (the decolonization of Rhodesia).

It would be an illusion to contend that the struggle for the decolonization of Africa is championed independently by Nigeria. We are far from making that assertion, not even by implication. What we are saying in effect is that Nigeria's economic resiliency gives her comparative political weight for the production of events in Africa.


Such political weight, when viewed in its

relationship vis-a-vis the United Kingdom, is a derivative of pure economic strength. The downward sloping (export/import) trade curves (See Graphs 5.7 and 5.8) with Britain illustrate the fall of Britain as the number one trading partner of Nigeria. From 1960 to 1974 Nigeria traded heavily with Britain; more than with any other single nation. The percentages (total value) of export and import ranged from 44.8 and 38.3, respectively in 1961, to 16.9 and 23.2, respectively in 1974.

Graphs 5.7 and 5.8 show the export/import trade (expressed as a percentage of each respective total) with Britain. The fall in Nigeria's trade with the United Kingdom can be attributed to the following observations:


- 1) A purposive change in the Nigerian foreign economic policies in order to induce changes in the British behavior -- that is, Nigeria utilizes economic measures for political bargaining. The softening of the British government's position on Rhodesia softened the Nigerian government's position to reassess its foreign economic policy. It rewarded contracts to the British firms. But the loss to Britain of the

EXPORT/TOTAL EXPORT



Source: Review of External Trade op. cit., p.32

Graph 5.8



Source: Review of External Trade, op. cit.

production and marketing of 300,000 barrels⁶⁵ a day of Nigerian crude oil represents an economic cost in exchange for the strategic and political significance (as perceived by the West) of Nigeria to the United Kingdom. And that cost is weighed against the probability distribution of events in Africa and Nigeria's capability to influence them.

2) The fall in Nigeria's trade with Britain was followed by the rise in the American-Nigerian trade relationship. Petroleum was basically the element that accounted for this increase. Besides, it is important to state that there is a similiarity in the decline of the United Kingdom as Nigeria's foremost trading partner with the loss of its dominant position of world leadership after World War II to the United States. The increasing economic attraction between Nigeria and the United States tends to recognize the magnitude of the latter's power to influence world events today more than the United Kingdom. But so far Nigeria has not been convinced that the United States will help her bring about the much needed change she seeks in the African politectonic zone.

Southern Africa becomes a crucial variable in Nigeria's foreign policy because the decolonization of the pockets of colonial enclaves in Africa is antecedent

to the objectification of Pan Africanism which Nigeria now champions. The realization of this objective will bring the entire African nations politically and economically closer together.

NIGERIA AND THE SOVIET UNION

The Soviet Union was the last alternative that Nigeria had to turn to for military aid during the Nigerian civil war. Going to Moscow for arms, of course, was a sharp reversal of the pre-war Nigerian anti-Soviet bias. The Soviets, however, welcomed this change for the reasons that it had offered them the opportunity of securing influence (political, economic, and diplomatic) in a country that they had long coveted.⁶⁶

Although the Soviets at first moved very cautiously, striving to keep open as many options as possible, but the Britain's refusal to supply Nigeria with airforce equipment, the French early leaning towards taking sides with Biafra, and the American's sympathy towards Biafra, drifted the Soviets into taking sides with the Federalists. By mid-August, 1967 the first batch of the Soviet combat planes arrived in Nigeria.

⁶⁶ Oye Ogunbadejo, "Nigeria and the Great Powers: The Impact of the Civil War on Nigerian Foreign Policy", pp. 14-32.

The fact that Nigeria paid cash for all of the military aid that she received from the Soviet Union was an indication of economic growth. It was the kind of strength that implied the notion of expressed political independence and ideological non-committal (neutrality).

Quite apart from providing arms, the Russian involvement in the Nigerian civil war destabilized the received concept of bipolarity in the African politectonic zone. Nigeria, for a long time had been in the Western camp. As the richest and most populous country in black Africa, she had maintained the balance of power equilibrium in the continent. It should be recalled that Egypt, the second largest African nation, was in the socialist camp at the time. Nigeria's drift towards the Soviet military camp meant to the West an impending risk of losing a potential ally in the African geopolitics. The views of Nigeria's leaders or their ideological leanings on the other hand were not altogether novel to the Soviet authorities. While the Kremlin realized that Nigeria was basically in the capitalist camp, it conveniently traded off ideological differences for the strategic importance of Nigeria to the East, the lucrative trade in armaments and the new economic relationship.

The strategic importance of Nigeria to the East is again to be explained in the bipolarity context

of East-West cold war rivalry. Whether the rivalry implied making the world safe for democracy or to contain the spread of communism, the actions of both the East and the West with respect to Nigeria were veiled under a naked materialistic motive -- the economic underpinnings of world politics.

The fact that the Soviet Union's state owned exporting firm, Avtoekport, took 80 percent equity participation in a Nigerian company⁶⁷ (West African Automobile and Technical Company) in 1967 revealed to the Nigerians that the Soviets were interested in controlling their economy the same way as the Americans, the Britons and the Japanese were. They (the Soviets) quickly developed sales and servicing networks throughout Nigeria for their "Moskvitch" cars. By 1968, they had exported over six hundred Moskvitch passenger cars to Nigeria.

The overall volume of trade between Nigeria and the Soviet Union increased during the war years. By 1969 it had reached ₦24.6 million.⁶⁸ From 1970 to

⁶⁷ Ogunbadejo, "Nigeria and the Great Powers:" pp. 14-32.

⁶⁸ Nigerian Review, May-June, 1968. p. 11.

1977 exports to the Soviet Union over total export (See Graph 5.9) increased from 0.2 percent to 1.5 percent in 1975 before it deaccelerated to 0.3 percent in 1976. Imports dropped from 0.9 percent in 1974 to 0.2 percent of total import in 1976.

The drop in the export is accompanied by a reduction in the import of Soviet cars, trucks, passenger cars, motor scooters, cement fabrics, and sugar. Nigeria's exports were basically cocoa-beans, groundnuts, palm oil and kernels, and timber.⁶⁹


In addition to trade Nigeria concluded several economic and technical assistance agreements with the Soviet Union. The development of the Petroleum Institute, geological exploration, public health and agricultural development were some of the long term contracts that Nigeria signed with the Soviet Union. More important still, was the construction of the first Nigerian iron and steel complex that was contracted to the Soviet Union. Such a contract or contracts meant that Nigeria was seriously committed to maintaining long term relationships with the Soviet Union.

⁶⁹ See West Africa, September, 1970. p. 1058.

Graph 5.9


TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION

EXPORT/TOTAL EXPORT



Graph 5.10

IMPORT/TOTAL IMPORT



Source: Review of External Trade. p. 32.

The turning point of the Soviet's involvement in the Nigerian crisis was the opening up of the diplomatic relations (which did not exist before) between the two countries. The convergence of the Soviet's African policy and the Nigerian African diplomacy on the common ground of deconolization of the pockets of colonial enclaves in Africa has brought the two countries closer together on the Third World issues.

The historic role of the Soviet Union in the liberation struggles of Guinea Bissau, Angola, Mozambique, and even Zimbabwe has won the Nigerian and the African admiration. In short, it has won the admirations of the freedom fighters the world over. Perhaps what we are talking about might be clearer and insightful if we dichotomize the roles played by the great powers in the struggle for the universal human freedom.

CONCLUSION

Table 5.5 that follows concludes silently our discussion on this specific subject matter.

TABLE 5.5

THE UNITED NATIONS' VOTING PATTERNS OF THE BIG POWERS ON THIRD WORLD ISSUES

ISSUES	USSR	UK	USA	France	Nigeria
Right of people to self determination	Yes	abst.	abst.	abst.	Yes
Independence of Guinea Bissau	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Elimination of colonialism	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Eradication of apartheid & racism	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Self determination for Southern Rhodesia	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Self Determination for New Guinea	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Self Determination for Grenada	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Namibia Question (self deter.)	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Palestinian Question (self deter.)	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Natural Resources Sovereignty	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Comoro Island (self deter.)	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Declaration of Independence to colonial countries	Yes	No	No	No	Yes

Sources: UNIDEX, United Nations Documents Index. Series B. Cumulative Editions 1960-1977.

CHAPTER VI

ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL VARIABLES REGRESSED

A nation is involved in multitudinous activities. It may export and import various goods, give or receive aids, vote in the United Nations, deploy troops in a foreign land, make threats, sever or establish diplomatic relations. The magnitude and nature of these activities vary from nation to nation. For some, trade may be the central interest around which other activities group.¹ For some other nations, the immediate concern may be actions stemming from military alliance cohesion to wage a war of national liberation.

Scholars² in international politics and foreign policy are often pre-occupied with the development of empirical theory consisting of a set of interrelated propositions consisting of the above variables in order

¹ Many nations like Nigeria, the United States, Britain, et. al., have demonstrated empirically that trade is a pivotal interest around which foreign economic policies emerged. In the case of Nigeria, this thesis attempts to demonstrate just that as part of the test of the major hypothesis.

² The names are numerous, see James Green, "Bibliography of Recent Foreign Policy Studies, 1970-1972", ed., Patrick McGowan, Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies, Vols. I and II (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1974).

to explain how, why, and when states in the international system are likely to act and interact. For the most part those who seek this kind of theory are relatively unconcerned with the potential for actual application of their work in any quantitative manner.³ Others are concerned primarily with the policy implications of theoretical work, and in some cases with the development of solutions to specific policy problems.⁴

Given the remarkable amount of skepticism, hostility, and apathy still prevalent among scholars of world politics regarding the possibility (and or desirability) of a scientific discipline, we conceive of this methodology as a demonstration. It is intended to demonstrate that political scientists can use rigorous, quantitative methods to examine important theoretical questions in the field of foreign policy. It is intended to help dispel the pessimism in our field which often avers that the really important and interesting problems

³ John R. Karlik, "Economic Factors Influencing American Foreign Policy", John P. Hardt, "Soviet Commercial Relations and Political Change", Young C. Kim, "The Interaction of Economics and Japanese Foreign Policy", in Robert A. Bauer, ed., The International Economics and Foreign Policy, pp. 23-84, 130-151.

⁴ See D.A. Zinnes and J. Wilkenfeld, "An Analysis of Foreign Conflict Behavior of Nations", ed., W. Harrieder, Comparative Foreign Policy (New York: David McKay, 1971), pp. 167-213.

of international relations and world politics are not susceptible to quantitative treatment.⁵ This pessimism has been further buttressed by the belief that even if operational and quantitative procedures are relevant to the central problems of the field, they are so complex and elusive that no traditional trained political scientist can possibly master them.

However, the discipline has evolved from traditionalism to transtraditionalism. Along with it has emerged the behavioralists, empiricists, and quantitative methodologists whose orientations and applications challenged the conservatism of the traditionally trained political scientists.

THE MEASUREMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY VARIABLES

An enormous amount of time has been devoted to the study of foreign policy as a dependent variable by the behavioralists and empiricists. James Rosenau⁶ (1966) tried to explain the foreign policy of the United

⁵ Douglas A. Hibbs, Jr., Mass Political Violence: A Cross-National Causal Analysis (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1973), and Robert North and Nazli Choucri, Nations in Conflict, posed a similar problem in their research.

⁶ See James N. Rosenau, "Pretheories and Theories of Foreign Policy", in R.B. Farrell, ed., Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966).

States and other middle range powers by grouping together in clusters, a diverse set of variables he labelled: systematic, governmental, societal, and individual. John W. Eley and John H. Peterson⁷ classified economic assistance, military assistance, and diplomatic personnel as dependent variables. Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris⁸ associated dependent variables with the degree of administrative efficiency, the extent of leadership commitment to economic development, and the extent of political stability. What Copson⁹ termed conflict, Deutsch¹⁰ called, war.

In this paper we attempt to follow their methodological precedents but follow them with

⁷ John W. Eley and John H. Peterson, "Economic Interest and American Foreign Policy Allocations, 1960-1969" in ed., Patrick McGowan, Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies, pp. 161-187.

⁸ Irma Adelman and Cynthia Taft Morris, Society Politics and Economic Development: A Quantitative Approach, pp. 76-81.

⁹ Raymond W. Copson, "Foreign Policy Conflict Among African States, 1964-1969", in ed., Patrick McGowan, Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies, pp. 189-219.

¹⁰ Karl W. Deutsch and Dieter Senghaas, "The Steps to War: A Survey of System Levels, Decision Stages and REsearch Results" in ed., Patrick McGowan, Sage International Yearbook of Foreign Policy Studies, pp. 275-333.

understanding that while their respective researches were basically attempted cross-politically, we take as a point of departure the specificity of our inquiry to explain the actions and non-actions of Nigeria in the international system.

The first step in the transition from a general theoretical statement to an operational model was to identify the variables to be explained, that is the set of the endogenous variables. Only after the relevant variables have been identified and their relative potency assessed through quantitative analysis is it possible to fashion a coherent body of empirical generalization.

We chose as our endogenous variables the objectives of the Nigerian foreign policy: 1) the support for the national liberation struggle, 2) military expenditure and assistance, 3) diplomatic personnel, 4) the United Nations votes.

Our choice for these variables was guided by the following criteria. First, they must be capable of empirical delineation. That is, they must fall within the realm of empirical verification as pragmatic foreign policy outputs, and their relevance and implication must have interconnectedness with the international system. Second, they must define the foreign policy posture of Nigeria in relation to the economic development, and

must have consequent political significance. Third, their theme must have currency and universality among the foreign policy themes of other African states.

For example, the support for national liberation demands more than financial and military support. It includes logistics, and accessibility of the territorial land mass to the conflict area which Nigeria is incapable of providing, but the Front Line states like Tanzania, Angola, Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia have tactical and strategic advantages for overt and covert military incursion. In order for this to effectuate Nigeria's foreign policy objectives on national liberation, must have congruency with the foreign policy of the Front Line states on that specific objective. However, the struggle for the liberation of Africa from the vestiges of colonialism and racism is a major foreign policy theme of the OAU.

Given these prior theoretical rationalizations we define our dependent variables thus:

NATIONAL LIBERATION AS A DEPENDENT VARIABLE

The support for the national liberation movements in Africa -- that is, any financial support that Nigeria has given to Guinea Bissau, Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambique, Azania, Equatorial Guinea, and Namibia directly or

indirectly for the national liberation struggle in these areas. Or any financial aid that Nigeria has given to other independent African states (like Zambia and Lesotho in 1961 and 1963, respectively) for the consolidation of their political independence from external aggression (invasion).

Moral support is not included in this definition for the reason that the theory we are formulating explains political realism which refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe. Practical and concrete support that can change the probability distribution of events in the conflict areas is the kind of support we are pinpointing.

Nigeria supports concretely the national liberation movements in Africa from 1960 to 1977. The quality of that support changes from moderation and verbiage in the 1960's to pragmatism, material involvement and radicalism in the 1970's. Concurrently, economic development has moved from marginality in the 1960's to leaps and bounds in the 1970's. At the same period the balance of payment rose from deficit balances in the sixties to plus balances in the seventies. Foreign reserves increased dramatically in the 1970's.

Given the gradual growth of the economy synonymous with the moderate support for the national liberation movements in the sixties in contradistinction with the mounting economic performance cum revolutionary high gear of political support in the 1970's, we therefore hypothesize that there is a close relationship between the level of economic performance and the support for the national liberation struggle in Africa.

Nigeria's support for the national liberation struggle in Africa takes many forms. Support by mandatory financial contributions through the OAU is one form. Indirect bilateral support through a surrogate is also another. For the purpose of lucidity, we define our support in terms of the direct and indirect total naira value of the funds that Nigeria has committed to the liberation of Africa. Symbolically we define it in a system of simultaneous equation -- thus:*

$$Y = a + B_1X_1 + B_2X_2 + u \dots\dots\dots 6.1$$

where Y = support for national liberation

X₁ = balance of payment

X₂ = foreign reserve

u = stochastic disturbance

The above equation states that changes in the exogenous

* All the X's and Y's in the equations in this chapter are computed on first differences.

variables over time will affect changes in the endogenous variable. Equation 6.1 was estimated with two other indicators -- gross national product and crude petroleum. We predict that R^2 , the amount of variance in the dependent variable accounted for by the independent variables will be significant, the path coefficient for the individual independent variable will be positive.

DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL AS A DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Diplomatic relationships among states in the international system center around the establishment of diplomatic missions and consular offices, followed by the exchanges of diplomatic personnel and consuls who protect and safeguard the interests of their respective nations. The ability to influence the decision making processes of other international actors is the capability to communicate desires to the official decision makers of these actors. Although there are other direct and indirect channels through which communications could pass from one national actor to another national actor (or actors) but for simplicity reasons we chose the formal diplomatic channels.

For instance, the Nigerian permanent representative at the United Nations in New York, communicated the subjects of Nigeria's foreign policy (on the decolonialization of Africa) almost every year to other national actors. This bulk of diplomatic and informational communication of a

to other national actors. This bulk of diplomatic and informational communication of a routine non-crisis nature is carried on through a regularized diplomatic channels through persons of Nigerian foreign service assigned to the embassies, consular offices and other international organizations.

The degree and magnitude of any national actor to Nigeria is indicated by the numeric strength of the Nigerian diplomatic personnel attached to such actors. Nigeria has more diplomatic and consular personnel in the United States and the United Kingdom, respectively than any other single nation in the world. The reasons are: 1) the largest volume of Nigeria's export of crude petroleum goes to the United States, 2) the United States' investment in Nigeria is about \$1.5 billion, 3) the United States has the technology and form of constitutional democratic government that Nigeria admires and duplicates, 4) the United States having taken over from Britain after World War II as the metropole of world capitalism of which Nigeria is only a satellite has become in modern times the critical intersection that directs not only the traffic of the world commodity trade, but the centre for the political and diplomatic criss-cross flows of information.

For Britain, the relationship has moved from colonial -- imperial status to client-patron and finally to partners in traffic belonging to the same relic of the old colonial past (the Commonwealth of nations). It is not only a historical deposition that Nigeria trades more with Britain bilaterally than with any other country, but that in about 100 years of British colonialism in Nigeria, the former has reproduced itself culturally, politically and economically in Nigeria. The ties between the two nations are conceivably more than a diplomatic love affair but what has come to be regarded as common shared experience in language, education, legal system, and governmental. It becomes inevitable that Nigeria has more diplomatic personnel in Britain, and of course, in the United States than any other single nation.

The numeric strength of the diplomatic personnel (as a dependent variable) is a function (over time) of the level of economic development and growth, and the level of political consciousness. An illustration of this is still the Nigerian experience. From 1960 to 1966 Nigeria had diplomatic relations and trade pacts with only nine African countries: Togo, Benin, Cameroon, Senegal, Guinea, Niger, Mali, Egypt, and Zaire. By 1972 the number had risen to twenty five and by 1977 it had gone up to forty one. Nigeria had no trade pact nor

diplomatic ties the first few years of independence with any Eastern bloc countries, but in the second part of the sixties, it had established embassies in almost every socialist country in the hemisphere.

The incremental increase in the numeric strength of the diplomatic personnel in this period reflects a corresponding increase in Nigeria's exports and capital outflow. An increase in the volume of exports, we presume, increases the numeric strength of the economic attache attached to the embassy that deals with trade treaties and foreign investment. Capital outflow will be sensitive positively to the increase in diplomatic staffs. Mathematically we state that:

$$Y = a + B_1X_1 + B_2X_2 + u \dots\dots\dots 6.2$$

where Y = diplomatic personnel

X₁ = exports

X₂ = capital outflow

u = stochastic disturbances

We estimate it for the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. If the hypothesis has merit then the regression of exports and capital outflow on diplomatic personnel should have a significant positive parameter estimate. This would indicate that the

conjunction of exports and capital outflow has an impact on foreign policy.

MILITARY POSTURE AS A DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Military posture comprises military assistance and military expenditure. It constitutes an important component of Nigeria's foreign policy in the 1970's. Military posture includes the capital outlay expended for the development, maintenance, employment, and deployment of military forces for deterrence and defense or for aggressive purposes. The deployment of Nigeria's troops in Tanzania (1964) in Equatorial Guinea (1975) and Lebanon (1979) was a foreign policy not only to influence events in those areas but to influence the outcome of events geopolitically. It was also meant to generate the perception of Nigeria's military capability in the politectonie zone conflict (Southern Africa).

The national bases of military power evidently remain significant, for they determine the ability of countries to deter military action by other states. The holding of American nationals in Iran as hostages provides a classic example of this kind of deterrence. The United States has the military capability to run over Iran in order to liberate their nationals at the

risk of fifty American lives or more. While the safety of the hostages might deter such military moves, the greatest deterrence of all is the balance of terror presented by the Soviet Union which shares a common border with Iran.

The power can be seen then to reside in the capabilities that permit the power wielder to make effective threats or deterrence. The Soviet Union has repeatedly warned the United States of utilizing any military venture as a justifiable means of solving the conflict between Iran and itself. And the United States' perception of the Soviets' compatible military strength, and calculated interference for reasons of national interest dampens the Americans' resolve to attempt conflict resolution by military power.

What we are saying here in effect is that military expenditure per se does not represent a deterrence in relations among nations, but the putative and actualized military power depicted in the military posture is undoubtedly a deterrence to other nations. Klaus Knorr shows how military strength can be perceived or mobilized as a powerful instrument of foreign policy. One method he contends is through war.

Clauswitz¹¹ (1968) and David Ziegler¹² (1977) contribute to Knorr's assertion. The second method, Knorr posits, is by way of military threats, and the third is through the anticipation or anxiety of other states that the nation involved may resort to its military strength if a serious conflict of interest arises.

Serious conflict of interest arose between Nigeria and the Cameroon, Nigeria and Benin, and Nigeria vis-a-vis the Chad Republic in the sixties, but none of them erupted into war because each of them knew the incomparable power weights (economic and military) in relation to their respective countries. Military posture then is a strategy for action on the part of Nigeria designed to influence events within and beyond the continent.

We have stated in Chapter Four that there is a close relationship between military expenditures of state and the GNP. We have shown also in that Chapter, the ratio of Nigeria's GNP (7 percent 1979) that goes

¹¹ Carl Von Clausewitz, On War (London: Routeledge 8 Kegan Paul, 1968), Vol. 1. pp. 2 and 23.

¹² See David W. Ziegler, War, Peace and International Politics (Boston: Little Brown and Company), 1977.

to the production of military posture. We now posit that when a foreign threat, civil war or need to support national liberation movements for decolonization induces a government to expand its military posture, it is basically a continuation of foreign policy by some other means.

We therefore define military posture as the total naira value of military assistance that Nigeria gives to the foreign countries plus the total naira value of Nigeria's military expenditures.

Symbolically we represent it thus:

$$Y = a + B_1X_1 + B_2X_2 + u \dots\dots\dots 6.3$$

where Y = military posture

X_1 = gross national posture

X_2 = foreign reserves

u = disturbance variable

A large GNP indicates a national ability to support a large military effort. It is therefore a major determinant of economic military potential. Foreign reserves of a state affects the foreign deployment, acquisition and use of military forces. For example, the large scale military intervention of the United States in Vietnam occasioned sizable outlays of foreign exchange for supporting goods and services purchased

abroad. Thus a strong position of international liquidity is an asset that is part of the military potential of an emerging power. We anticipate that the regression coefficient in the above equation will be highly significant to confirm our hypothesis.

UNITED NATIONS VOTES AS A DEPENDENT VARIABLE

The voting patterns of every nation on issues in the United Nations reflect the foreign policy posture of the individual nations on those issues. Recalling from Chapter Five that, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France voted in identical patterns, on the twelve Third World issues that we recorded; and the Soviet Union and Nigeria voted uniquely in conformity together on those same issues. The expression of their respective votes was the expression of their respective foreign policy postures on those issues.

In the 1960's, Nigeria tended to vote more in agreement with the United States and less with the Soviet Union despite the fact that the latter supported the decolonization of Africa long before Nigeria had independence. Nigeria at the time was dependent on the United States and other Western nations' economic support. (See Chapters Two and Five). The Index of

Agreement¹³ (i.e. Nigeria voting in agreement) with the United States was determined or influenced by the latter's aid, grants, and loans.

In the 1970's, Nigeria voted more in agreement with the Soviet Union and less with the United States in spite of the fact that Nigeria was not dependent on the Soviet Union for loans, aid, and grants. After the civil war ended in 1970, Nigeria reduced its dependence militarily on the Soviet Union as the United Kingdom and other Western countries opened up the doors to their weapons markets for her.

Nigeria's Index of Agreement with each of the superpowers from 1960-1977 changed inversely with the level of economic development. Neither the pattern of the United States' votes nor that of the Soviet Union was changing.

¹³ This is in reference to the formula developed by Arend Lijphart for calculating an index of agreement:

$$IA = \frac{f + \frac{1}{2}g}{t} \times 100$$

where t equals the total number of votes under consideration, f equals the number of votes on which Nigeria and the United States (or the Soviet Union) are in full agreement, and g equals the number of votes on which they disagree in part. See Arend Lijphart, "The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly: A Critique and a Proposal", American Political Science Review LVII, No. 4, (December 1963), pp. 902-917.

Since the United Nations is the foremost international forum that all independent countries are represented, there are more independent African countries geopolitically represented in that forum than any other geopolitical representation. We believe that Nigeria's Index of Agreement with each of the superpowers on African items in particular and the Third World issues in general would delineate 1) the extent to which Nigeria affects African diplomacy and World politics at the United Nations, 2) the changing patterns of Nigeria's votes with respect to the changes in the level of economic development and, 3) the level of Nigeria's interaction in the world forum.

Because GNP is one of the measures of national power in international relations and foreign policy, it is interesting to discern its relationship with the United Nations activity. GNP is closely related to interaction because it is an important factor in the determination of national assessments for the UN budgets. United Nations financial support and GNP of nations is important evidence of the significance of interaction data.¹⁴

¹⁴ Chadwick F. Alger, "Interaction in a Committee of the United Nations General Assembly", in J. David Singer, ed., Quantitative International Politics: Insight and Evidence

More controversial items such as the Palestinian Question, the call for the Soviet Union's withdrawal from Afganistan, and self determination for Zimbabwe would tend to generate a higher rate of interaction.

We define the United States votes as Nigeria's Index of Agreement with the United States and with the Soviet Union. Mathmatically we represent it as follows:

$$Y = A + B_1X_1 + B_2X_2 + B_3X_3 + u \dots\dots\dots 6.4$$

where Y = Index of Agreement with the United States

X_1 = Gross National Product

X_2 = Capital Inflow

X_3 = Petroleum

Equation 6.4 was also estimated for export and income per capita. We anticipate that the R^2 with respect to the Index of Agreement with the United States will be low or negative.

$$Y = A + B_1X_1 + B_2X_2 + u \dots\dots\dots 6.5$$

where Y = Index of Agreement with the Soviet Union

X_1 = Petroleum

X_2 = Gross National Product

Equation 6.5 was also estimated for income per capita and foreign reserve. We expect that the R^2 will be positive.

CONCLUSION

The independent variables: gross national product, gross national product per capita, foreign reserves, balance of payments, capital inflow, capital outflow, export, import, will be positively correlated with the dependent variables: support for the national liberation struggle, diplomatic personnel, military posture, and the United Nations votes. Index of Agreement with the United States will be negatively correlated with the economic indicators.

The following are the definitions of the symbols we used in the systems of our equations.

<u>SYMBOL</u>	<u>DEFINITION</u>
NL23	Support for the National Liberation Struggle
MILP	Military Posture
DPL1	Diplomatic Personnel with the United States
DPL2	Diplomatic Personnel with the United Kingdom
DPL3	Diplomatic Personnel with the Soviet Union
UNV4S	Index Agreement with the United States
UNVSS	Index Agreement with the Soviet Union
GNP	Gross National Product
GgNP	Gross National Product per capita
EXPT	Export
IMPT	Import

<u>SYMBOL</u>	<u>DEFINITION</u>
KPL1	Capital Inflow
KPL0	Capital Outflow
FRS	Foreign Reserves
BYPT	Balance of Payment
FAID	Foreign Aid
TACE	Trade With African Countries
DD1	Period I (1960-1977)
DD2	Period II (1968-1977)
MSGR	Messages Received
MSGs	Messages Dispatched
GDP	Gross Domestic Product

CHAPTER VII

INTERPRETATION OF THE INDICATORS COEFFICIENTS

Data, it may be argued, only emerges after large and unsorted heaps of facts have been screened and codified by the systematic application of consistent, visible and replicable procedures for observation and classification. When such operational and scientific procedures have been so utilized, we may speak of data making, as distinguished from more anecdotal and intuitive procedures of fact accumulating and information gathering.¹

To put it another way, empiricism does not inevitably generate data which are theoretically useful, it often generates nothing more than facts or impressions which, while valuable are not yet in the form required for testing hypotheses.

Our hope is that the data generated here and the resulting interpretations and generalizations will carry our disciplines a step further away from the traditional

¹ Raw data must still, however, be manipulated, rearranged and combined in order to be theoretically useful. That is, data on one variable must be compared and correlated with data measuring other variables, both for purposes of cross-validation among apparently similar variables and for the production of empirical generalizations.

end of the spectrum, and a discernible degree closer to the scientific end. Our justification is not, however, a purely intellectual one. If we think of interactions among nations in scientific as well as normative terms, rather than in the latter fashion alone, then it becomes evident that the variations can be explained not only by factors having little to do with the conventional "diplomatic history model" of foreign policy.

That is, an appreciation of some other basic phenomenon such as economic capability in the calculus of political variations would seem equally critical. Thus, we present in this chapter, not only the findings and implications of our research (based on foreign policy correlates), but also the data techniques that we have used to arrive at such findings.

In this analysis we rely heavily on the estimated coefficient of each individual parameter, the cumulative R^2 , the significance of the "t" and DW statistics, and the "F" ratio. These key summary statistics will illustrate that the theoretical constructs developed to analyze the specific political phenomena in Nigeria have a strong scientific basis.

METHODOLOGY

We utilized time-series econometric models to

test our argument based on the economic determinants of foreign policy. First, we constructed systems of equations (See Chapter Six) to hypothesize the relationship between the economic indicators and the foreign policy variables over time. Then we ran simple and multiple regressions utilizing the models developed. The Ordinary Least Squares² method was used to estimate the parameters of the theoretical models.

Special care to resolve some of the problems involved with using this technique was necessary. To guard against multicollinearity we constructed a correlation matrix of all the dependent and independent variables to see which independent variables correlate among themselves, and which do not. As a rule of thumb, if the correlation coefficient between the independent variables was less than the correlation coefficient between the dependent and the independent variables, we concluded that multicollinearity was not a serious problem and included the independent variables in one equation. If the coefficient for the independent variables was higher we dropped one and made attempts to resolve this problem.

² See J. Philip Cooper and Gary A. Curtis, Econometric Software Package (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1976).

We first estimated these regressions with the actual levels of Y_t and X_t . The R^2 were considerably high. Although a high R^2 reflects a good fit, we suspected from the Durbin-Watson statistic that auto correlation was a problem. If this problem was not resolved the results obtained would have been biased and might not have captured the reality we are trying to explain; that is, changes in foreign policy as a result of changes in economic development. To resolve this auto correlation problem and to minimize the observed multicollinearity we used the first differences.³ The R^2 were lower but the Durbin-Watson statistics, were closer to 2.0, thus, demonstrating that the R^2 obtained earlier were spurious. We believe the regressions in first differences reveal the true nature of the relationship between independent and the dependent variables.

³ The first differences are defined as:

$$Y_t - Y_{t-1} \text{ and } X_t - X_{t-1}. \text{ For a detailed}$$

discussion, see G.S. Maddala, Econometrics (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1977), p. 92.

A PRIORI EXPECTATION

We expect that changes in gross national product, petroleum, export, balance of payment, foreign reserves, capital outflow, captial inflow, and gross national product per capita will affect positively the changes in the foreign policy of national liberation movements.

FINDINGS

Tables 7.1 to 7.3 presents the results of the simple regression equations that were estimated using annual levels of exports, petroleum, and gross national product as regressors on the regress and; the support for the national liberation movement. From 7.1 we observed that twenty nine percent of the variations in the support for the national liberation movement is accounted for by the changes in the level of exports. The t statistic (2.52) shows that the parameter is significant at .05 level. The Durbin-Watson (2.1) indicates that there is no auto correlation.

The estimate coefficient for the export (0.095) shows that for every billion naira increase in export, Nigeria spent about ₦90,000 on the support for the national liberation struggle in Africa. The R^2 , t, and DW statistics justify the a priori expectations of the

TABLE 7.1

REGRESSION OF NL23 ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (INDICATORS)

1960 - 1977 N = 18			
Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate	t Statistic	
EXPORT	0.095	2.52	
CONSTANT	60.54	1.6	
<u>R²</u>	<u>Regression Standard Error</u>	<u>DW</u>	<u>F</u>
0.29	134.024	2.1	(1.15) 6.35

Support for National Liberation (Y) = A + B(Export)

TABLE 7.2

REGRESSION OF NL23 ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (INDICATORS)

1960 - 1977 N = 18			
Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate	t Statistic	
PETROLEUM	0.055	1.68	
CONSTANT	71.53	(1.15)	1.70
<u>R²</u>	<u>Regression Standard Error</u>	<u>DW</u>	<u>F</u>
0.159	146.58	2.56	3.98

Support for National Liberation (Y) = A + B(Petroleum)

TABLE 7.3

REGRESSION OF NL23 ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (INDICATORS)

1960 - 1977 N = 18			
Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate	t Statistic	
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	0.05	2.38	
CONSTANT	-6.25	-0.10	
R ²	Regression Standard Error	DW	F
0.27	136.14	2.40 (1.15)	5.69

Support for National Liberation (Y) = A + B(GNP)

TABLE 7.4

REGRESSION OF NL23 ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (INDICATORS)

1960 - 1977 N = 18			
Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate	t Statistic	
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	0.176	1.6	
EXPORT	0.23	1.5	
R ²	Regression Standard Error	DW	F
0.41	131.4	2.4 (2.14)	3.06

Support for National Liberation (Y) = A + B(GNP + Export)

parameter estimate. The theory postulated above expects this estimate to be positive.

The t and DW statistics, the parameter estimate of 0.095 tends to give us some explanation for the explained variance in the support for the national liberation movement. The constant (β) states that the independent variables not included in the equation accounted for the ₦60.54 million variations in the funds that Nigeria spent in the wars of national liberation.

Tables 7.2 and 7.3 display similar results with petroleum and gross national product. From 7.2 we noticed that 16 percent of the variations in the support for the wars of national liberation is explained by the growth in petroleum. Gross national product (Table 7.3) accounted for 27 percent of the variance in the same foreign policy posture. This makes sense considering the fact that the GNP is a much more comprehensive measure than the petroleum. The t statistic for petroleum is significant at 0.01 level, and the GNP at 0.05. Durbin-Watson shows no auto correlation.

We ran multiple regressions in Table 7.4, 7.5, and 7.6. The results are relatively impressive. Changes in export and gross national product combined, explain

TABLE 7.5

REGRESSION OF NL23 ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (INDICATORS)

1960 - 1977 N = 18

Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate	t Statistic
BALANCE OF PAYMENT	-0.06	-0.48
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	0.3	2.0
PETROLEUM	0.5	3.5
CONSTANT	-1.06	-1.2

R ²	Regression Standard Error	DW	F
0.39	1.3	2.2	(3.13) 10.53

Support for National Liberation =

$$(Y) = A + B(\text{GNP} + \text{Balance of Payment} + \text{Petroleum})$$

TABLE 7.6

REGRESSION OF NL23 ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (INDICATORS)

1960 - 1977 N = 18

Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate	t Statistic
EXPORT	0.10	2.52
PETROLEUM	0.05	1.68
CONSTANT	71.5	1.7

R ²	Regression Standard Error	DW	F
0.15	74.4	2.60	6.3

Support for National Liberation =

$$Y = A + B(\text{Export} + \text{Petroleum})$$

a forty one percent variation in the support for the national liberation movement. Balance of Payment is negatively correlated with the foreign policy. When we first regressed with the actual levels of Y_t and X_t , the balance of payment had a negative parameter estimate with the monies that go to the support of the national liberation, and was negatively related to the military posture.

The reasons for the negatively estimated coefficient of the balance of payment can first be attributed to the first differences, and second, to the (actual) minutesimal position of the balance of payment in the 1960's. We ran the regression again and logged both foreign reserves and funds for the support of national liberation. The parameter estimate was positive (0.05) and the t statistic was significant at the 0.01 level. Durbin-Watson was 1.8 R^2 was 0.16. This means that changes in the balance of payment accounted for the 16 percent variations in the support for the national liberation.

In table 7.6, changes in petroleum and export explain 15 percent variances in the support for the liberation movement. Durbin-Watson, and t statistics

indicate 0.05 significant level and no auto correlation, respectively.

Our findings tend to support the hypotheses we postulated that changes in the economic development (represented by economic indicators) generate changes in the Nigerian foreign policy.

Next we regressed five potential measures of economic development on the military posture. We postulated in Chapter Six that there was a relationship (positive) between the level of Nigeria's economic development and its military posture. Our findings proved that only GNP and Capital Outflows are positively correlated with the military posture (See Tables 7.7 and 7.8). Yet their respective t statistics (0.18 and 0.39) were too weak to confirm the argument of positive relationship. But when we first regressed this dependent variable with petroleum, gross national product and foreign reserve on the levels of Y_t and X_t , the relationship was linear. The "t" statistic was significant at 0.05 level. The R^2 for each was high. When we logged it the relationship was curvilinear; and scat it, it was still curvilinear.

Why would military posture not be functionally related to the levels of economic development? We checked the original data again for some error and also checked

TABLE 7.7REGRESSION OF MLP ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (INDICATORS)

1960 - 1977 N = 18			
Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate	t Statistic	
EXPORT	-0.02	-0.55	
CONSTANT	171.245	3.29	
R ²	Regression Standard Error	DW	F
0.02	183.9	0.71	0.31

Military Posture (Y) = A + B(Export)

TABLE 7.8REGRESSION OF MLP ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (INDICATORS)

1960 - 1977 N = 18			
Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate	t Statistic	
PETROLEUM	-0.02	-0.56	
FOREIGN RESERVE	-0.01	-0.3	
GROSS NATIONAL PROD.	0.008	0.18	
CAPITAL OUTFLOW	1.22	0.39	
R ²	Regression Standard Error	DW	F
0.03	204.4	0.6	0.09

Military Posture (Y) =
A + B(Petroleum + Foreign Reserve + GNP)

the residuals. We noticed that except for the war years (1967-1969) and between 1975 and 1977 military expenditure expressed as a percentage of GNP was not really rising. The outliers in the residuals picked up the abnormality; that is, the behaviors of the military posture during the war years. We used Dummy War to correct it and ran the regression again. The result was still negative.

However, the result tends to depict the real life situation. Nigeria is not at war with any of her neighbors, therefore, the responsiveness (or elasticity) of the economic development to the military build-up (to deter aggression) is minimal. The inverse relationship then depicts the deficit nature of the military expenditures to the aggregate economic performance, not only to Nigeria but to the Third World as a whole.

Tables 7.9 -- 7.11 report the findings for the diplomatic personnel models. Changes in the gross national product and capital outflow have an impact on the Nigerian-American (DPLI) relationship. Thirty nine percent of the variations in Nigeria's diplomatic strength in the United States is explained by the relative changes in GNP and Capital Outflow. For every billion naira increase in GNP, Nigeria spent about ₦4,000 in diplomatic personnel. The parameter estimate for the Capital Outflow is higher than that of the GNP. What this

TABLE 7.9

REGRESSION OF DPL1 ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (INDICATORS)

1960 - 1977 N = 18			
Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate	t Statistic	
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	0.004	3.03	
CAPITAL OUTFLOW	0.35	1.5	
CONSTANT	17.6	4.07	
R ²	Regression Standard Error	DW	F
0.39	7.38	1.9	4.64

Diplomatic Personnel US (Y) = A + B(GNP, Capital Outflow)

TABLE 7.10

REGRESSION OF DPL2 ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (INDICATORS)

1960 - 1977 N = 18			
Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate	t Statistic	
PETROLEUM	0.009	6.58	
CONSTANT	30.99	16.4	
R ²	Regression Standard Error	DW	F
0.74	6.12	1.8	(1,15) 43.4

Diplomatic Personnel UK (Y) = A + B(Petroleum)

implies is that if Capital Outflow increases by a billion naira, about 1/3 of that increase is spent on foreign diplomatic and consular missions. In other words, it states that for every billion naira increase in Capital Outflow, ₦350,000 is spent on diplomatic personnel. This is highly relevant considering the fact that Nigeria has a very large numeric strength of the diplomatic personnel in the United States. The t and significant at the 0.05 level. Durbin-Watson showed a good fit (no auto correlation).

Changes in petroleum (Table 7.10) explained 74 percent of the variations in the Nigerian diplomatic personnel's model for Britain. This is reflective of the largest numeric strength of the diplomatic and consular personnel that Nigeria has in the United Kingdom (more than any other country). It is also a reflection of the old-colonial ties. Fourteen percent of the changes in export explained the changes in the Nigerian diplomatic personnel in the Soviet Union. This is, however, a good indicator of the relative strength of the Nigeria diplomatic personnel in the Soviet Union when compared with the United States and the United Kingdom.

It also depicts the limiting (cultural and economic) influences that the Soviet Union has on Nigeria and vice versa. The mode of Nigeria's production is basically the

and the mode of production is basically the

TABLE 7.11

REGRESSION OF DPL3 ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (INDICATORS)

1960 - 1977 N = 18			
Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate	t Statistic	
EXPORT	0.006	1.6	
CONSTANT	19.06	4.8	
DUMMY I	-0.8	-1.4	
R ²	Regression Standard Error	DW	F
0.14	14.04	2.08 (1,15)	2.6

Diplomatic Personnel USSR (Y) = A + B(Export)

TABLE 7.12

REGRESSIONS OF DPL3 ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (INDICATORS)

1960 - 1977 N = 18			
Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate	t Statistic	
CAPITAL OUTFLOW	-0.28	-0.13	
FOREIGN RESERVE	0.002	0.7	
CONSTANT	21.9	3.57	
R ²	Regression Standard Error	DW	F
0.04	15.4	0.28 (2,14)	0.3

Diplomatic Personnel USSR
(Y) = A + B(Capital Outflow + Foreign Reserve)

indication of such influences and the fact that most of the Third World countries that Nigeria deals with are in the same Western camp like Nigeria. The mixture of economic and political relationships with respect to Nigeria and the Western world is revealed in these models.

We corrected for the "no foreign policy" with the Soviet Union in the first six years of Nigeria's independence with Dummy I (See Table 7.11). We also included Dummy variable (Dumwar) in Table 7.12 to correct for the imbalance or depletion in the foreign reserve and excessive capital outflow used for the execution of the civil war. The regression result, (Table 7.12) however, is a poor fit. Capital outflow is inversely related to the diplomatic personnel, while changes in foreign reserves explained minimally, changes in the diplomatic model for the Soviet Union.

Impressively, changes in the economic development indicators (export, GNP, petroleum, and foreign reserves) have a relationship with the variances in the foreign policy. Our findings have empirically supported that argument.

We displayed in Tables 7.13 through 7.17 the regression results for equation 6.4 (See Chapter Six). We posited in Chapter Six that the pattern of Nigeria's votes in the United Nations (Y_t) in agreement with the

TABLE 7.13REGRESSION OF UNV4S ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (INDICATORS)

1960 - 1977 N = 18			
Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate	t Statistic	
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	-0.003	-1.63	
CONSTANT	19.35	3.85	
R ²	Regression Standard Error	DW	F
0.15	11.6	2.4	(1,15) 2.66

United Nations Votes with US (Y) = A + B(GNP)

TABLE 7.14

1960 - 1977 N = 18			
Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate	t Statistic	
EXPORT	-0.007	-2.4	
CONSTANT	16.4	5.4	
R ²	Regression Standard Error	DW	F
0.29	10.63	1.86	(1,15) 6.23

United Nations Votes with US (Y) = A + B(Export)

superpowers (the United States and the Soviet Union) particularly on the issues of the Third World will rise and fall with the level of Nigeria's economic development (X_t) over time. We anticipated that the level of Nigeria's economic development would be inversely related to Nigeria's votes (agreement) with the United States (specifically in the issues of colonialism, self-determination, apartheid, racism, nuclear non-proliferation, and raw materials); and linearly related to the Soviet Union on those issues.

The ratios of the votes with each entity for eighteen years (1960-1977) were taken and regressed with major economic indicators. Table 7.13 shows a simple regression result of economic development and the pattern of Nigeria's votes (agreement) in the United Nations with the United States. Gross national product is inversely related to Nigeria's votes. This implied that Nigeria voted less in agreement with the United States at the UN as the level of Nigeria's economic development increased.

Fifteen percent (R^2) of the variances in Nigeria's disagreement with the United States in the world forum is explained by the changes in the gross national product. The t statistic is significant at a .01 level. Durbin-Watson depicts a good fit.

This result contrasts with the voting pattern of Nigeria, with the United States and Great Britain in the 1960's. The qualitative research findings reveal that Nigeria voted "yes" with the United States many more times than it voted "yes" with the same country in the seventies. The issues they agreed upon in the 1960's have not changed much in the 1970's.

What has changed in the 1970's is the level of Nigeria's economic development that has generated changes in foreign policy. This is very much depicted in this equation. The change in foreign policy with respect to the Third World issues is independent and radical. The decolonization of Africa, apartheid, right to self-determination of oppressed and colonized peoples which the United States has voted against in every agenda, have occupied Nigeria's attention in the 1970's. And now that its strategy for economic development does not depend on the foreign aid from the United States, the United Kingdom, and even the Soviet Union, we tend to see an evolution of independent foreign policy that defines the national interest of Nigeria.

The pattern of Nigeria's votes in disjunction with the United States also reflects the pattern of the

World votes in disconjunction with the West, in the United Nations in the 1970's on the Third World issues. The increased political awareness of the developing countries emanating from their economic relationships with the advanced industrial societies has generated antagonisms. Antagonisms that are derived from the debt trap, the foreign trade carrot, and the foreign aid influence.

Export also delineates a negative link with the UN votes with respect to the United States (Table 7.14). The multiple regression in Table 7.15 shows that increases in Capital Inflow and petroleum are negatively correlated with the votes. When GNP is regressed with petroleum and Capital Inflow on the UN votes with the Soviet Union, the estimated coefficient (0.0003) for GNP is positive, but its t statistic (0.15) is too weak to make any strong argument.

With the Soviet Union, Nigeria's votes in the United Nations tell a different story. Twenty one percent of the variations of Nigeria's agreement with the Soviet Union at the UN is explained by the changes in the level of economic development. Table 7.16 indicates that for every billion naira change in the gross national product, Nigeria's votes 0.0013 times in agreement with the Soviet Union at the United Nations. The t statistic

TABLE 7.15

REGRESSION OF UNV4S ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (INDICATORS)

1960 - 1977 N = 18			
Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate	t Statistic	
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	0.0003	0.15	
PETROLEUM	-0.64	-2.24	
CAPITAL INFLOW	-0.26	-1.19	
CONSTANT	17.29	3.84	
R ²	Regression Standard Error	DW	F
0.42	10.28	1.82	(3,13) 3.23

UN votes with US

$$(Y) = A + B(\text{GNP} + \text{Petroleum} + \text{Capital Inflow})$$

TABLE 7.16

REGRESSION OF UNVSS ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (INDICATORS)

1960 - 1977 N = 18			
Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate	t Statistic	
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	0.0013	3.07	
CONSTANT	2.58	3.16	
R ²	Regression Standard Error	DW	F
0.21	1.88	1.7	(1,15) 4.5

United Nations' votes in agreement with the Soviet Union

$$(Y) = A + B(\text{GNP})$$

shows 0.01 level of significance. Durbin-Watson reveals no serial correlation.

This regression result tends to depict Nigeria's foreign policy convergence with that of the Soviet Union with respect to the Third World issues. The Soviet Union has voted in agreement with the Third World on such issues as the elimination of colonialism, racism, apartheid, self-determination, Palestinian autonomy; which the United States, the United Kingdom, and France have consistently voted against. In addition to the votes, the Soviet Union has demonstrated concretely the support for the national liberation struggles of the oppressed peoples in Africa.

Lastly, Table 7.18 shows the regression on Gross National Product per capita, foreign reserve on the UN votes (in agreement) with the Soviet Union. The result is poor, judging from the individual parameter estimates, R^2 , DW, t, and Durbin-Watson statistic. Foreign reserve and income per capita are negatively correlated with the foreign policy. Income per capita are negatively correlated with the foreign policy. Income per capita in our previous results (that is regressions on the actual levels of Y_t and X_t) was also negative. In this instance, changes in foreign reserves and income per capita reflect

TABLE 7.17

REGRESSION OF UNVSS ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (INDICATORS)

1960 - 1977 N = 18			
Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate	t Statistic	
PETROLEUM	0.00	-0.51	
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT	0.0003	0.64	
CONSTANT	2.4	2.77	
R ²	Regression Standard Error	DW	F
0.11	2.01	1.96	(3,13) 1.9

UN Votes with the Soviet Union

$$(Y) = A + B(\text{Petroleum} + \text{GNP})$$

TABLE 7.18

1960 - 1977 N = 18			
Independent Variable	Parameter Estimate	t Statistic	
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT PER CAPITA	-0.0004	-0.24	
FOREIGN RESERVE	-1.20	-0.9	
CONSTANT	19.77	4.6	
R ²	Regression Standard Error	DW	F
0.016	196.5	0.9	0.8

UN Votes with the Soviet Union

$$(Y) = A + B(\text{GNP Per Capita} + \text{Foreign Reserve})$$

variation of the voting patterns of Nigeria with the Soviet Union.

Generally, the quantitative evidence of the impact of economic indicators on foreign policy is supportive of and equally stronger as the qualitative research we have reported in the previous chapters, although it yields results that are no less conflicting.

The applications of the key summary statistical tools in this research to test our hypotheses have sound scientific bases in establishing our conclusion that increases in the levels of Nigeria's economic growth indicators (GNP, petroleum, export, capital outflow, foreign reserve) have affected the conduct of Nigeria's foreign policy. The higher the increase of these economic indicators, the more independent and radical the foreign policy.

We have found gross national product, crude petroleum, capital outflow, and export to be very elastic with the conduct of Nigeria's foreign policy. There is a very strong linear relationship between each of these parameters and the Nigerian foreign policy,

particularly in the 1970's. The relationship, however, is not absolute. There are unexplained variances that economic indicators are incapable of discerning, and which we believe the other elements of national power (See Chapter Four) can explain. This is to acknowledge again, the relative importance of other factors in the determinants of Nigeria's foreign policy. But those factors we have always maintained, are themselves, economically invigorated.

In the foregone analyses we have noticed peculiar instances where foreign policy is insensitive to the gross national product per capita. That is, income per capita has a negative functional relationship with the foreign policy. There is more to this explanation than what the statistical data indicates. This data does not only reflect the structural imbalance of the economic system that is fundamentally based on social inequality, but it tends to give the suggestiveness of the political system that trades off social welfare programs for the quest for power and influence. The reality we are trying to capture is the philosophical implications of the low

level of GNP per capita in a system of structured social inequality. If Nigeria, with a modest wealth and low income per capita is exercising influence internationally, the price tag of such ambition is not just the millions of naira spent abroad to wield the influence, but, it is definitely the unresolved domestic social problems. Given the low level of income per capita to reflect the high degree of domestic social problems, in contradistinction with its expensive foreign policy commitments, then we can deductively imply that the negative regression coefficient between these two variables (foreign policy and GNP per capita) depicts the negative social reality. That is, the poverty of the masses.

However, there are limitations to that interpretation. First, much of the social ills in Nigeria's economic system are not addressed in this research. We are not obliged to such an explanation. The unit of our analysis has basically been the impact of an economic subsystem on the input-output of foreign policy. Since an analysis of foreign policy inevitably touches upon the analysis of the structure of power and influence.

Then we have been basically concerned with the analysis of the economic structure of Nigeria's power and influence, and not the social problems.

Second, the support of the struggle for the national liberation has no alternative price tag in terms of money spent abroad or unresolved domestic social problems. It is the struggle for freedom which cannot be equated with an "unfreedom". The freedom of the African people that Nigeria is committed to is a just cause if there are resources to support it.

IMPLICATIONS

As far as Nigeria is concerned the composite index of economic growth proves to be a useful indicator of foreign policy. For example, the higher the levels of gross national product, foreign reserve, export, capital outflow, trade with African countries, and petroleum, the greater the Nigerian involvement in international politics.

The repoliticization of economic issues will have a positive linkage effect with the Nigerian foreign policy in as much as petroleum will remain the predominant engine of growth. The power and influence of Nigeria will continue to exert an incredible pressure in international politics.

The GNP growth rate will continue to be impressive in the 1980's, and the impact of that growth will be transmuted into the guns of Azania and Namibia. The demands for freedom for the African people will grow as Nigeria experiences aggregate growth in the macroeconomic trends. That is, the ongoing national liberation struggle in Southern Africa will be highly sensitive to the changes in Nigeria's national attribute.

The strategy for the war of national liberation will still be a mixture of violence and diplomacy, and Nigeria will continue to use both forums in the 1980's. An increase in the fundamental attribute will affect not only the numeric strength of the Nigerian diplomatic personnel, and consular officers, but also their efficiency. The direct effect of this increase will be tantamount to increasing Nigeria's influence and statecraft in world diplomacy.

The military posture will be functionally related to the endogenous motions, and the scale of conflicts in continental Africa. The foreign policy successes of the 1970's and that of the first quarter of 1980, will increase the latitude of military activism that will first be used putatively as a deterrence to change the probability distribution of events in Southern Africa, and second, as an actualized revolutionary force to combat and

eliminate colonialism, racism, and apartheid in that geopolitical area.

CONCLUSION

There is a functional (linear) relationship between the changes in the gross national product, export, petroleum, capital outflow, and the variations in the Nigerian foreign policy in the period we have studied. There is a curvilinear relationship between the foreign reserves, balance of payment and gross national product per capita with the foreign policy of the same period. Military posture is inversely related to the economic development. Diplomatic personnel, and the support for the wars of national liberation as dependent variables correlate positively with the economic growth indicators. Nigeria votes less in agreement with the United States (on the issues of the Third World) as the former experiences economic growth, and tends to vote more in agreement with the Soviet Union (on the issues of the Third World) as its (Nigeria) level of economic development increases.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

We started this research with the prognosis that significant changes in the fundamental attribute of a major continental power will affect the behavior of that nation towards other nations, and thus, alter the overall relations among other major powers. We raised the argument that a country generating national growth may also generate lateral pressures in the form of conflict, domination, and violence. We then asked the question; how and in what ways have Nigeria's growing economic potentialities affected the calculus of political variations in Africa and the world. In the inquiry, we utilized both quantitative and qualitative data to test our hypotheses. Below we give a summary of our findings.

The variations in foreign policy of the period we have studied are both linearly and curvilinearly related to the changes in the level of economic development. Changes in Gross National Product, Export, Capital Outflow, and Petroleum production explain positively the variations in the foreign policy; while changes in the Balance of Payment, Gross National Product Per Capita and Foreign Reserve are inversely related to

the changes in foreign policy.

Diplomatic personnel and the support for the wars of national liberation in Southern Africa correlate positively with the changes in the fundamental attribute. Military posture has a functional (inverse) relationship with the level of economic development. Nigeria votes less in agreement with the United States at the United Nations on the issues of the Third World as it (Nigeria) experiences a high level of economic development; and tends to vote more in agreement with the Soviet Union on the same issues in the same forum and at the same level of economic development.

Nigeria's economic insurgency has generated a quasi-economic and political independence that has a positive functional relationship with the emerging political consciousness of the African nations. The growing African political activism for the decolonization of the colonial enclaves in the African geopolitics has moved beyond the level of appearances to the level of essence; and concretized in the material (military, political, financial) support given by Nigeria and other African states for the revolutionary social praxis in Southern Africa.

The resultant births of new nations such as

Angola, Mozambique and the impending independence for Zimbabwe are Nigeria's foreign policy outcomes, that is, positive foreign policy accomplishments.

Nigeria's economic assertiveness has generated a semi economic independence that is inversely related to the Ex-Ante economic structure. The extension of loans and aid to some of the needy African states has minimized the economic and political dependency of these states on their former colonial and imperialist masters, and has maximized the economic and political interdependence of the African nations. The formation of the ECOWAS and its positive role in inter-African economic relations are some of the positive accomplishments by Nigeria.

The politicization of the African bloc votes in the United Nations in relation to the major powers is another Nigerian accomplishment. Nigeria's votes in conjunction and disjunction with the super powers on the Third World issues reflect to a large extent the African political stance on those issues that Nigeria that Nigeria cast its votes.

The coalition with the Arab states at the United Nations in the demand for Palestinian autonomy has resulted in the Arab states coalition with the African nations in the demand for the decolonization of Africa.

Nigeria has been at the center of that diplomacy. Nigeria has influenced the production, distribution, and allocation of loans, aid, and grants from the EEC and the OPEC to the African nations in particular and to the Third World at large.

Above all its growing economic strength is inversely related to its neo-colonial economic structure. The relationship has generated a by product -- a radical foreign policy posture. Its radical foreign policy posture is a mix of; 1) aggressive foreign economic policies; 2) political actions and nonactions; and 3) putative and actualized military postures for the negation of colonialism, imperialism, and the elimination of apartheid in the African politectonic zone. Thus, the propensity to generate foreign economic policies, and actualized African economic interdependency, emanates from national economic growth.

Economic imperialism is out of the vocabulary of Nigeria's economic nationalism. Rather it is the national economic growth that generates African political consciousness and revolutionary social praxis for the decolonization of the African continent. The quality of Nigeria's economic relations with other African states confirms this point.

Nigeria's foreign trade is a good indicator of the power or leverage it has been able to exercise in international economic relations. Nigeria's power and influence on the international scene is largely derived from its supply of a critical non-renewable resource (petroleum) with a relatively high inelasticity of demand.

But it must be noted that the structural vulnerability of a monopolistic supply of this commodity is like a double edged sword. The reason being that most economic relationships usually involve the simultaneous existence of both economic vulnerability and economic power for the actors involved. The precise balance depends on the relative costs in changing the relationship for the involved parties. That is, dependence on imported raw materials is a vulnerability, but it is also a source of economic power over an exporting country that may depend upon its foreign earnings from the sale of raw materials to procure necessary military weapons.

The quality of Nigeria's relationships with the other major powers has moved from colonial -- imperial (specifically the United Kingdom) to client -- patron, (particularly with the Western countries) and finally

to equal partners in trade and international politics. The re-alignment of the United States' foreign policy toward Africa, the re-examination of the United Kingdom's dying, old colonial policy and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic's support for the struggle of national liberation in Africa have been greatly influenced by Nigeria's perceived power.

Nigeria's perceived power is a mix of economic capability, critical mass, political capability, military capability, and the strategic will reified as political leadership. Changes in economic capability have a causal inference on changes of other elements of power.

Changes in economic capability have effectuated changes in the international political dimension. The Nigerian-French and Nigerian-German contracts for the construction of the nuclear power plants in Nigeria are results of the changes in the international attitude of these powers toward Nigeria.

Nigeria's economic assertiveness has reconstructed Nigeria's ideological neutrality and redefined it in the context of non-alignment. In essence, then, the level of Nigeria's economic development affects its foreign policy format; and the higher the level of economic development, the lower the

economic and political dependency and the more radical
the foreign policy output.

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